A spatial model (SWAM) for water efficiency and irrigation technology choices :  A case study from Northwestern China by Fang, Lan
FARMING & RURAL SYSTEMS ECONOMICS
edited by Werner Doppler and Siegfried Bauer
VOLUME
53
A Spatial Model (SWAM) 
for Water Efficiency 
and Irrigation 
Technology Choices
A case study from 
Northwestern China
Lan Fang
ISBN 3-8236-1411-8
ISSN 1616-9808
D26
Lan Fang
A Spatial Model (SWAM) for Water Efficiency and Irrigation
Technology Choices
A case study from Northwestern China
edited by
Werner Doppler
Dept. of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics,
University of Hohenheim, Germany
Siegfried Bauer
Dept. of Regional- and Project-Planning,
Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Germany
Bibliographic information published by „Die Deutsche Bibliothek“
Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic
data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de.
Layout
Lan Fang
Printing & Binding
f.u.t. müllerbader gmbh, Filderstadt
© Margraf Publishers GmbH, 2004
Kanalstr. 21, P.O.Box 1205
D-97990 Weikersheim
www.margraf-verlag.de
ISBN 3-8236-1411-8
ISSN 1616-9808 D 26
In the series „Farming and Rural Systems Economics“ methodological and empirical
results of research in the fields of Farming Systems and Rural Development in the Tropics
and Subtropics is published.
Pre-conditions for publication of a manuscript are:
• the research concept is based on systems research and
• it is related to disciplines like agricultural economics, economics, sociology, anthropology
and policy. Manuscripts may be send to Prof. Dr. Werner Doppler, University of
Hohenheim, Department 490C, 70593 Stuttgart, Germany, or through email:  doppler@uni-
hohenheim.de
Preface 
The study is a part of a series of analyses of the farming and rural system economics in China, 
carried out within the DAAD Program “Agricultural Economics and Related Sciences”. This 
PhD thesis and the underlying empirical and methodological research has been supervised by 
Prof. Dr. Ernst-August Nuppenau at the University of Giessen / Germany. The research, 
including a half-year field study, has been done within the period between 1999 and 2003 and 
led to a PhD-Degree for the author.  
In the study a spatial water allocation model, SWAM, was designed to assess the impact of 
public and private investments on water resource allocation and social welfare in an irrigation 
area in northwestern China. The author made use a combination of econometrics and 
mathematical programming approaches for this work. An important feature of the study is to 
use dynamic optimal control theory to model the movements of canal water and groundwater 
in an irrigation area. The results of the model suggest that public investments play a very 
important role in improving water transit efficiency. The private investments in irrigation 
technology will improve on-farm water efficiency significantly. A high water price will 
strongly drive farmers to go for modern irrigation technologies. The study also unveils a 
relationship of combination between public and private investments. They are complementary 
with respect to improving overall water efficiency in an irrigation area, and they are 
substitutional with respect to absolute costs within social welfare. Finally, based on the model 
results, the author recommends a set of policies, which may initiate a more efficient water 
management.  
For the editors: Siegfried Bauer, University of Giessen, Germany 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and problem statement 
Water, as a vital resource for human beings, is increasingly becoming scarce on 
our planet. A United Nation (UN)-sponsored Conference of water experts, held in 
Geneva in February 1999, stated, that in 50 years time, up to 2 billion people 
could face severe water shortages. At least one billion people will be living in 
regions of absolute water scarcity (BBC, 2001). 
Agriculture is the biggest consumer of water. Typically, the major consumption of 
water is irrigated agriculture, which accounts for 73% in both developing and 
developed countries. Industrial consumption accounts for 21% and domestic uses 
account for the rest of 6% (SECKLER, DAVID, DAVID MOLDEN et al., 1999). It 
becomes increasingly important to manage and use water resources more 
efficiently, especially in developing countries. Developing countries possess 75% 
of the world's irrigated land area, and moreover twice as much water is used per 
acre in developing countries than in developed countries, in particular, due to poor 
management (SECKLER et al., 1999). 
China is rich in water resources but its water resources are extremely unevenly 
distributed over the country. China possesses two of the world's longest rivers, the 
Yangtze and the Yellow Rivers with water reserves of total 2,800 billion cubic 
meters (m3). China’s water resources are the fifth richest in the world after Brazil, 
Russia, Canada and the United States. But the uneven distribution of water 
resources in China creates severe water shortages in certain areas of the country. 
In the densely populated areas of southern China, the Yangtze River and the Pearl 
River basins provide a relatively abundant water supply. But areas north of the 
Yangtze River which account for 60% of China's land mass and half of its 
population only receive approximately 20% of the nation's water resources. In 
particular, the northwest region and the northern China Plain often suffer from 
great water shortages (WWW.H2O-CHINA.COM, 2001). 
Managing and utilizing the water resources efficiently is a challenge to China. 
Inefficient use of limited water supply worsens the situation of water shortage. 
China only recycles 20-30% of its industrial water. The water consumption per 
industrial product is 5 to 10 times higher than that in industrialized countries. 
Agriculture consumes approximately 80% of China's water supply, but only about 
57% of this water is used efficiently. The rest is lost due to under-developed 
technology and inefficient management (WWW.H2O-CHINA.COM, 2001). 
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Given limited water resources and inefficient utilization of water, water scarcity 
and mismanagement will certainly hamper the further growing of the Chinese 
economy. How to improve the management of water resources, especially in 
irrigated agriculture, is a great task that Chinese people are facing in the next 
decades.  
1.2 Objectives and hypotheses of the study 
The purpose of this study is, on one hand, to provide policy makers with a 
theoretical and quantitative tool to manage public goods, such as water resources, 
more efficiently and to improve the allocation of water in irrigation projects. On 
the other hand, farmers’ behaviors are taken into account in terms of adoption of 
modern irrigation technology. Hence the objectives of this study are:  
z To determine the optimum amounts of surface and groundwater consumption 
at different locations in an irrigation project. 
z To investigate the efficiency of water conveyance systems supported by public 
investment.  
z To investigate on-farm water use efficiency by analyzing the necessary private 
investment to be undertaken. 
z To explore the relationship between public investment and private investment. 
z To analyze different impacts on the social economy and water resource 
allocation by considering different amounts of public and private investment. 
z To optimize the social welfare of farmers living in an irrigation area. 
In line with these objectives of the study, two main hypotheses are tested: 
1) The efficiency of using water can be improved by adopting modern irrigation 
technologies combined with an increase of public investment in a water 
conveyance system. 
2) If the optimization for an entire watershed is considered, it may be justified to 
allow for significant water losses from the canal and the fields. 
1.3 Presentation of the study 
In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, this dissertation is presented in 
eleven chapters.  
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z Chapter one gives a general introduction to the research background and a 
problem statement as well as the objectives, hypotheses and organization of 
this study.  
z Chapter two explains the research design and describes the socio-economic 
situation, the farming system, and the current status of irrigation in the survey 
area.  
z Chapter three gives a primary analysis of the application of current water 
saving technologies and revenues from apple production. It shows input 
shares of apple production in terms of irrigation fees, labor contribution, 
fertilizer and insecticide expenditures as based on empirical findings of the 
field survey.  
z Chapter four reviews literatures as related to institutional aspects of water 
allocation, definition of water saving, water conveyance, and water 
management as well as the intended modeling approaches. Models used for 
surface water allocation and for groundwater allocation are presented, as well 
as models for a conjunction of water use of surface and groundwater are 
reviewed.  
z Chapter five describes the methodology and the structural framework of the 
study. A spatial water allocation model (SWAM), to be applied in the study, is 
introduced as a spatial mathematic programming model. There are two parts 
in this model. The first part is an estimated econometric model, and the 
second part is a non-linear spatial programming model. The estimated 
econometric model will serve as a component in the programming model 
through a GAMS approach using the parameters of the econometric model.  
z Chapter six presents the results of the econometric model as described in 
chapter 5. In particular the water demand function, the revenue function and 
the on-farm water efficiency function as well as the canal water loss function 
will be documented in this chapter.  
z Chapter seven specifies the organization of the programming model. Relevant 
definitions, variables, and equations are presented there. The objective 
function and constrain conditions are also presented in this chapter. The 
maximization of social welfare and some indicators, such as quantity of water 
consumption, length of canal, revenue, land rent as well as water rent, will be 
solved through the modeling process.  
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z Chapter eight starts to present scenarios results. The selected scenarios explore 
the impacts of changing status of public investment on social welfare and 
water resource allocation.  
z Chapter nine investigates the impacts of different distribution of private 
investment on social welfare and water resource allocation.  
z Chapter ten investigates the impacts of price regime change on social welfare 
and water resource allocation.  
z Chapter eleven summaries the main findings of the study. Policy 
recommendations and further research are also discussed in this chapter. 
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2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND GENERAL 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE STUDY AREA 
This chapter presents the research design and offers general information about the 
study area. The research design includes the selection of the study area, the 
sample, and the questionnaire design. The general information about the 
geographical and socio-economic situation as well as a description of different 
kinds of technologies, applied in the study area, are presented in this chapter.  
2.1 Research design 
2.1.1 Selection of the case study area 
Since the present study has two main goals to achieve through scenario design 
and optimization, the study area was selected for special purposes. One goal is to 
provide theoretical and quantitative support to policy makers to better allocate and 
manage irrigation projects in China. The other goal is to give suggestions to 
farmers to apply suitable water saving technologies. To achieve these goals, the 
case study selected, has mainly to fulfill the following criteria (AGRAWAL, 
EMRICH, FECHTER-ESCAMILLA et al., 1993): 
z It should cover a relatively comprehensive irrigation system with advanced 
irrigation agriculture. 
z It should cover all kinds of different irrigation technologies, i.e., from 
traditional technology to modern technology. 
z It should be well documented, in order to facilitate the necessary work in a 
field survey. For instance, there should be proper records available in the 
administration of water resource management as well as in the villages. 
z It should have a dominant cropping pattern because of requirements for 
simplification of the model. 
According to these mentioned criteria, the Liquan County of Shaanxi province 
was selected as the study area. The work will show that it has been a right place to 
carry out the survey. 
2.1.2 Sample and questionnaire design and interview conduct 
The research started with a farm-family-household survey. In the 
farm-family-household survey, a simple random technique was applied. There 
were 149 interviews conducted in the field survey. Farmers in the irrigation area 
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were questioned according to the designed questionnaire. Two different 
questionnaires were administered, aiming at two different groups of people. One 
was designed for a group of farmers, who are located in the irrigation area; the 
other was designed for a group of employees of water management institutions. 
By this approach, different aspects of the irrigation system could be covered. 
The questionnaire for farmers consists of two parts. The first part is related to 
farm characteristics, the second part is related to water use information. For 
instance, in the first part, the demography of the household, family characteristics, 
labor force, farmland, outlay, on-farm and off-farm income, agricultural inputs, 
credit and savings are listed. In the second part, irrigation fees, expenditures for 
purchasing modern irrigation equipment, expenditure of digging a tube well, and 
distances from the water source to the farm-gate are considered. 
The questionnaire, aiming at public institutions, consists of information 
concerning water resource allocation and management. Problems with the current 
water management systems and potentials for improvement are also taken into 
consideration. This questionnaire is less complicated, as compared to that for the 
farmers. Furthermore, information regarding the existing irrigation systems was 
collected from published or unpublished materials and documents, all from 
relevant water institutions. A few interviews were made with government officials 
and technical staffs at departments of water resource management. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Shaanxi Province, China 
Source: Map Press, China 
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2.2 General information about the study area 
2.2.1 Geographical and demographic information  
about the Shaanxi Province 
Shaanxi province is situated in the northwest part of China, as shown in Figure 
2.1. It extends approximately from 105°29″ to 111°15″ east longitude and from 
31°42″ to 39°35″ north latitude. It is 200-500 kilometers (km) wide from east to 
west, and 870 km long from north to south. It covers an area of 205,600 square 
kilometer (km2). It is bordered by Shanxi and Henan provinces in the east, Hubei 
and Sichuan provinces in the south, Gansu province and Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region in the west, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region in the 
north. The province is divided into two river basins by the Qinling Mountain. The 
southern area of Qinling Mountain lies in the Yangtze river basin, which covers an 
area of 72,302 km2, i. e. 35.2% of the total area of the province; whereas the 
northern area lies in the Yellow River basin covering an area of 133,301 km2, i. e 
64.8% of the total area. Shaanxi province is divided into 10 districts, 107 counties 
and 2,135 townships. The total population is about 34 million. The population 
density is 169 people per km2. Among the total population, about 27 million are 
farmers, i. e. 77.5% of the population (SHAANXI PROVINCIAL STATISTIC BUREAU, 
2000). 
The climate in the Shaanxi province is of a continental monsoon type. It is dry 
and cold in winter, relatively humid and hot in summer. Rainfall in this area 
normally concentrates in between July and September. Rainstorm and drought 
occur very often. According to different characteristics of the climate, the whole 
province is divided into three different climatic areas: temperate, semi-arid zone 
in northern Shaanxi, temperate, semi-humid zone in Guanzhong Basin and a 
sub-tropical humid zone in southern Shaanxi. The average annual rainfall in this 
province is about 676.4 millimeters (mm). Due to the geographical differences, 
the precipitation is unevenly distributed in the region. In the north which is 
located along the Great Wall, the average annual precipitation is 463.4 mm, 
whereas Guanzhong area receives 670.9 mm per year, and the south i.e., in 
Qinling–Daba Mountain area can be up to 925.3 mm per year. The evaporation 
also varies from region to region. It is 1000-1400 mm in the northern region, 
900-1200 mm in Guanzhong region, and 800-900 mm in the south. The highest 
evaporation is observed in the northern desert area, soaring to 1400 mm annually 
(SHAANXI PROVINCIAL WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OFFICE, 1997). 
As a less-developed province, the agricultural sector still plays an important role 
in Shannxi's economy. By 1999, the provincial GDP reached 18 billion US Dollar,  
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of which the contributions of agriculture, industry and service sectors were 18%, 
43% and 39%, respectively (SHAANXI PROVINCIAL STATISTIC BUREAU, 2000). 
2.2.2 Irrigated agriculture in the Shaanxi Province 
Shaanxi has a long history of irrigation agriculture. Irrigation agriculture existed 
already two thousand years ago in the area. Some frameworks of the old canal 
system still serve today’s agricultural activities. There are 13.4 million hectares of 
irrigated land in this province, which account for 38% of the whole cultivated 
land of the province (DEPARTMENT OF WATER CONSERVANCY OF SHAANXI 
PROVINCE, 1997). The province is planning to become one of the main cereal and 
fruit production areas in China. A well-run irrigation system will be the most 
important premise to reach this goal.  
Water shortage and inefficiency of water use coexist in this region. Most 
interesting is the Guanzhong Basin. Guanzhong Basin is the most important cereal 
and fruit production base in Shaanxi province, and it accounts for 75% of 
effectively irrigated area of the province. It also contributes more than 70% of 
GDP in the Shaanxi province, but it is severely short of water. The water demand 
in this region is 7.4 billion cubic meters (m3) a year (SHAANXI PROVINCIAL WATER 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OFFICE, 1997). The current capacity of water resources 
basically can only supply 5.5 billion m3 of water in a year. There exists a gap of 
1.9 billion m3 water annually. Meanwhile, in the three major irrigation areas of 
Shaanxi province - Jing River, Wei-River and Luo River area, the seepage rates of 
water transport by canals are normally up to 0.4-0.5% per km. The amount of 
these annual water losses would be sufficient to irrigate an increased area of 
100,000 hectares of land. In addition, compared to water availability, this means 
that about 50% of water is lost in water conveyance system 
(WWW.IRIGATE.COM.CN, 2001). Another type of water loss is on-farm water loss. 
High rate of on-farm water loss indicates that most farmers in the region are 
accustomed to perform traditional flood and furrow irrigation techniques. This 
causes a lot of water waste and also crop damages occur. The water resources and 
the irrigation system in the area, consequently, need an improvement and better 
management. 
2.2.3 Description of the actual area of case study area, Liquan County 
It was not possible reasonably well to study the entire region and therefore a 
county, known as Liquan, was chosen for intensive studies. Liquan County is 
located in the north of the Guanzhong Basin and has a typical irrigated 
agricultural area. It was chosen as the case study area.  
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2.2.3.1 Physical and socio-economic situation in Liquan County 
The county lies in the north of the Guanzhong Basin of Shannxi province. It 
covers 1,010 km2, of which 56,667 hectares is arable land. The irrigated land is 
39,200 hectares, which account for 70% of the total cultivated land. The county 
extends from 108°17′40″ to 108°41′46″ east longitude, and from 34°20′51″to 
34°50′02″ north latitude. Precipitation in Liquan County is 558mm annually. 
Historically it was a typical rain-fed agricultural area and suffered from frequent 
drought, almost once every two years. By 1999 the population was 446,800, 
among them the rural population accounts for 406,200, i. e, 90.9% of the total 
population. The population density is 442 people per km2 (BUREAU OF WATER 
RESOURCES OF LIQUAN COUNTY, 1999). 
2.2.3.2 The Farming system in Liquan County 
In the last decades, agriculture has developed quickly thanks to a good 
performance of the irrigation system in this area. Liquan County used to be one of 
the most important cereal production bases in Shaanxi province up to the 1980s. 
Still convenient water access secured agricultural production. However, the grain 
price in China has decreased year by year since the 1990's. Farmers could not get 
sufficient returns from their cereal products, which they sold to the market or to 
the government. Due to too high costs and low returns from grain production, 
some educated farmers converted their conventional grain production to fruit 
production. At first, this conversion occurred in the northern area, in which the 
irrigation system is close to end and farmers have relatively poorer access to get 
cheap water. Other basic inputs, such as fertilizer and insecticides were expensive 
as compared to those situated in the southern plain. The miracle was that farmers 
who converted to apple production got quite good returns from selling apples as 
compared to those still engaged in cereal production. After some years, the apple 
production became more and more popular in this county. Till now, Liquan 
County has become the largest apple production area in Shaanxi province. It is 
now known as a specialization area of apple production. The change in the 
farming system demonstrates that farmers start to convert production inputs, such 
as water, fertilizer, labor, etc, from a low-valued conventional grain to a 
high-valued crop production, such as fruit-trees and vegetables. In terms of water 
use efficiency, this is exactly what the water management institutions have long 
been trying to achieve: to persuade farmers to use water more efficiently and 
convert water into high-valued crops rather than low-value products. Though, a 
win-win situation occurs, economic and agronomic water efficiency has to be 
distinguished.  
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One notable point is, thanks to their early-start of apple production, that farmers 
located at the northern tail area have been finally better off, and some of them 
even are more wealthy than those living in the southern plain area of the study 
area. The major reason for this current situation is that it normally needs 3 to 5 
years for a young apple tree to be able to bring an income to the farmers, and 
farmers situated in the upper southern plain started to grow apple only after they 
had seen the higher returns achieved by their counterparts in the northern 
downstream area. This indicates that the farmers located at the northern area 
benefited from apple production at least three years earlier than those in the 
southern plain area. And moreover, during that early time period the supply of 
apples was far less from meeting the demand so that the farmers received very 
good selling prices. One can also often find that a farmer living in the northern 
area is better equipped with farming machines than a farmer living in the southern 
plain. This is a general observation while doing interviews in the survey area. 
Naturally this kind of phenomenon cannot last long. After apple production 
becomes popular over the whole survey area, things will change. The average 
profit of apple production would doubtlessly go down after more farmers entered 
into the market. On the one side, it is the ever-growing apple supply, whereas the 
demand for apple cannot grow forever to meet the excessive supply. This certainly 
brings the price down. It implies that the farmers located at the upper southern 
plain, who started late to grow apples, might get by and large 2 years good return 
from that apple production, only. Nowadays the competition becomes even fiercer. 
However, the market of apples will not be involved in the present study due to 
limitations in the research scope. Nevertheless, the message delivered should be 
clear: in the survey area some farmers at the northern tail are already better off 
than those at the upper southern plain. This provided an opportunity for them, to 
afford costly modern irrigation technologies.  
2.2.3.3 The Public irrigation network and problem statement in Liquan County 
Liquan County has a relatively well-managed irrigation network. Public irrigation 
facilities ensure and promote the agricultural production potential for irrigation. 
This causes some conflicts between farmers and water management institutions 
and between farmers themselves. Farmers located close to the water source are 
used to applying flood irrigation thanks to the relative convenience of cheap 
access to the irrigation system. Contrary, those who are located distant from the 
water source cannot get sufficient water to irrigate their crops. In response to this 
problem, groundwater use has risen considerably. This not only makes the burden 
of water costs heavier but also potentially increases the probability of decline of 
the water table. A decline in the water table further increases water costs.  
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2.2.3.4 Specification of application of irrigation technologies and 
 their application in the study area 
In Liquan County, all kinds of irrigation technologies can be found: Traditional 
flood irrigation, locally produced seepage irrigation (also called locally produced 
drip irrigation) and modern irrigation technologies, such as drip and sprinkler 
irrigation technologies. They coexist in the area. Farmers, whose fields are located 
near the public canal, have convenient water access and get relatively cheap 
water. They normally apply conventional surface irrigation technologies, such as 
flood irrigation and border irrigation (also called furrow irrigation). Farmers 
living far away from the public canal are more likely to apply small-scale surface 
irrigation, such as basin check irrigation, or they use locally produced low cost 
seepage irrigation facilities. Modern water saving technologies, such as sprinkler 
and drip irrigation can also be found mostly, where farmers have heavily invested. 
Even dry land farming is an option for the poorest farmers. Again as explained 
before, all farmers use the expected water supply for high value tree-crops, for 
instance, apples and pears. On a certain area, they irrigate and leave the remaining 
land either fallow or plant drought resistant crops. Low-value crops are only 
planted occasionally in the hope there might be unexpected rainfall. In the present 
study, farmers perceived food security as dependent on high apple yields and 
apples are sold for food crops. Due to limited land, this means that water and 
irrigation schemes strongly contribute to survival and are a basis for rural 
livelihood. Meanwhile most farmers plant only very few conventional food crops, 
like maize and wheat. Rather, they buy food from local markets. 
To get the understanding of technologies prevalent, one hundred and forty-nine 
interviews were conducted in the area. Among them, 75 farmers applied flood 
irrigation, 16 farmers applied border irrigation, 11 farmers applied seepage 
irrigation, 21 farmers applied basin check irrigation, 7 farmers applied sprinkler 
irrigation, 11 farmers applied drip irrigation, and 8 farmers applied dry land 
farming. Moreover, the character of different kinds of technologies is specified 
below:  
Flood irrigation is a traditional surface irrigation technique in China. It is 
characterized by low labor input and simple technical requirements. But, water is 
wasted to a large extent, and water logging can occur. Increased salinity and 
alkalization are by-products of flood irrigation. The coefficient of water use is 
only 40-50%. 
Border and basin check irrigation techniques are also a kind of flood irrigation but 
with smaller scale and more labor intensive. It works like this: a big plot of field 
is divided into some much smaller sized plots in order to retain water. Normally 
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this technique requires much more labor and some additional costs as compared to 
flood irrigation. The coefficient of water use efficiency is around 45-60%. 
Seepage irrigation technique, which is also called locally produced drip irrigation, 
functions like modern drip irrigation, but it doesn’t require such expenses as the 
costly purchase of equipment for drip irrigation. Rather simple tubes with holes 
are used. The utility coefficient of water is around 70-80%. Its main shortcoming 
is that tiny sands or soil easily plugs holes where water can seep. 
Sprinkler irrigation is one type of modern irrigation technology. It is characterized 
by a production increase of 20-40% and less salinity. It has a higher efficiency in 
water use, which reaches approximately 80%. Another advantage is the saving of 
cultivated land by 15-20% due to the water transport on the field without furrows, 
ridging, ditches or paths in the fields.  
Modern drip irrigation is currently considered the most advanced and effective 
irrigation technology in the region. It is characterized by a very high production 
capacity, increasing the efficiency of water use up to approximately 95%. 
Fertilizer can be at the same time added to the water during irrigation. The effect 
of fertilizer can increase production by more than 100%. At the same time, 
salinity is reduced due to low drainage needs. 
2.3 Summary 
The background and preparing work for the field study have been presented in 
this chapter. General information about field study area and especially the applied 
irrigation technologies in the survey area have also been specified. The main 
findings of field research will be presented in the next chapter. 
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3 FIELD SURVEY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The field research was conducted from August 2000 to January 2001 in the 
Liquan County of Shaanxi province, China. It was done during the harvest time of 
apples. 149 farmers were interviewed with respect to their production and 
irrigation activities. Since many farmers do not sell the apples till next year 
February (the time period of the Chinese New Year, e.g., when they can get a 
better price than selling the apples right after harvest), it was not possible to 
enquire the situation of revenue in the same year. The data on prices employed in 
the present study are from the previous agricultural year (1999), and they 
depended mainly on farmer’s memory because proper paper records were not 
available. However the necessary information about production, inputs and other 
elements was collected from the previous (1999) and the current year (2000) and 
as reference materials recorded. All the information collected from farmers had 
been verified by local experts before they were incorporated into the database of 
the study. In order to avoid errors, as much as possible, double checks were 
carried out.  
3.1 Specification of farmer groups by categories  
Since the purpose of the study is to value the impacts of private and public 
investment on social welfare and water resource allocations of farmers by taking 
the water use efficiency into account, this aspect receives a major focus. In this 
study the concept of water use efficiency contains two aspects. One is the 
efficiency of the water conveyance system and the other is on-farm water use 
efficiency. In most countries, the water conveyance system is constructed and 
operated by the government, i.e., the public sector, and the improvement of the 
on-farm water use efficiency is mainly carried out by individual farmers, i.e., the 
private sector. While the data from field research concerning public investment 
came mainly from official documents and relevant literature, the main data for the 
private sector were gathered by interviews with individual farmers. 
From the 149 farm interviews, every farm household has its characteristics and 
diversity. To better describe the situation and analyze farm behavior of individual 
farmers, clear categorization, in particular on technologies are needed. Since 
private investment in irrigation technologies is a key factor in this study, and it is 
represented by monetary costs, e.g., costs in line with various irrigation 
technologies, investments for technologies can serve as a qualified categorization 
to fulfill the research requirements of stratified description.  
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Based on irrigation technologies adopted, the interviewed farmers were divided 
into eight categories as specified below: 
Category A: Farmers who apply flood irrigation. 
Category B: Farmers who apply border irrigation (furrow irrigation). 
Category C: Farmers who apply basin check irrigation. 
Category D: Farmers who apply seepage irrigation. 
Category E: Farmers who apply sprinkler irrigation. 
Category F: Farmers who apply drip irrigation. 
Category G: Farmers who apply dry land farming. 
The following empirical analysis of this chapter will be undertaken with these 
farmer group categories. 
3.2 The actual irrigation schemes in the study area 
As mentioned before, the Liquan County has a relatively advanced irrigation 
system and a long history of irrigated agriculture. There are three irrigation 
categories in Liquan County according to the ownership and execution. They can 
be classified as the public category, the community category and the private 
category. 
Under the public category, there are two irrigation schemes. One is owned and 
managed directly by the BUREAU OF WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, 
Liquan County, named the local scheme. It is characterized by small-scale 
irrigation networks, such as combinations of several public pumping stations and 
public tube wells. It normally charges farmers with a very low water rate, in 
particular due to huge subsidization from the county administration. For instance, 
this scheme used to charge farmers for water based on how much land they own, 
instead of how much water they use, i.e., a farmer would be charged the same 
price if he has the same farm size as compared to his neighbor, no matter how 
much water he uses. This certainly results in high water use in the covered area. 
Because of that problem, this method has been basically abandoned due to its 
encouragement of wasting water. It may be used only in the off-season in order to 
encourage farmers to use water. Farmers are interested to be covered by this 
network due to its low costs. Unfortunately it can only supply a certain small area 
due to the limited infrastructure.  
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The next irrigation scheme is owned and operated by the BUREAU OF BAO JI 
XIA IRRIGATION NETWORK MANAGEMENT, which is one of the largest 
irrigation projects in Shaanxi Province. It covers 4 counties, and is named the 
provincial scheme. It irrigates 37,333 hectares of land in Liquan County. The 
amount of water received through this network is equivalent to 160 mm 
precipitation annually (Office Of Water Resources Management Of Liquan 
County, 1993). This scheme charges farmers a relatively high though socially 
acceptable water price based on the quantity of water delivered to them. In 
comparison the water price charged by BAO JI XIA IRRIGATION NETWORK 
can roughly be twice the price charged by the local scheme, but it is still on some 
50% of the water generation costs (YANG, 1996). 
Next with regards to a community scheme, which is the second category, we have 
an irrigation system that is owned and operated by a village or a small town. It is 
characterized by three criteria: low pumping capacity, low technical level and low 
operation costs. Normally a scheme consists of one small scale pumping station 
and several small sub-watercourses. It can deliver water to one or two villages. 
There is no permanent staff employed in such a scheme. A few skilled farmers do 
the routine operation and maintenance with low payment. Consequently it can 
supply the cheapest water to farmers as compared to the other schemes, though 
the capacity is limited.  
The private category, which contains three different schemes, is completely 
owned and operated by individual farmers. Specifically in this study, such scheme 
refers to farmers who apply basin check irrigation, seepage irrigation, and some 
sprinkler irrigation and drip irrigation.  
The first scheme of private category refers to those farmers, who apply basin 
check irrigation, pump water directly to their fields. Typically such a scheme is 
characterized by its small scale and it can only irrigate one or two Mu1. Electricity 
or diesel costs are the only irrigation expenses for these farmers besides digging 
costs and labor costs. As a second scheme, we have farmers without direct access 
to water. But they can buy water. For many farmers, who apply seepage irrigation, 
the situation is much different from privileged farmers. Since they have no surface 
water and no groundwater access, water has to be transported. They need to 
transport water from the water source outside the village to their fields. Naturally 
they have to pay the highest price for irrigation as compared to other farmers. And 
normally their unit water costs (including transportation fee) can be 10 times 
higher than those for water from the local scheme or the community scheme.  
                                                        
1 Chinese land measurement, 1 Mu=1/15 hectare  
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Finally farmers using modern sprinkler and drip irrigation, are covered by two big 
private groundwater suppliers. This is the third scheme. The area where they live 
is a mountainous area, which is too far away to be served by the public canal 
water schemes. The two farmers are exceptions. Normally it is too costly to afford 
a deep well for an average farmer. Many farmers without cheap facilities buy 
water from the private tubewell owners. Farmers are charged a relative high water 
price as compared to those living in public water schemes. However, basin check 
irrigation users, who have their own private shallow tubewells, also think that 
costs for pumping are high. 
3.3 Empirical findings and main results 
The primary data, which were collected during the field survey, were analyzed by 
using Microsoft Excel and the statistical software SPSS. Major results are 
presented in this section. 
3.3.1 Demographic and socio-economic characteristics of sample farmers 
3.3.1.1 Land holding and family size 
China's household responsibility system has increased agricultural productivity in 
rural China twice and production has redoubled since 1980’s. But it also brought 
some side effects in rural areas, such as declining size of fields' plots. Since the 
land was divided into small pieces to every farm household from the former 
collective cultivation system, land is now scarce. Such effects have become more 
and more obvious and serious in recent years. It hinders the development of 
agriculture's modernization and specialization. Liquan County is not an exception, 
it is located in an area with a population density of 442 persons per square 
kilometer, and the cultivated land is only 2.1 Mu per capita. The features of the 
interviewed farmers with respect to farm size are given in Table 3.1  
Table 3.1 demonstrates that family size and farm size are small in the investigated 
irrigation scheme. The average family size is 4.0-5.2 persons in the survey area. 
The age of the head of household is considerably young. The average age of the 
household head is less than 47 years among all different farmer categories. Land 
holding per person in farmer Category A and B are lowest among the interviewed 
farmers due to higher population density. Farmers in these two categories are 
situated at the area of the upper portion of canals. They are traditionally well-off 
groups due to better natural and irrigation conditions. Surface irrigation 
technologies are most prevalent in this area. Farmers in Category G are lower in 
land holding per person, but the reason is much different from that in Category A  
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Table 3.1: Farm and family characteristics of the interviewed farmers based on  
adoption of technologies 
Farmer 
Category 
Average farm 
Size (Mu) 
Average family
Size (number) 
Land holdings 
per person (Mu)
Average age of 
head of household 
A 6.50 4.41 1.30 43.00 
B 6.77 5.19 1.47 45.00 
C 7.17 4.48 1.60 46.00 
D 13.18 4.90 2.69 47.00 
E 15.43 4.86 3.18 41.00 
F 14.68 4.45 3.30 39.00 
G 7.50 4.00 1.88 41.00 
Notes: 1Mu= 1/15 Hectare 
A: Flood irrigation users; B: Border irrigation users; C: Basin check irrigation users; 
D: Seepage irrigation users; E: Sprinkler irrigation users; F: Drip irrigation users; 
G: Dry-land farming users 
and B. Category G is worst in welfare, it is the category with the lowest income 
among all the interviewed farmers. They are located in the hilly area where there 
is shortage of land and water. That is the main reason why the farm size is small 
in category G. Neither public nor community irrigation schemes reach them.  
Farmers in Category C are located at the lower portion of the irrigation area. Their 
landholding per person is equally low due to relatively higher population density 
and limited land resources. Next farmers in Category E and F have almost double 
landholding per person compared with the other farmer categories. They are 
located at the tail portion of the irrigation area, which implies lower land rents. 
Because of poor access to public canals and high water costs, land is cheap. Some 
farmers in this area can perform economies of scale in apple production thanks to 
relatively cheap land. This is the reason why the land holding per person of 
category E and F is at a higher level, as compared to the other farmer categories. 
Economy of scale in production lowers the production cost and hence offers 
farmers a better return. It also makes it possible for them to afford more modern 
water saving technologies.  
3.3.1.2 Levels of education in the study area 
To a certain point, farmers’ education levels determine their well-being. Education 
increases the likelihood of adoption of new irrigation technologies in the study 
area. Figure 3.1 describes the situation as based on different farmer categories. 
Farmers in category A and B are the biggest groups to apply traditional surface 
irrigation. Half of them have finished elementary school, and less than half have 
finished middle school, meaning that still few of them are illiterate. Farmers in  
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Figure 3.1: Education levels of farmer household heads 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of farmland for different farm activities 
category D, E and F are better educated, 60-70% of them have middle school 
education and some of them received high school education. This can be a reason 
why they are more likely to adopt new water saving and environmentally more 
friendly technologies. Farmers in category G have the lowest education level 
among all categories partially due to their poor economic background. 10% of 
them are illiterate, 70% of them finished only elementary school and only 5% of 
them have some high school education.  
3.3.2 Production activities in the study area 
Apple production is the dominant agricultural activity in the study area. Figure 3.2 
describes the distribution of farmland for different farm activities. It is apparent 
that 79% of the land is used to produce apples, at least, among the interviewed 
farmers, 12% of land is still used to produce cereals. The remaining 9% is taken 
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for other fruit production, such as pears, peaches, grapes, etc. The economic 
background behind this land allocation is quite simple. Fruit production can 
deliver better returns compared to traditional cereal production. Furthermore, that 
apple production in the study area is fairly developed. Moreover there is a 
well-informed network for marketing and transportation to support production. At 
harvest time, plenty of business individuals and groups gather in market places 
and purchase fruits from farmers. Some big farmers have had already contracts 
with them in the previous year. Thanks to reliability and good co-operation 
between market purchasers and apple growers, those business contacts have 
developed over years. They are already different kinds of modern "company plus 
farmer" arrangements and this might be a future way for rural China's 
modernization with respect to agriculture. Though some farmers kept cereal 
production to fully utilize their land, it is observed that the land for cereal 
production is normally small and unfertilized, and it is given less care as 
compared to fruit production. Cereal output is usually small, and cannot meet the 
need of farmer household's consumption. Buying food from the local market is 
very common in the study area. Consequently specialization in apple production 
boosts the development of local grain markets due to the huge demand from the 
farm side (rural population accounts for 90.9 % of total population in this county). 
The suppliers of the local grain market are dominated by neighbor counties, 
where grain production is still the major production activity. The specialization of 
apple production, in return, helps to raise the specialization of grain production in 
neighbor counties. As a general observation, specialization is beneficiary to 
farmers. Consumption figures show clearly that food security is meanwhile 
ensured by specialization of commercial agriculture (BUREAU OF STATISTIC, 
2000). 
3.3.3 The credit market in the study area 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 investigate the credit situation. Small-sized and poor farmers 
can hardly get loan from formal financial institutions, such as China Agriculture 
Bank, though it is possible. Most of them cannot meet the security requirements 
and cannot carry out the complicated procedure to apply for a loan. Additionally, 
it is difficult for them to raise any asset as a mortgage to the bank. That's why 
small-sized farmers intend to seek financial support from informal credit sources. 
Sources are relatives, friends and moneylenders. As mentioned already, a big 
portion of poor farmers belongs to category A, B, C and G, who are surface 
irrigation and dry-land farming users. Only less than 5% of them got a loan from 
formal institutions. More than 80% of the financial needs were borrowed from 
informal institutions including individuals. Children's education and mainly  
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Table 3.2: Source of credit and contribution  
Farmer category No credit (%) Formal institutions (%) Informal institutions (%)
A 15.50 1.50 83.00 
B 16.40 2.00 81.60 
C 14.30 3.00 82.70 
D 55.10 10.00 34.90 
E 78.90 21.10 0.00 
F 82.40 17.60 0.00 
G 9.20 0.00 90.80 
Notes: A: Flood irrigation users; B: Border irrigation users; C: Basin check irrigation users; 
D: Seepage irrigation users; E: Sprinkler irrigation users; F: Drip irrigation users; 
G: Dry-land farming users 
Table 3.3: Distribution of credit use  
Farmer category Children's education (%) 
Housing 
(%)
Farm 
inputs (%)
Irrigation 
equipment (%) 
Health 
care (%)
A 40.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 40.00
B 35.00 15.00 15.00 0.00 35.00
C 34.00 10.00 20.00 20.00 16.00
D 30.00 15.00 18.00 27.00 10.00
E 0.00 21.10 0.00 60.00 18.90
F 0.00 17.60 0.00 72.00 10.40
G 50.00 15.00 15.00 0.00 20.00
Notes: A: Flood irrigation users; B: Border irrigation users; C: Basin check irrigation users; 
D: Seepage irrigation users; E: Sprinkler irrigation users; F: Drip irrigation users; 
G: Dry-land farming users 
family health care are the main purposes of credit, and they account for more than 
50% of the credit use. It is also observed that credit investment in irrigation 
technologies is irrelevant among the four farmer categories A, B, C and G. The 
economic situation of these farmers is vulnerable. They hardly can get a loan from 
the official credit system, and meanwhile, have to pay a much higher interest rate 
to informal credit markets. However, credit problems harm the farmer's interests. 
The situation for farmers in category D, E and F, who are modern irrigation 
technology users, is different. They have a higher probability to get access to 
official bank loans since they are relatively better off and can offer mortgage on 
their own assets. The credit use of farmers in these three categories is more 
concentrated on irrigation equipment and housing. Children's education fees and 
family health care play a minor role. Better economic situations lead to more 
financial resources, and advocate further improvement of the economic situation. 
Presumably, the income gap between farmers in category E, F, D and farmers in 
category A, B, C and G is getting bigger. This matter will be investigated more 
intensively in the coming section.  
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3.3.4 Distribution of farm income and off-farm income in the study area 
In recent years, non-farm incomes have gained additional shares in farmers’ total 
incomes. Non-farm incomes become more crucial for farmers especially, in case 
they get a bad harvest year. For small-sized and poor farmers, Non-farm income is 
the main financial resource for them to offset budget deficits. Table 3.4 shows the 
situation among the farmers interviewed. Farm income still has the biggest share 
as compared to non-farm incomes. A remarkable phenomenon is observed for 
farmer category E and F, who are in a better economic situation. Most of their 
non-farm income is from business, such as performance of transportation. Other 
business or operation, such as refresh-keeping for local apple growers and 
marketing is common. However, the sources of non-farm income for small-sized 
and poor farmers are mostly from cheap labor, offered to urban areas, during 
off-season of agricultural activities.  
Table 3.4: Distribution of annual farm income and non-farm income  
Farmer 
Category 
Off-farm income 
(Yuan) 
Off-farm income 
(%)
Farm income 
(Yuan) 
Farm income 
(%)
A 1500.00 30.00 3500.00 70.00
B 2000.00 37.04 3400.00 62.96
C 2400.00 46.15 2800.00 53.85
D 4800.00 48.98 5000.00 51.02
E 30000.00 40.00 45000.00 60.00
F 40000.00 44.44 50000.00 55.56
G 1000.00 31.65 2160.00 68.35
Notes: A: Flood irrigation users; B: Border irrigation users; C: Basin check irrigation users; 
D: Seepage irrigation users; E: Sprinkler irrigation users; F: Drip irrigation users; 
G: Dry-land farming users 
3.3.5 Irrigation activities and apple production in the study area 
3.3.5.1 Irrigation technologies, quantity and quality analysis of apple production  
The output levels for apples are determined by many inputs. They are not only 
linked to water use. There are also some other important input elements 
influencing it. However while doing interviews, it has been observed that there 
were no big differences in the use of fertilizer, pesticides and labor per unit land 
among different farmer categories. The big differences among them are found 
with regard to water consumption. Considering this situation, Figure 3.3 
investigates the output levels based on different farmer categories. Figure 3.3 
surprisingly shows that big differences of apple yields exist among different 
farmer categories. For instance, farmers in category G, who operate dry land  
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Figure 3.3: Apple yields based on different farmer category 
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Figure 3.4: Apple prices based on different farmer category 
farming, have the lowest apple yields among all the interviewed farmers (nearly 
three times lower than category F, who operate drip irrigation technique). Also it 
is merely half of the yields harvested by farmers in the D category, seepage 
irrigation users. Because the farmers in the G category have not irrigated, their 
outputs completely rely on limited and irregular rainfall. By contrast, drip 
irrigation makes it possible that up to 95 % of water can reach the roots of the 
apple trees. Moreover fertilizer can be fully absorbed by trees by adding it to the 
water during irrigation. This is the reason why such a huge yield difference 
between the two farmer categories occurs.  
Farmers in A, B, and C are surface irrigation users. No big yield differences are 
observed among these three categories. Farmers in D, the seepage irrigation users, 
have also considerably higher yields as compared with surface irrigation users. It 
has to be mentioned that the quality of apples improves with irrigation. Quality  
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between water price and quantity of water consumption 
differences are mirrored by apple selling prices for different farmer groups. 
Modern technology users achieve a higher output price due to a better quality of 
apples. As shown in Figure 3.4, Farmers in category G (Dry land farmers) get the 
lowest apple price. The apple price for farmer categories E and F (sprinkler and 
drip irrigation users) can be up to 4.93 and 5.57 folds of that for farmers in the G 
category. Apart from the extreme case of category G, apple prices for farmer 
categories E and F are still up to 4.05 and 4.58 folds of that for farmers in the A 
category, the traditional flood irrigation users.  
The big quantity and quality differences of apple production indicate, that the 
right way to get maximum production and best quality of fruits, with respect to 
water use, is to use more high-frequency irrigation instead of using traditional 
irrigation at fairly long intervals (HERVE PLUSQUELLEC, CHARLES BURT, & HANS 
W.WOLTER, 1992). Schemes, such as drip and sprinkler, seem to increase revenue 
over proportionally. 
3.3.5.2 Water consumption and water price 
Water consumption varies while water prices are changing. Figure 3.5 shows the 
relationship between the water used per Mu and the water price paid. The higher 
the water price is, the less water will be applied. Farmers in category G are an 
extreme case. They have to pay a sky-high water price, i.e., more than 20 Yuan 
(2.44 USD)/m3 (which is perhaps unaffordable for others due to transportation 
cost). They want to water their apple trees, but prices are too high. That is why 
they gave up irrigation and went for dry land farming. Farmers in A and B have 
better access to cheap water so they consume more water than other categories. 
The water consumption by categories A and B, on average, can be up to 200 
m3/Mu. Next, since farmers in categories E and F have to pay considerably high  
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Figure 3.6: Relationship between distance and water price 
water prices, modern water saving technologies are alternatives for them, and are 
attractive. Farmers in D pay the highest water price among all interviewed 
farmers (except G) since the water price for this group includes transportation 
costs. It is understandable that they consume the least amount of water among all 
irrigation farmers. Nevertheless this farmer category still gets considerably good 
returns compared with categories A, B and C due to the adoption of water saving 
technologies. 
3.3.5.3 Distance and water price 
We have seen that the water price and water consumption is significantly 
connected. The reason is that the water price increases with locations farther away 
from the water source. Due to increased lining and operation costs, transport costs 
matter very much. The relationship between the water price and the distance from 
farm-gate to source based on different farmer categories, is presented in Figure 
3.6. It clearly shows, that the two categories (distance and water price) are 
following a similar path. The water price is fairly low within 10 kilometers from 
the water source. Importantly, farmers in categories A, B and C are all located in 
this region. All of them operate surface irrigation. Farmers in categories D, E and 
F are located in an area more than 10 kilometers away from the water source. 
Most of them have adopted modern technologies to save water. Then, especially, 
farmers in the category D need to transport water from the water source to their 
tanks in the fields. Long distance leads to longer water conveyance, and longer 
conveyance leads to higher water costs (either by tractor or public canals). The 
higher water costs encourages farmers to adopt new water saving technologies to 
minimize the entire costs, to maximize production and to optimize water 
procurement.  
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3.3.5.4 Distance, water source type, groundwater, and water consumption 
As seen already, water consumption decreases with locations getting farther away 
from the water source. The longer the distance is, the less water is used. As shown 
in Table 3.5, farmers close to water source are the heaviest water users. With the 
distance getting farther, water in the public canal becomes less and less due to a 
considerable water loss rate. Meanwhile the maintenance and conveyance costs 
are getting higher. Expensive and insufficient water, provided through the public 
canal, enforces some farmers to seek alternative solutions, such as groundwater, 
to satisfy their water requirements.  
Groundwater use occurs when transported canal water is getting insufficient and 
more costly than local groundwater. Farmers in the category C operate surface 
irrigation. Their water source type is mainly groundwater, instead of surface water. 
This implies that potential surface water supply in this particular area has become 
insufficient and costly compared to groundwater supply. For instance, most 
farmers possess shallow tube wells and pump water by themselves. Farmers in 
categories E and F live even farther away from the water source than farmers in 
category C. However they would require more reliable and continuous water 
flows due to utilization of advanced irrigation technologies. But their small 
shallow tube wells cannot meet these requirements. Furthermore, two big private 
tube well owners control the area where the farmer categories E and F are located. 
Their groundwater procurement is pipe transportation that is ensured by a private 
operation system. Accordingly, farmers in this area are charged with relatively 
high water prices. This clearly suggests that groundwater supply replaces the 
surface water supply when the distance from the surface water source increases. 
Specifically, in the present study, ground water procurement starts with farmers in 
the category C and then extends to categories E and F. 
Table 3.5: Distance, water consumption and water source type for each category 
Farmer 
Category Water source type Distance (km) Water consumption (m
3/Mu)
A Public canal <2.0 217.23 
B Public canal 2.0-5.0 188.63 
C Private tube well 5.0-8.0 71.67 
D Water tank 16.0-20.0 19.30 
E Private tube well 8.0-20.0 35.71 
F Private tube well 8.0-20.0 32.73 
G No water source >20.0 0.00 
Notes: A: Flood irrigation users; B: Border irrigation users; C: Basin check irrigation users; 
D: Seepage irrigation users; E: Sprinkler irrigation users; F: Drip irrigation users; 
G: Dry-land farming users 
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between investment in irrigation and water consumption 
3.3.5.5 Private investment and water consumption 
As a major hypothesis we will state that private investment in irrigation 
technologies improves water use efficiency. The higher the investment is, the less 
water will be consumed. As shown in Figure 3.7, water consumption is at a fairly 
high level by farmers in categories A and B, since they operate flood and border 
irrigation. In the present study, it is assumed that zero investment in water saving 
technologies is made by these two farmer categories. Farmers in the category C 
also operate a kind of small-scale surface irrigation, namely, basin check 
irrigation. They consume much less water than their surface irrigation 
counterparts in categories A and B. But this scheme requires investment in terms 
of labor etc. It is observed in the category C that around 150 Yuan/Mu are spent 
on water saving technologies. The reason behind this is that farmers in category C 
are groundwater users and their water costs are much higher than with farmers in 
categories A and B. Specifically, they need to dig a shallow well, to purchase a 
pump, and to pay electricity costs. Moreover they need to contribute labor to 
divide their fields into smaller areas. Fields have normally the size of 1.5m x 1.5m 
per plot. It is a fairly labor-intensive farming system. In this study, such necessary 
expenditures are taken as irrigation technology costs.  
Farmers in the category D operate seepage irrigation. The average cost is 260 
Yuan/Mu and the water consumption is 20 m3/Mu, which is one tenth of the water 
consumed by farmers in category A. Farmers in categories E and F use modern 
capital-intensive technology, such as sprinkler and drip irrigation. Their average 
costs are 835.43/Mu and 1545.35 Yuan/Mu, respectively, 3.5- and 5.9- times of 
the investment of seepage irrigation. Correspondingly the water consumption of 
farmers in categories E and F is only one fifth and one sixth of water, which is 
consumed by farmers in category A. One significant phenomenon is that the 
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seepage irrigation users even consume a lower amount of water than modern drip 
irrigation users. This does not suggest that the seepage irrigation technique can 
use water more efficiently than modern drip irrigation. The hypothesis is that it is 
because the farmers have bad access to water. As mentioned before, they have to 
fill their field tanks with costly transported water. 
3.3.6 Cost shares in apple production 
We investigate the economic situation of farmers as related to water by applying a 
cost share approach. The cost shares of each farmer category are different. There 
are four main input elements. They are labor, fertilizer, pesticides and irrigation 
costs. Among them labor cost has the biggest share. Labor is intensively needed 
over the whole year in apple production. This includes land ploughing, fertilizing, 
insecticide spraying, weeding, irrigation, fruit thinning and harvest. According to 
apple growers, grain production requires labor for three months in a year only, 
whilst apple production keeps them busy over the whole year. The heaviest work 
is in the harvest season. Almost every farm household has to hire people to pick 
and pack apples. As shown in Table 3.6, the share of labor costs varies from 
55.18% to 73.02% of the total cost for all interviewed farmer groups. Labor costs 
were calculated by the amount of man-days used, multiplied by average wages 
per day. Farmers in the category G (dry land farming operators) have the largest 
labor cost share due to their bad economic situation. These farmers spent less on 
other input element besides labor. However, farmers in the category F (modern 
drip irrigation users) have the smallest share of labor costs in their total cost. 
Farmers in the category C have higher labor costs as compared with their surface 
irrigation counterparts A and B. The reason for this is that farmers in category C 
are required to prepare their field into smaller field plots. This implies that, at a 
certain point, modern irrigation technologies cannot only save water, but also save 
labor consumption (For instance, fertilizing and irrigation can be carried out in 
one procedure by drip irrigation). It is obvious that the shares of irrigation fees are 
highest in categories D, E and F, since these farmers need to pay high prices for 
water. Especially farmers in the category D are affected. They need to pay the 
highest water prices due to additional transportation costs. This is why the 
irrigation fee as share in this farmer category is the largest among all interviewed 
farmers. No significant difference is observed on fertilizer and pesticide costs 
amongst all interviewed farmer categories.  
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Table 3.6: Distribution of input share in apple production 
Farmer 
Category  Fertilizer  Pesticide Irrigation fees Labor costs 
 Yuan/Mu % Yuan/Mu % Yuan/Mu % Yuan/Mu %
A 281.31 21.10 164.22 12.32 54.94 4.12 832.82 62.46
B 240.54 19.64 142.34 11.62 51.68 4.22 789.99 64.51
C 165.69 17.81 88.46 9.51 50.00 5.37 626.34 67.31
D 130.00 15.48 60.00 7.14 150.00 17.86 500.00 59.52
E 100.00 19.42 55.00 10.68 60.00 11.65 300.00 58.25
F 110.13 21.16 54.29 10.43 68.82 13.23 287.09 55.18
G 124.11 16.55 78.15 10.42 0.00 0.00 547.43 73.02
Notes: A: Flood irrigation users; B: Border irrigation users; C: Basin check irrigation users; 
D: Seepage irrigation users; E: Sprinkler irrigation users; F: Drip irrigation users; 
G: Dry-land farming users 
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Figure 3.8: Ratio of apple yields and water consumption 
3.3.7 Ratio of apple yields and water consumption 
In general one might think, all thing being equal, that the adoption of seepage 
irrigation technology could be the right solution for water saving of low-income 
farmers. This is illustrated by a ratio of yields to water applied as shown in Figure 
3.8. The ratio is defined as a production coefficient, e.g. apple yield divided by 
irrigation water consumed, i.e., Ratio = Apple yield (kg/Mu)/Water consumption 
(m3/Mu). Naturally apple trees get water not only from irrigation, they also get it 
from rainfall. Since the survey area is a relatively small area, it is assumed that all 
the farmers get the same amount of rainfall. Hence the ratio is used to measure the 
effective costs and benefits in terms of irrigation water use only. As shown in 
Figure 3.8, farmers in the category A, flood irrigation users, have the lowest ratio 
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value at 9.34. This suggests that one cubic meter irrigation water can only produce 
9.34kg of apple by flood irrigation. It is easy to perceive that much water is 
wasted by this kind of irrigation method rather than is consumed by apple trees. 
Farmers in the category B are almost at the same level, with a ratio value at 9.78. 
The result is different for a farmer of category C, who applies basin check 
irrigation (small scale surface irrigation). Note that farmers in this category are 
also groundwater users. They have a relatively high ratio value of 33.78 as 
compared with the surface irrigation counterparts in the categories A and B. 
Farmers in categories E and F have an even higher ratio, with a value of 87.9 and 
113.43, respectively. The most remarkable result is, that farmers in category D 
surprisingly get a ratio of 136.11, i.e., 1m3 water can produce 136.11 kg apples. 
This is the highest ratio among all interviewed farmers (This appears if the system 
functions well. Remember that problems with the holes may occur). As described 
already, also modern sprinkler and drip irrigation can use water more efficiently 
than traditional modus and improve productivity. Farmers in categories E and F 
have a high rank of apple yields and their apple quality is the highest. Though, 
note that they have the heaviest investment in water saving technologies. 
Furthermore expenditures on modern irrigation technologies are multi-times that 
of seepage irrigation. Only few farmers can afford that. Farmers in the category D, 
i.e., seepage irrigation get already considerable revenue at much lower 
expenditure on water saving technology as compared with the categories E and F. 
Based on the above results, the hypothesis can be stated that the adoption of 
low-cost seepage irrigation technology could be a practical and efficient way to 
save water for average farmers in the survey area at minimal investment. Despite 
of problems in maintenance, farmers have a high incentive to adopt this technique 
as the water price increases. 
3.4 Summary  
This chapter gave a brief and primary description of the field survey. The 
preparation, such as the methodology of research design and sample selection, the 
status of existing irrigation networks as well as the primary data analysis of 
empirical findings, are also presented here. The collected information provides a 
basic structure, and we will discuss ideas to establish the econometric and 
mathematic programming models to optimize the social welfare as well as water 
resource allocation over the irrigation area.  
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The following findings are suggested by the empirical analysis: 
z Traditional surface irrigation still plays an important role in the surveyed area. 
z The water price becomes higher with the location getting farther away from 
the water source due to an increase of water conveyance costs. 
z Increasing and higher water prices motivate farmers to adopt new water 
saving technologies. 
z Locally produced seepage irrigation is under average conditions more 
economic and practical for low-income farmers to save water than imported 
modern irrigation techniques in the survey area.  
4  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
31
4 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Water resource management has become one of the hottest topics in the search for 
better resource management. A lot of studies have been carried out in this field. 
Particularly there is a focus on approaches for assessing and improving the 
performance of water used in agriculture in terms of increasing the water use 
efficiency (KELLER, KELLER, & SECKLER, 1996; WICHELNS, 1999; CAI, RINGLER, 
& MARK W.ROSEGRANT, 2001). Furthermore, there is ample literature on 
increasing competition between water users within river basins (SECKLER, 1996; 
LEE, 1999; WORLD BANK, 1993). Some authors focus also on the sustainable use 
of groundwater resources as well as on the contamination problem (HELLERGERS, 
ZILBERMAN, & VAN IERLAND, 2001; ROSETA-PALMA, 2002; GAYATRI & EDWARD, 
2002). Next there are studies that concentrate on water resource institutions and 
policies. Issues, such as how to utilize the limited water resources efficiently and 
to protect the environment, have attracted more and more attention, notably from 
water researchers as well as practioners. Due to limitations and a specific research 
scope, only a part of these studies will be reviewed here. The literature can be 
divided into the following three categories based on their focuses: (1) Institutional 
approaches towards water management, (2) Water markets and irrigation system 
management, (3) Economic modeling of water resource management. 
4.1 Institutional approaches towards water management 
We start with institutional approaches and survey historical achievements. Then 
past policies will be equally reviewed. 
4.1.1 History of water management 
By institutional approaches, researchers study how communities, governments 
and societies are dealing with water resource management problems. This 
involves the investigation of legal aspects, policy approaches, and institutional 
arrangements. Studies range from national to regional as well as from rural to 
agricultural levels. Modern scientific water management practices, which have 
their beginning in the last half of the 19th century, were for many years identified 
only with centralized approaches issues pertaining to water management. Even 
during most of 20th century, the centralized top-down system was still the 
preferred form of water management and these approaches dominated towards 
water management in most countries. The disadvantage of this system became 
increasingly obvious in late years showing that many state investments were not 
well directed. Projects were commonly failing to meet their initial objectives and 
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the returns of many of investments were very low if not negative (LEE, 1999). 
Since the 1970s the role of the state in the management of directly productive 
activities and in the provision of services has been increasingly questioned. Today 
it is widely accepted that users should be given an important role in water 
management. Local organizations should be considered the focus of applying 
scientific approaches to resource management (WORLD BANK, 1993). This 
user-based approach, i.e., a bottom-up approach of water management, is gaining 
more attention. As more private participation is involved, water has been 
considered more and more an economic commodity involving private 
decision-making. It is also discussed to increase users’ responsibilities in water 
management and to make them coincide with the general adjustment of central 
governments towards decentralization. An efficient water resource management 
system can only work successfully, when the top-bottom and bottom-top systems 
complement each other (LEE, 1999). 
Intervention from government is typical for both, heavily centralized bureaucracy 
and user-dominated systems in particular, when market failures occur. 
Government intervention can protect the public from abuses of power due to 
market imperfections and coordinate deficits due to lack of private commitments, 
but it is dangerous for efficiency. The particular justification for government 
involvement in water management is based on several characteristics of the water 
sector. These characteristics can result in a market failure (LEE, 1999). The 
characteristics have been summarized in a World Bank policy paper on water 
management (WORLD BANK, 1993) as follows: 
z The large and lumpy nature of capital investments and economies of scale 
tend to create natural monopolies warranting regulation.  
z The relatively large size of water investment and the potential for political 
interference reduce the incentives for private investment. 
z Uses of water are interdependent and a government regulation is required to 
ensure that users abide by the rules of the game for water allocation and the 
maintenance of water quality. 
z Some water-related products, such as flood control and control of waterborne 
diseases are, at least locally, public goods, which are difficult to charge for on 
an individual basis. Therefore, public intervention may be necessary to ensure 
appropriate levels of investment. 
z Water resources are often developed for special use purpose because of their 
assumed importance for overall economic development.  
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Notably government intervention is often not optimal and even results in failures, 
albeit it is needed sometimes. There are two broad forms of government failures. 
One is Rent-Seeking or the pursuit of self-interest by politicians, public sector 
employees, and other interest groups. The other is regulatory failure or capture, 
which evenly occur when a public authority falls under the improper influence of 
some special interest group, either public or private. The recognition of 
government or regulatory failures challenges the classic public welfare or 
governance theory that assumes that government is a disinterested pursuer of the 
public interest. It is nowadays widely accepted that any government intervention 
will have an economic as well as a political background.  
Though there are government failures, it never does mean that government should 
withdraw from public governance rather the question is how to get a good 
governance structure. In considering the establishment of water management and 
regulatory systems, government should be open-minded in judging the various 
alternatives that are available and be cautious in developing too elaborate systems 
in environments without traditions of strong public service. Talking on good 
governance also underlines the need to target intervention on areas where market 
failures are most pronounced, to pay attention to the costs and benefits, and to 
design regulatory mechanism to maximize benefits in relation to costs. In the 
opinion of many researchers, neither privatization nor user-management regimes 
can, of themselves, release governments from their responsibility to provide their 
populations with a reasonable and equitable access to basic water-related services. 
This responsibility has to remain with government in the area of public policy 
(LEE, 1999). 
4.1.2 Water-related policies and concepts 
Surface water policies 
Traditionally, the existing water laws in many countries have done little to 
encourage transferring water rights between users to equate values (prices of 
water). For instance, the prior appropriation system as applied in many states of 
the USA, allows third parties to block a transfer. Blocks would affect users, 
regardless of how small the impact is (LESSER, DODDS& ZERBE, 1997).  
Market-based surface water policies could enhance water rights transfer and 
improve economic efficiency (ROSEGRANT & GAZMUI S, 1994). These polices 
could include the removal of irrigation subsidies. This would make it less likely 
that development of uneconomic projects would occur and would encourage 
transfers of water to high-valued uses (RAY & WILLIAMS, 1999). 
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Groundwater policies 
Groundwater allocation policies are complicated by the common-property nature 
of groundwater as a non-point resource. Several methods have been proposed to 
privatize groundwater rights or levy "pump taxes" on groundwater. A "pump tax" 
on groundwater is yet another market-enhancing allocation mechanism. The most 
difficult issue, emerging with establishing a pump tax, is setting the tax at the 
right level. With taxes too low, the common-property problem will not be solved. 
With taxes too high, not enough water will be used, reducing economic efficiency 
in both cases (LEE, 1999).  
Water price policies 
Agriculture is not the only area where water is used inefficiently. Few water 
utilities use marginal cost pricing, because they are either regulated monopolies or 
branches of local government. In general most water utilities price at average 
costs, e.g. recovering sufficient revenues to cover their total costs but not 
reflecting marginal cost. Policies such as increasing block prices, which charge 
marginal costs for marginal water use while covering average cost on average and 
allowing people a minimal level of use at a minimal charge, are rare. In such cases, 
there is little or no incentive to conserve water. However improvements are 
possible. Some policies attempt to improve the efficiency of their water. For 
instance, rates for initial blocks of water can be set low, to maintain affordability 
for an amount of water that is needed for basic survival, and then subsequently 
blocks can be priced much higher. Then, individuals who wish the luxury will pay 
more for their water (LESSER et al., 1997).  
Irrigation value of water 
Irrigation is the single largest use of water in many countries. There have been 
two alternative valuation methods as suggested by GIBBONS (1986). Methods are 
crop water production functions and farm crop budget analysis. Crop water 
production function analysis simply means that a production function for a 
particular crop is estimated and values are generated by the marginal values of 
that function. Various combinations of seed, fertilizer, water, labor and capital 
equipment can be used to produce a particular crop. Specifically, the inputs will 
be combined in such a way, that the values of their marginal products are 
precisely equal to their marginal costs. To determine the marginal value of water 
using this method, controlled experiments are usually carried out. Then, in these 
experiments, all other crop inputs are held constant besides water. Additional 
water is applied to a particular crop to determine the change in overall production.  
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Then this change, times the price of the crop, will be equal to the marginal value 
of the additional water applied (GIBBONS, 1986).  
One of the problems with crop production analysis is that in many areas, no 
experiments have been performed yet. Thus the actual physical productivity of 
water is unknown. Nevertheless farm crop budget analysis try to circumvent this 
problem by developing representative farm budgets that determine the maximum 
revenue share as deductibles for water. In other words, the total revenue of 
producing a given amount of crop is estimated, usually by agricultural extension 
agents. From this total revenue, called a revenue budget, the costs of all of the 
non-water inputs are subtracted, and the rest is left for water. Then incremental 
steps are introduced. The incremental residual, will equal the maximum amount a 
farmer could pay for water and still cover production costs. If the cost of 
obtaining water is subtracted from the amount of the net value of providing 
irrigation water, specific values can be compared to other values of obtaining 
water.  
TORRELL et al (1990) used a different approach. He determined the value of water 
in the Ogallala aquifer by examining the difference in values for irrigated and 
dry-land sales, thus capturing all of the factors that may contribute to the value of 
water. This approach has the advantage of being able to determine water values 
for dry land farming. It can examine price differentials between irrigated and dry 
land farm sales, though it is rough. In the approach, it is suggested that the 
difference in sales prices is attributable to the net earnings potential of water. 
Dividing this value by the average water use at the farm, one can compute the 
value of water on a per-acre-foot basis.  
The "piecemeal" problem 
Water is an input to many production processes. The marginal value of water will 
be determined by its value of marginal product (VMP). However, the VMP may 
be affected by economic distortions. This is particularly important in 
determinations of water values for irrigation purposes. A farmer may purchase 
subsidized electricity and subsidized water, and his participation in government 
programs creates artificial price support for the crops, which he grows. This will 
affect his marginal value of water. Because of that the VMP of water maybe 
significantly distorted. This is sometimes referred to as the "piecemeal" problem 
and is shown in Figure 4.1, where VMP refers to the "true" value of marginal 
product of water in the absence of economic distortions (LESSER et al., 1997). The 
quantity of water will equal Q gallons. Suppose that the only distortion in the 
market is that farmers receive a subsidized price for their crops. As a result, the 
VMP for water will shift upward, reflecting the increased value of each additional  
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Figure 4.1: Distortion in water use because of subsidized crop prices 
Source: Lesser, Jonathan A; Dodds, Daniel E; Zerbe, Jr.,Richard O (1997) 
unit of water. As a result, the quantity of water consumed increases to Q' gallons. 
Marginal values of water will be higher for a given reduction in water supplies.  
In addition, irrigation can result in negative externalities on land productivity, 
such as increased salinity, as well as increases in sedimentation in rivers, silting in 
navigation channels, and increased use of agricultural chemicals. To the extent 
that none of these impacts are incorporated into empirical estimates of the value 
of water, price estimates will be distorted. Even in the presence of fully 
transferable water rights, efficient transfers will be distorted to the extent that 
other economic distortions are present.  
4.2 Water markets and irrigation system management 
4.2.1 Water market management 
Let us assume that water is recognized as a tradable economic commodity, then it 
should be possible to govern its allocation through the market. The initial 
incentive to establish water markets is due to water scarcity. The increase of 
private participation in water management is also a boosting for a water market. 
(LEE, 1999).  
A proper system of tradable water rights is the premise of ensuring a water market 
to function. Firstly, a market requires the prior determination of the total number 
of water rights to be allocated to the existing water users scheme. Secondly, the 
rights must be clearly and securely defined and appropriately registered. Once 
markets are introduced and property rights are established in water, it is expected 
that transfers of water rights will occur. A market-based system of water  
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allocation will be therefore, both resilient to shocks and open to take advantage of 
opportunities. 
A water market is actually a water management tool. It is a tool that spreads the 
burden and difficulties of water management among a larger population, and it 
permits greater participation in management decisions and can introduce greater 
flexibility into management systems. Again, so far the theory tells water markets 
can be distinguished from other processes for water allocation by (LEE, 1999): 
z The motivating force is a voluntary perception by both, buyers and sellers, 
whereas the transaction is in their own best interest given the alternative 
opportunities available to them. 
z No central authority determines the price and other terms of transfer, although 
it may condition or regulate them administratively. 
z The price is generated through voluntary transactions negotiated between 
willing buyers and sellers. 
z The transfer of water is the real purpose of the transaction and the value of 
water is established independent of the value of other goods and services 
involved in the transaction. 
z A water market only exists where water rights are commodities with an 
identity, distinct form other real property.  
However, a water market has its own limitation, albeit it is powerful. Arguments 
against proper introduction of water markets are: market power could be 
exercised in a water market directly through monopolistic behavior, either by a 
price-setting seller or by a price-setting buyer. There could be a potential for some 
other economic agents to influence market price levels. Making a water market 
work well requires a clear understanding of the required institutional and legal 
framework. It also requires the establishment of clear rules and regulations 
governing exclusive property rights, the necessity for simple transfer mechanisms, 
and the corollary of a minimum of bureaucratic interference in the market (HAHN, 
1984). It also requires considerable investment by both the public and the private 
sector in the registration of rights, in a monitoring and measurement system, and 
in improving water distribution and transportation systems. 
4.2.2 Irrigation system management and water saving 
The issue of water saving, after a certain point, is that of water saving in irrigation. 
Thus, irrigated agriculture is increasingly feeling the pressure to demonstrate and 
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improve its performance (BURT, A.J.CLEMMENS, T.S.STRELKOFF et al., 1997). 
Irrigation efficiency is a key part of irrigation management. Irrigation 
management means c.a. water efficiency. There are still arguments about the 
concept of water use efficiency between water researchers. Some researchers 
think that there is still considerable room to improve the efficiency and 
productivity of water utilization in agriculture since the level of average water use 
efficiency is still pretty low over the world, due to under-developed irrigation 
techniques and poor management. However, some other researchers have argued 
that the potential gains from improving agricultural water use efficiencies maybe 
minimal. They argue that low values for measured water use efficiencies exist. 
This implies substantial potential efficiency, but losses are often derived from 
individual system evaluations rather than from basin-wide assessment. 
Unmeasured downstream recovery of drainage water, recharge and extractions of 
groundwater can result in actual basin-wide efficiencies. Individual observer may 
observe the situation. Substantially efficiency can be greater than the nominal 
values for particular systems compartment.  
The concept of real water saving, instead of water saving on paper, was first 
discussed by SECKLER (1996). He suggested that water saving must take into 
account the impact of water reuse in a whole water basin. He also argues that in a 
new era of water management, a "real" not "paper" wise water saving should be 
achieved. If a water conservation technique simply reduces the amount of 
drainage water from a particular user and this drainage water is beneficially used 
downstream, this would be only a "dry "water saving. But, if the drained water 
flows directly into a salt sink, then "wet" water would be saved. By definition, if 
all of the usable drainage water, in a closed water basin, is already being used 
beneficially, water efficiency measures can only be reduced by drainage as 
measured against "dry" water. In open systems, on the other hand, usable drainage 
water may be lost to salt sinks. Reducing this loss by reducing drainage water will 
result in "wet" water saving, a real gain in efficiency! However, whether in close 
or open water basins, the real efficiency gains can be achieved by increasing the 
output per unit of evaporated water, reducing water losses to sinks, reducing the 
pollution water, and reallocating water from lower valued to high valued uses.  
A detailed review of the concepts of physical and economic efficiencies of water 
use is presented by WICHELNS (1999) and CAI et al (2001). There are two types of 
efficiencies of water use, which are cited in water-related literature. They are 
physical water use efficiency and economic water use efficiency. The physical 
water use efficiency compares the volume of water delivered and consumed. It 
can be increased by decreasing the water used per unit of output. Instead 
economic water use efficiency relates the value of output minus opportunity costs 
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of water used in agricultural production to the value of water applied. It can be 
increased by reallocating water from lower valued to higher valued uses.  
Physical irrigation efficiency 
Physical irrigation efficiency represents the fraction of water beneficially used 
compared to the water withdrawn. Classical irrigation efficiency (IEc) is defined 
as the ratio of water volume beneficially used by plants to the volume of water 
delivered through an irrigation system, adjusted by effective rainfall and changes 
in the water storage in the root zone (BURT et al., 1997). 
agewater storroot zone change of -eliveredof water dvolume
fallraineffective -spirationevaportrancropIEc =      (4.1) 
This is mostly applied at project levels. Irrigation efficiency at the project level is 
typically further divided into distribution efficiency (water distribution in the 
main canal), conveyance efficiency (water distribution in secondary canals), and 
field application efficiency (water distribution in the crop fields). 
KELLER and KELLER (1995) and KELLER et al (1996) argue that although the 
classical or local irrigation efficiency concept is appropriate for irrigation system 
design and management, it could lead to erroneous conclusions and serious 
mismanagement of scarce water resources, if it is used for water accounting at a 
larger scale. This is because the classical approach ignores the potential reuses of 
irrigation return flows (see before). To overcome the limitations of the classical 
irrigation efficiency, they introduced a new concept, called effective efficiency 
(IEe), which takes into account the quantity of water delivered from and returned 
to a basin's water supply: 
returned  waterof volume storage waterzone root of changedelivered  waterof volume
rainfall effectivespirationevaportran crop  IEe −−
−=
                    (4.2) 
Economic efficiency 
Economic efficiency of irrigation water use refers to the economic benefits and 
costs of water used in agricultural production. As such, it includes the costs of 
water delivery, the opportunity costs of irrigation and drainage activities, and 
potential third-party effects or negative (or positive) externalities (DINAR, 1993). 
Economic efficiency can be expressed in various forms. For instance, it can be 
expressed as total net benefit, net benefit per unit of water, or per unit of crop area. 
It is a broader approach, compared to physical efficiency, and allows an analysis 
of private and social costs and benefits.  
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Physical and economic efficiency at the river basin scale 
Water use efficiency at a river basin scale basically extends the efficiencies at 
local sites to the basin level. Irrigation efficiency at the basin level is the ratio of 
crop water evapotranspiration to total water depletion for irrigation in the basin. 
The concept takes into account the potential reuse of return flows and potential 
decline in the water quality of return flows. Thus, it follows the concept of 
effective water use efficiency suggested by KELLER and KELLER (1995). However, 
the concepts of basin water use efficiency and effective water use efficiency are 
based on the following assumptions: 
z The amount of return flow is significant relative to the water withdrawal; 
z The quality of the return flow should meet water quality requirements for 
downstream water uses; 
z The return flow can be reused through natural and /or engineering process, 
such as withdrawal from rivers and streams, stored in reservoirs or aquifers 
and could be delivered or pumped, or used for in-stream committed 
environment flow, hydropower generation and for ecological preservation. 
z The time lag of flow for returning or for reuse is neglected. It should be noted 
that for some basins, there might be a "time lag" for return flows, and the time 
lag will affect the reuse of, at least, part of the return flow by downstream 
users, which depends on specific hydrologic characteristics in a basin.  
The relationship between physical and economic efficiency 
It is suggested by WALLENCE and BATCHELOR (1997) that in general both, 
physical and economic efficiencies, can be improved in irrigation systems by the 
following four ways:  
z Agronomic improvements, such as improved crop husbandry and cropping 
strategies; 
z Technical improvements, such as advanced irrigation systems; 
z Managerial improvements, such as adoption of a demand-based irrigation 
scheduling system and improved maintenance of equipment; and 
z Institutional management, such as introduction of water pricing and 
improvement in the legal environment.  
The improvement of physical efficiency of water use is related to water 
conservation by increasing the fraction of water beneficially used compared to the 
water applied. Enhancing economic efficiency is a broader concept, which seeks 
4  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
41
the highest economic value of water use through both, physical measures and 
allocations of water, to the highest obtainable valued of uses and users.  
As an interesting study, LYNNE, ANAMAN and KIKER (1987) showed that the 
management of soil moisture in the crop root zone differs for the objectives of 
optimal physical and economic irrigation efficiency. According to Eq. (4.1), the 
physical efficiency is determined by the selection of the depth of irrigation 
(related to the water source and supply capacity) and the uniformity of water 
application (related to the irrigation system and field water management.). Once 
optimal physical efficiency is achieved, the economic efficiency can be improved, 
if it is based on the selection of the frequency of water application. The frequency 
is determined by selecting the optimal management and allowed deficit (MAD), 
which is expressed as a percentage of the available moisture capacity. MAD is the 
difference between full water requirements and the amount of water applied that 
allows for maximum economic efficiency.  
Based on an agronomic-economic simulation model for lettuce, SUTTON and 
JONES (1994) proposed that optimal physical efficiency could differ from optimal 
economic efficiency under various physical conditions and economic incentives. 
Physical efficiency is expressed as crop production per unit of water applied, 
which is identical to classical irrigation efficiency assuming that crop yields are 
proportional to crop evapotranspiration. Whereas economic efficiency is defined 
as a net benefit per unit of land area. They think that optimal physical efficiency is 
achieved at a lower relative water supply than optimal economic efficiency.  
Results from above both studies analyzed efficiency concepts at the crop field 
scale. At basin level, the relationship between physical efficiency and economic 
efficiency can be even more complex. Due to issues such as water allocation 
among various water users, and contribution for upstream return flows to 
downstream water availability, things may change.  
Finally, if improvement in physical efficiency leads to environmental or 
ecological damage, such as reduction in water quality levels, water logging and 
salinization, or other negative externalities as well as third-party effects, the 
economic efficiency levels actually will decrease (WICHELNS, 1999). 
Furthermore, socio-economic studies have to be mentioned. Based on game 
theoretical inquires, SAKURAI and PALANISAMI (2001) conducted a theoretical and 
empirical analysis on the issue of institutional evolution for resource management 
focusing on irrigation water. Two management types for irrigation schemes, a 
community management regime (tank irrigation) and an individualized 
management regime (well irrigation) are compared in terms of rice production 
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efficiency. They found that the profit of rice production using well water is low 
because well irrigation management requires a high labor input. Their estimation 
of profit functions reveals that the profit of farmers using both tank and well water 
is statistically significantly higher than that of farmers who use either well water, 
only, or tank water, only. The result, based on game theoretical inquiries, implies 
that in equilibrium tank and well irrigation can coexist.  
4.3 Economic modeling of water use 
There is a lot of research contributing to water-related economic modeling. The 
literature can be roughly divided into the following three aspects according to 
their research scope. These are surface water use modeling, groundwater use 
modeling and conjunctive water use modeling.  
4.3.1 Surface water use model 
CHAKRAVORTY et al (1995) developed a spatial model to determine the optimal 
conveyance investment, water allocation, and investment in farm-specific 
conservation technology. This model is a von Thuenen-like spatial model of a 
water project in which a regulated utility supplies water to individual farms and 
invests in the distributions systems (canals). Optimal water prices, investment in 
conveyance, and individual farm's investment in irrigation technology are 
determined at each location. The model hypothesis and results are: 
z The net benefits from a project with optimal conveyance are higher than that 
from a project with no conveyance. The project area, i. e., the length of the 
canal is higher in the optimal case than without conveyance. 
z The aggregate land rent is much lower in the model with conveyance and it is 
the highest in the uniform pricing model where farms pay a fixed rate for 
water that does not vary with location.  
z Conveyance improvements reduce water loss. Correspondingly the shadow 
price of water differentiates slightly across locations. Thus, the variation in 
head-tail shadow prices is of little importance and the differences in water and 
technology investment from head to tail are negligible. 
CHATTERJEE et al (1998) developed a dynamic model to analyze the 
inter-temporal allocation of surface water for irrigation and for hydropower 
production in the western United States. This issue arises because peak irrigation 
demands may not coincide with periods of peak demand for power. This study 
focused on the trade-off between water used for agriculture versus water used for 
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hydroelectric power. The analysis was done under two dimensions. One is to 
concentrate on the level of the water-irrigation district. The other is to study the 
implications for agriculture and hydropower production of intra-year variations in 
the release of water. The dynamic model is to determine the optimal flows of 
water releases by taking into account the value of water for both irrigation and 
hydropower production. The key trade-off developed in the model is that water 
released in spring to satisfy irrigation demands diminishes revenues from 
hydropower production for two reasons. First, power generated in the spring is 
less valuable than power generated during the summer period of peak demand. 
Second, water released in the spring diminishes its power-generating potential. 
The results of this model show considerable deviations between the actual and the 
optimal allocations. Such models are important when seasonal demand for water 
differs.  
4.3.2 Groundwater use model 
There are two well-developed branches of economic research that focuses on 
groundwater use. One uses dynamic optimization models, which are similar to 
those in typical renewable resource problems, for instance, to analyze pumping 
patterns. These models emphasize the difference between optimal pumping paths 
and common property outcomes. The other models study aquifers with 
contamination as an externality imposed by productive activities. They analyze 
aquifer contamination in a pollution control perspective giving special emphasis 
to non-point pollution, namely when pollution is caused by irrigated agriculture. It 
is clear that there is a gap between quantity and quality management in these two 
branches of studies and studies have seldom been crossed. The study of 
ROSETA-PALMA (2002) fills this gap. This study suggests that the value of water as 
a resource depends as much on the quantity available as on its quality, so that both 
aspects should be considered simultaneously for adequate management. The 
major contribution of this study is the analysis of the performance of groundwater 
quantity-quality interactions in a most general setting. In the study, a quality 
variable was added to a typical resource extraction model using three different 
hydrological assumptions. Then it is shown, that an optimal groundwater stock, at 
the steady state, always becomes higher than in quantity-only models. This is an 
expected result, since water use becomes less profitable. Furthermore, it is shown 
that private common property solutions can be characterized by small water stock, 
or low quality, and both. Thus, if there is intervention from a central planner, at 
least one of the two features of an aquifer will be improved. Though, there is a 
possibility that such an improvement is achieved at the expense of the other. It is 
also shown that an efficient steady-state level of polluting actions might be higher 
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than the one chosen by private agents, as long as the steady-state water quality is 
higher. 
Nevertheless PALMA (2002) brought quality and quantity into the above model. 
However, his model contains a number of unrealistic simplifications with respect 
to the hydrological component. Next HELLEGERS et. al (2001) investigated the 
groundwater extraction problem in the Netherlands. They studied socially optimal 
agricultural groundwater extraction patterns and showed how desiccation and 
contamination can be integrated into an optimal control model. In contrast to 
above approaches, this approach considers temporal changes in both quantity and 
quality of the stock as mutually interacting. This theoretical model has not been 
tested yet on the basis of an empirical application but there is scope. HELLEGERS 
et. al (2001) show the importance of bringing the impact of agricultural shallow 
groundwater extraction on groundwater quality into resource management models. 
Their model demonstrates that the current low price of agricultural groundwater 
use is inefficient and provides few incentives for the adoption of modern 
irrigation technologies. The system does not consider the cost of desiccation and 
contamination in the price of water. The model also demonstrates that 
internalization of the negative as well as the positive externalities from 
agricultural shallow groundwater extraction on stock quality at the price of 
groundwater is particularly significant, if the recharge of groundwater is large 
compared with stock size.  
HEANEY et al (2001) developed a model incorporating the relationship between 
agricultural production and groundwater hydrology. They estimated the benefits 
of improved irrigation efficiency in the Riverland of South Australia. Benefits 
from improvement in irrigation efficiency may be derived by two factors. First, 
internal benefits may accrue to the individuals undertaking the action as a result 
of more efficient agricultural production. Second, improved irrigation efficiency 
may decrease the amount of groundwater leakage, thereby decreasing the amount 
of saline groundwater being transported to the river system. These are external 
benefits, as they will not be straightly reflected in the returns to irrigators. 
Farmers make the investment in irrigation efficiency and are, therefore, the source 
of less potential market failures. The framework is a dynamic representation of 
the relationship between a hydrological cycle and economic returns to alternative 
land uses. Within this modeling framework, economic models of land use are 
joined with a representation of hydrogeological processes in a catchment. (The 
hydrogeological component incorporates the relationships between rainfall, 
evaportranspiration and surface water runoff). The effects of land use change on 
groundwater recharge, discharge rates and the process, governing salt 
accumulation in streams and soil, are investigated. In the agro-economic 
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component of the model, land use is allocated to maximize economic return from 
the use of agricultural land and irrigation water. Incorporated in this component is 
the relationship between salinity and yield losses for each agricultural activity. 
The model demonstrates that increased irrigation efficiency can generate external 
benefits to downstreamers through reduced discharge of saline groundwater. But 
achieving optimal irrigation efficiency is likely to require institutional 
arrangements to promote investment and public expenditure in the irrigation 
system.  
4.3.3 Conjunctive water use model 
To reiterate, in the surface water model, seepage from the canal has been treated 
as a negative effect on a water project. However, in many cases, water goes down 
and replenishes the aquifer, generating positive effects for the groundwater stock. 
Therefore, recently, the conjunctive water use becomes a more and more 
researched subject. UMETSU and CHARKRAVORTY (1998) extended the previous 
spatial surface water use model (CHAKRAVORTY et al., 1995) and developed a new 
spatial conjunctive water use model. By taking into account the irrigation return 
flows, they seek system efficiency. The return flow is assumed to recharge the 
groundwater aquifer. With all other parameters being the same, only variables 
related to groundwater use are newly introduced. The result suggests that both 
seepage and the investment in the water distribution systems play a critical role in 
the spatial organization of irrigation and production. Differences in seepage rates 
are much more critical in projects with high distribution losses than those with 
low losses. Unlike previous models where the choice of on-farm technology is 
guided solely by the shadow price of water, high seepage in this model induces 
high water losses on the farm, thus replenishing the groundwater aquifer. The 
model also challenges water polices based on conventional wisdom that 
encourages the investment in distribution canals and in better on-farm irrigation 
technologies separately. If the seepage rate is significantly high, attempts to 
reduce water losses on the farm through improved technology adoption maybe of 
little benefit. As described above, CHARKRAVORTY et al (1998), (1995) studied the 
optimal water allocation and impact of irrigation projects by using optimal control 
theory rather than programming approaches.  
RAY and WILLIAMS (1999) used mathematical programming models to evaluate 
the water price policy in rural India. The presence of water theft was also 
analyzed in their paper. In their study area, the canal irrigation is critical for the 
productivity of agriculture. Subsidies to water interact with low domestic prices 
for wheat and high support prices for water-intensive sugarcane. Around a canal, 
farmers’ locations are never homogeneous. A heterogeneity in location suggests 
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that a price regime could have significant efficiency and distributive 
consequences. Location is a key determinant of such thing as water "theft" 
because it is much easier for upstream farmers to siphon off extra water, 
impacting on downstream farmers' irrigation returns. Survey data were used to 
develop a location-centered, mathematical programming model of a canal, with a 
number of farms in sequence. The model's central features are the spatial flow of 
the surface water and subsurface water, the seepage, the seasonal interlocking of 
year-round agriculture and a farm-level optimization. With a realistic range of 
crops, technical coefficients, and water response functions, the data-driven model 
determines each farmer’s water deliveries, actual water use, and optimal crop 
choices, and shows how these vary within the price regime. The model also makes 
the water deliveries to downstream farms endogenous to the choices made by 
individually optimizing upstream farmers.  
4.3.4 Irrigation technology choices 
Some researchers have studied the impact on efficiency by the selection of 
irrigation technologies. Their work tended to take an engineering approach 
(KNUTSON, ROBERT, CURLy et al., 1978). For a variety of circumstances, these 
studies computed and compared profits associated with the use of alternative 
irrigation technologies and determined the set of circumstances under which each 
technology is the most desirable choice. The engineering approach is more useful 
for determining when to adopt the new technologies than for predicting adoption 
patterns. This approach ignores variability in perceptions and information among 
farmers and does not consider the actual adoption data. CASWELL and ZILBERMAN 
(1985) took an alternative approach that used econometric tools and actual data on 
adoption patterns to explain and predict parameters and factors affecting the 
diffusion of modern irrigation technologies in California. The methodology of the 
approach has two characteristics. (a) It investigates the adoption of technologies 
that are non-crop specific and the behavior with respect to these technologies for 
growers. Several crops in several regions in a given period were included (Most 
studies have investigated the adoption of crop-specific technologies, and studied 
the behavior over time of the growers of a specific crop in one or several regions). 
(b) The model uses aggregate data and applies the discrete-choice econometric 
framework. A multinomial Logit model was applied using the land shares of each 
of the technologies for each of the regions as estimated by adoption probabilities 
(Traditionally, this framework has been used with panel data based on the 
decisions of individual farmers). The results from this model demonstrate that 
economic considerations (cost saving) have significant impact on the tendency to 
adopt new irrigation technologies. It was also shown that the groundwater users 
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are more likely to adopt modern technologies than surface water users. A further 
finding was that water-price policies could also help to promote the adoption of 
modern irrigation technologies and lead to substantial water saving.  
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, some previous work in the field of water resource management 
has been reviewed. It can be observed that little systematic analysis has been done 
with respect to programming models. By using mathematical programming to 
investigate the aggregate impacts on water resource allocation and social welfare 
as well as agricultural activities simultaneously, separate aspects have been 
brought in dispense analyses to the systems analysis, especially based on first 
hand empirical data. Moreover, in terms of technology adoption, the previous 
work was done primarily at discrete technologies, exogenously, instead of a 
continuous technology level, endogenously to systems. Specifically in conjunctive 
water use models, production activity problems at farm level are seldom tackled.  
In the present study, an attempt will be made to fill this gap. A spatial mathematic 
programming model is established based on empirical data through field research. 
It will be discussed in detail in the next chapters. 
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5 METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURAL 
FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
In this chapter, the methodology of the study and the framework of the model, as 
employed in the study are discussed. The methodology of the study is presented 
by building a comprehensive modeling framework, named a spatial water 
allocation model (SWAM). The framework contains two packages. One is an 
econometric model using regression methods (SPSS). The other is a mathematical 
programming model, employing a General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). 
In the programming model, variables, parameters and equations are expressed in 
ways in which GAMS requires them. The objective of the SWAM model is to 
achieve optimal social welfare as rent from water and to provide simultaneously 
the optimal water allocation in a given irrigation area. The structure shall impact 
on farmers’ choices of irrigation technologies and hence minimize investment to 
obtain the rents. The data used in the model were collected and processed during 
the field research. Data as shown is from a specialized apple production area, the 
Liquan County of Shaanxi Province, China, and covers one agricultural year. As 
described the employed farming system is fairly typical for current commercial 
agricultural production in rural China. The natural conditions of agricultural 
activities, such as soil quality, climate, etc., are assumed constant and excluded. 
Whereas the heterogeneity of location along the public canal is given priority of 
optimization. The model's usefulness is therefore, not regionally confined. 
Quantitative relationships such as agricultural input, output, and water use 
efficiency are brought in line with investments as applied to different farmer 
groups. Farmer categories of investment are derived endogenously through the 
modeling procedure. The solutions suggest that a better and more efficient water 
allocation and consumption could be achieved by a reduction of canal water 
losses and farmer's rational adoption of modern water saving technologies.  
5.1 Structure of the model 
The SWAM model, portrayed in this study is a combination of empirical studies 
using an econometric and mathematical programming model. In general, a 
framework, such as applied by SWAM, can be classified by two different 
approaches. First results from an econometric model are directly introduced into 
the programming model as part of the functional relationships to be explored. 
Some variables, though included in the econometric model, are later considered as 
endogenous variables in a system wide approach. Furthermore, the empirical 
foundation serves as a starting point. Second, econometric models are considered 
as sub-models to estimate parameters and then look for the impact of their 
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endogenous re-calculation. A change of estimated parameters is then part of 
flexibility in the programming model. In the study, the two approaches are put 
together. This procedure suggests that the econometric model incorporated into 
the programming model, can be used either as component or set of parameters. 
Then a comprehensive programming model will be used to optimize the social 
welfare of the irrigation area.  
Figure 5.1 shows the structural framework of the SWAM model. Field data were 
collected via interviews with farmers, water resource management officials, and 
technical staffs. These data were already reported in Chapter 3. The data are from 
both the private and the public sector. Some of the data are used to estimate 
relevant functions in the econometric model (see details in Chapter 6). Most 
importantly the model includes a water demand function, a profit function, an 
on-farm water efficiency function, a canal water loss function, and a water price 
function over the locations. Those estimated functions are then used as part of the 
stated objective function as revealed technology description. Functions serve as 
constraint conditions as well as parameters in the modeling. It is noticed further, 
some other technical data, such as the seepage rate in the irrigation area, can be 
directly used by the programming model. The objective function is designed to 
maximize social welfare and it is subject to technical constrains on production and 
investment activities. Furthermore the water availability in the model is specified. 
For simplicity, the model incorporates only two types of activities of farming. 
They are apple production and private investment in irrigation technology. Water 
conservation is undertaken by the public and the private sector. There are also two 
major constraints for the management of the irrigation system. One is a fixed 
constrain, such as water resource availability, the other is a variable constrain, 
such as water efficiency. The last is an equation of motion for water in the canals 
and includes procurement of the groundwater. Except to the equations of motion, 
all other variable constrain functions can be achieved through econometric 
approaches. Finally the matrix of technical coefficients of the model can be 
obtained directly from field data and other related sources. The mathematical 
model is developed using the GAMS program (see details in Chapter 7) and the 
mathematical simulations were carried out using GAMS/CONOPT and 
GAMS/MINOS in the modeling process. Several different scenarios are also 
modeled.  
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Figure 5.1: Diagrammatic presentation of the structure of the SWAM model 
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5.2 Specification of the model  
5.2.1 Layout of the irrigation area and adoption of various  
technologies in the study area 
The model is developed from UMETSU's (1998) spatial water use model. The 
irrigation system of the model is assumed as a relatively closed water cycle 
system instead of an open river basin, and it contains controlled inflows and 
outflows. Farmers extract water from the canal, and simultaneously water is 
assumed to recharge the aquifer below the topsoil due to seepage from the canal 
and farmer's fields. Every farmer has access to groundwater. Neither a time lag 
nor a third party impact is considered in the model. The water flow, water loss, 
and likely choice of irrigation technologies are illustrated in Figure 5.2. A central 
planner supplies water to the project area. Farmers' fields are all located along the 
canal. At the head of the canal, upstream water is cheaper than downstream water, 
so that traditional surface irrigation technologies, such as flood irrigation and 
border irrigation, might be intensively adopted. Along the canal moving into the 
irrigation area, water becomes scarce due to extraction by individual farmers and 
leakage from the canal. Finally, canal water will be used up to a certain point, 
such as point C, as shown in Figure 5.2. It is assumed that the point C will emerge 
somewhere along the canal, on which farmers stop using canal water and switch 
to groundwater. Further, the switch point C is endogenous to the system and it 
will be determined by the model internally. It implies that, upstream farmers, who 
are located before point C, extract water from the public canal rather than from 
the groundwater aquifer. Since the cost of canal water is much lower than that of 
groundwater, this is reasonable.  
In order to simplify the model, it is assumed that pumping is available for each 
farmer and pumping costs are constant throughout the survey area. However, 
downstream farmers start pumping water from the aquifer at point C, since there 
is no longer much water available in the canal. After the point C, groundwater 
supply gradually becomes the dominant water source in the tail area. Relatively 
expensive groundwater encourages farmers to adopt modern irrigation 
technologies in order to save water and lower costs. As shown in Figure 5.2, basin 
check irrigation, locally produced seepage irrigation, modern sprinkler and drip 
irrigation are dominant at the tail of the survey area.  
It is necessary to stress that the distribution of irrigation technology dotted in 
Figure 5.2 just describes the situation in the survey area, in general, as a point of 
references. In a practical model established in the study, we attempt to achieve 
technology that it is not too regionally confined. The different distribution of the 
irrigation technology will be discussed in detail under different situations.  
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Figure 5.2: Water flow and allocation of irrigation technologies in the survey area 
Source: Modified from Umetsu and Chakravorty, 1998 
5.2.2 Dual investment activities 
In order to understand the model further, we briefly have to touch on functional 
relationships with respect to investments. The main purpose of this study is to 
investigate the impact of investment in irrigation technologies on social welfare 
and water resource allocation. By improving the water use efficiency on farmer’s 
fields and in the water conveyance system, social welfare shall increase. By 
aiming at improvement, investments are required from both, the side of individual 
farmers and the public side. Two types of investments for water conservation, 
namely public investments and private investments are to be considered in the 
current model simultaneously. As shown in Figure 5.3, in general, public 
investment is mainly from the central government and a local government is 
focusing on improvement of irrigation infrastructure. For instance, in the current 
case, the investment flows into the irrigation project for example, for water 
generation and canal lining, are part of a Chinese government’s investment 
strategy for agriculture. But public investment has to be supplemented by private 
participation, i.e. private investment. Private investments are made by individual 
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Figure 5.3: Structure of investment in water use efficiency 
farmers along their cost-benefit-analysis. In terms of water conservation, this case 
refers to expenditures on water saving technologies at the farm level, such as 
procurement of locally produced seepage irrigation, modern sprinkler or drip 
irrigation. It is to be noted that various investment types reflect and influence all 
together the adoption of different techniques, and they correspondingly result in 
different on-farm water use efficiencies.  
5.2.3 Adoption of different irrigation technologies as a endogenous 
continuous cost variable  
As the adoption of different types of irrigation techniques is an important factor to 
be re-considered in this study, we go for a continuous presentation. In lots of 
previous studies, they were mostly taken as a discrete and exogenous variable 
(CASWELL & ZILBERMAN, 1985), (CHAKRAVORTY et al., 1995), (UMETSU & 
CHAKRAVORTY, 1998). The key argument of this study is to assume that all kinds 
of techniques are in a continuous set and it depends on monetary costs rather than 
on a kind of fixed technical coefficient to invest. By this approach the model can 
optimize technologies endogenously instead of exogenously fixing it. As 
illustrated in Figure 5.4, water use efficiencies for different irrigation techniques 
are roughly graphed together in a quadratic function. It is perceived that, the 
higher the water use efficiency shall be, the more investment is required. This 
on-farm water use efficiency function will be discussed more in the coming 
section.  
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Figure 5.4: Water use efficiency and private investment 
5.2.4 Introduction of coefficient of on-farm water use efficiency 
Since on-farm effective water consumption is one of the key measurements of 
optimal water resource allocation, it is very essential to introduce a coefficient to 
reflect the on-farm water use efficiency. In general, the effective water use is 
defined as actual water consumption by plants, i.e., the amount of water that is 
consumed for plant’s transpiration rather than that of water run-off, evaporation as 
well as leakage into the ground. Hence the amount of effective water consumption 
actually needs a coefficient to measure how much water is actually consumed by 
plants. Due to research scope, we will not calculate the plant’s water requirement 
of transpiration, which is assumed constant to all the plants in the present study. 
The key issue of the study is to investigate how much irrigation water can be 
effectively consumed by plants. A coefficient of on-farm water use efficiency h 
will be introduced into the modeling process. The coefficient h is closely tied to 
irrigation technology, as different techniques will lead to different on-farm water 
use efficiency. The coefficient h is assumed a quadratic function of private 
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from field research. For instance, if no private investment is made, i.e., farmer 
operate traditional flood irrigation, then the on-farm water efficiency will be at the 
base level, i.e., 0.48. If farmers adopt the modern drip irrigation, then the water 
efficiency can be up to 0.95. This coefficient will be estimated later in the next 
chapter based on empirical data and will serve as an important component in the 
modeling process. 
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5.2.5 Introduction of coefficient of water loss rate in the water conveyance 
system 
Water use efficiency incorporates not only on-farm water use efficiency, but also 
the efficiency of the water conveyance system. A coefficient to reflect the water 
conveyance efficiency is also required in the study. Based on field survey and 
relevant literatures, we establish a canal water loss function a to reflect the water 
efficiency during water transportation. The water loss function is assumed a 
quadratic function, which ranges from 0 to 1. If public investment is made 
maximally, for instance, a pipe canal is constructed, this indicates that a is equal 
to zero. It indicates that a zero water loss rate is achieved in this case. If public 
investment is removed from the water conveyance system, the water loss rate will 
be high. Different types of canals suggest different water loss rates. For instance, 
the highest water loss rate is found in a muddy canal, which reported of a loss rate 
of around 0.74 according to relevant literatures (GUO, 1980). The canal water loss 
function will be estimated in the coming chapter. 
5.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the methodology of the study, the framework and specification of 
the model have been discussed. A combined econometric and a spatial 
mathematical programming model has been suggested. They can be used to 
systematically analyze activities of a farming system to minimize cost of 
production, to increase spatial water use efficiency and to guarantee the 
effectiveness of investment in water conservation, and consequently to optimize 
the social welfare and water resource allocation over the irrigated area. The idea is 
to have a closed water supply system as much as possible. The irrigation 
technology is introduced as a continuous variable, which is more dependent on 
monetary cost. It is endogenously decided in the programming modeling instead 
of using fixed technical coefficients exogenously. The background and main 
features of functions of on-farm water efficiency and canal water loss rate have 
been briefly discussed, which will be further worked in the coming chapter. 
Furthermore, the mathematical programming model is adopted in the current 
study instead of a solely optimal control theory model. More details of the 
econometric model and the spatial programming model will be given in the next 
two chapters.  
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6 THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The SWAM model structure and methodology as well as the general 
specifications of the model have been discussed in the previous chapter. An 
econometric sub-model will be estimated in this chapter. An econometric model 
plays a key role in estimating the relevant functions of the approach, as employed 
in this study, such as the water demand function, the profit function, the on-farm 
water use efficiency function of private investment and the canal water loss 
function of public investment. All the estimated functions will then be employed 
as components in the spatial mathematical programming model. Especially we 
design the objective function by our functional approach. For this, we need a brief 
introduction into production theory, i.e., essentially the duality principle. This 
principle will be reviewed in the first section. The main empirical results for 
estimation will then be presented in a sub-chapter.  
6.1 The Duality approach: Shephard's Lemma and  
Hotelling’s Lemma 
The concept of the profit function provides an alternative approach to the analysis 
of the production function and technology revelation (LAU & YOTOPOULOS, 
1972). For a given technology and a given endowment of fixed factors of 
production, the profit function expresses the maximized profit of a firm as a 
function of the prices of output and of variable inputs. Moreover it measures 
coefficients for the quantities of fixed factors of production. The assumptions 
employed in the formulation of the profit function are: (a) firms are profit 
maximizing, (b) firms are price takers in both output and variable inputs markets, 
and (c) the production function is concave with regard to variable inputs. This 
implies, among other facts, that there are decreasing returns to scale with regard 
to all variable inputs taken, all together.  
The profit function possesses many desirable properties for immediate empirical 
analyses. There exists a one-to-one correspondence between a set of concave 
production functions and a set of convex profit functions. Every concave 
production function has a dual property, which is a convex profit function, and 
vice versa. Hence, without loss of generality, we can consider only profit 
functions as a dual approach for the empirical analysis of the behavior of 
profit-maximizing and price-taking firms, instead of using a primal approach. 
For further analysis, consider a firm with a production function with the usual 
neoclassical properties in equation (6.1a). 
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),,;,,( 11 nm ZZXXFV LL=               (6.1a) 
Where V  is output, iX  represents variable inputs, and iZ  represents fixed 
inputs. The profit (defined as current revenues less current total variable costs) 
can be written  
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Where π  is profit, p is the unit price of output, and ic′  is the unit price of the ith 
variable input.  
By re-arranging, (6.1b) can be rewritten as (6.1c) to obtain a “Unit-Output-Price” 
function. The "Unit-Output-Price" (UOP) profit function is introduced to simplify 
the mathematical process.  
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Where π ′  is “Unit-Output-Price” profit, or UOP profit. 
The UOP profit function is decreasing and convex in the normalized prices of 
variable inputs and increasing in quantities of fixed inputs. It follows also that the 
UOP profit function is increasing in the money price of the output (LAU, 1978).  
Through mathematical proofs, it can be shown, that there is a set of dual 
transformations connecting the production function and the profit function 
(MCFADDEN, 1971). One of the important relations is referred to as the Shephard's 
Lemma (SHEPHARD, 1953), namely, 
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Where ∗iX  is the factor demand function, ∗V  is the supply function. 
There are many advantages to work with the UOP profit function instead of the 
traditional production function. Firstly, through equations (6.1c) and (6.1e), 
Shephard's Lemma makes it possible to derive the supply function, ∗V , and the 
factor demand functions, ∗iX 's, directly from an arbitrary UOP profit function. 
The UOP profit function is decreasing and convex in the normalized prices of 
variable inputs and increasing in the fixed inputs (LAU & YOTOPOULOS, 1972). No 
explicit specification of the corresponding production function is required, rather 
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a specification at the profit function is enough. Secondly, by starting from a profit 
function, it is assured, by duality, that the resulting system of supply and factor 
demand functions are obtainable from profit maximization. A firm with a concave 
production function in the variable inputs, subject to given fixed inputs and under 
competitive markets is sufficiently described by maximizing a concave profit 
function. Thirdly, the profit function, the supply function, and the derived demand 
functions obtained, may be explicitly expressed as functions of variables normally 
determined independently of the firm's behavior. Econometrically, this implies 
that these variables are exogenous variables (LAU & YOTOPOULOS, 1972). 
However, Hotelling's Lemma (HOTELLING, 1932) reveals a relationship between 
the profit function and the factor demand function as well as the supply function. 
Hotelling's Lemma introduces two kinds of prices for the profit function, output 
and input prices. In other words, the profit function, as defined in Hotelling's 
Lemma, is a function of the output price and the input factor price rather than that 
of the variable costs and it specifies a quantity of fixed inputs of production. As in 
the case of Shephard' s Lemma, Hotelling 's Lemma is presented below: 
Let y (p, w) be the firm's supply function and let xi be the firm's demand function 
for factor i. Then  
p
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This requires that the derivatives exist for w >> 0, p > 0. Where p is defined (a 
scalar) price of output and w is the vector of factor prices. The mathematical proof 
is given below (VARIAN, 1984): 
Proof: Suppose ( ∗y , ∗x ) is a profit-maximizing supply-demand plan at prices 
( ∗p , ∗w ). Then we define a function:  
)(),(),( ∗∗ ⋅−⋅−= xwypwpwpg π             (6.2c) 
Obviously, the profit maximizing production plan at prices (p, w) will always be 
at least as profitable as the production plan ( ∗y , ∗x ). However, the plan ( ∗y , ∗x ) 
will be a best plan at prices ( ∗p , ∗w ), so that the function g reaches a minimum 
value of 0 at ( ∗p , ∗w ). The assumptions on prices imply this is an interior 
minimum. The first-order conditions for a minimum then imply that  
*
** ),(),(0 y
p
wp
p
wpg −∂
∂=∂
∂= π              (6.2d) 
6  THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
 
60
*
** ),(),(0 ixp
wp
iw
wpg +∂
∂=∂
∂= π  for ni ,,1 L=          (6.2e) 
Since this is true for all ∗w  and ∗p , Hotelling's Lemma is obtained by 
re-arranging above equations (6.2d) and (6.2e).  
It is further noticed that the concept of "profit" can be more broadly interpreted as 
function instead of being limited to the word of "profit". It can be a net profit, a 
gross margin, or a net revenue and so on. This depends on how input variables are 
specified. The "profit" in the present study is defined as water related net revenue 
achieved by individual farmers. This will be explained soon in the following 
section.  
6.2 The econometric model of the study 
A relevant econometric model in this study is estimated by using regression 
methodologies. It consists of several equations. All the relevant data are from the 
field survey database. The statistical program, SPSS, was employed to carry out 
the calculations. Two statistical indicators (t-test and F-test) and the adjusted R2 
are used for testing the significance of the estimated functions. The t-test can be 
used to test the individual partial regression coefficient and the F-test can be used 
to test the overall significance of the regression model (PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, 
1998). The R2 explains what percentage of output can be explained by the selected 
variables. 
6.2.1 The inverse water demand function and the net revenue (profit) 
function  
By estimating the profit function, we adopted Hotelling's Lemma. Specifically, 
what is needed in the model is equation (6.2b), which is a relevant parametric 
specification of the profit function, i.e., the relationship between profit function 
and input factor demand function needs a functional form. The approach is to get 
the inverse of water demand function first. Then, the estimated inverse water 
demand function will be used to obtain the profit function by integrating the 
demand function back. This kind of relationship can be more clearly illustrated in 
Figure 6.1. The Y-axis represents the water price, the X-axis represents the water 
consumption. A linear inverse water demand function shows a downward trend. 
The higher the water price is, the less water will be consumed. The small triangle 
below the inverse water demand function, which intersects with Y-axis and the 
shadowed rectangle, is the profit area that farmers got from water consumption. 
Specifically in the current study, the shadowed rectangular area represents a water  
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of relationship between profit function and inverse water demand 
function  
rent for water supplier, or a water expenditure for farmers. The concept of “profit” 
also needs to be clarified. Note that, the Hotelling's Lemma is still valid, which is 
independent of the "profit" defined. The profit function, in the model, is actually a 
water related net revenue function. Hence it is assumed that, in the present model, 
the variable costs, such as costs of fertilizer, are already deducted. Our concept of 
profit in the model therefore concerns only the net revenue, which concerns 
profits to pay for water consumption. 
To simplify the water demand, the function of the model is considered to be a 
linear function of the water price and the annually on-farm irrigation technology 
investment I. The price of water and investment in irrigation technology, for 
individual farmers are available from the field survey database (see Chapter 3). To 
estimate the water demand function, it is essential in the model to directly link 
investment to obtained objectives. As we assumed before, our objective function 
is a function of effective water use, annual private investment in irrigation 
technology, as well as annually public investment in canal construction, 
maintenance and operation. The concept of effective water use, which is defined 
as actual water consumption by plants, has already been mentioned in the 
previous chapter 5. In this study, our variable of effective water consumption can 
be achieved by investigating what kind of irrigation technology farmers operate. 
In terms of traditional technologies, such as flood irrigation, border irrigation, 
basin check irrigation, the variable water consumption was obtained by citing the 
results from several irrigation water filtrate experiments carried out by a research 
team in the survey area (WANG, 1999). In terms of modern technologies, the 
variable was obtained by citing international studies (CASWELL & ZILBERMAN, 
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1985; CHAKRAVORTY et al., 1995). By doing this the variable of effective water 
consumption for the empirical analysis has been calculated. 
Then, after the water demand function is estimated, the profit function of the 
water project area can be achieved by integrating this function back over the 
water demand. 
For the presentation of results, we start with the effective irrigation water demand 
function. It is specified as below: 
WPIEW ×−××−= − 152.7104.7643.84 2            (6.3) 
 502.26=t   305.3−=t   767.4−=t   141=n  
 347.02 =R , 634.36=F , 0000.0.. =Fsign  
Where EW is the effective water consumption, measured in cubic meter per Mu 
(Mu is the Chinese land unit measure. 1Mu=1/15 hectare or 666.67 m2.). I is the 
private investment in irrigation technology per Mu made annually during the life 
expectancy, and it is measured in Chinese currency Yuan per Mu. WP is the water 
price and it is measured in Yuan per cubic meter. 
Since cross-section instead of time series data were used in the model, it is not 
surprising that the R2 is only 0.347. Compared to other studies, it is already a 
relatively high value of R2 for cross-section data analysis. Both the F and the t 
significance are within expectations. The t value for the constant term, variable I 
and WP also show a strong significance. The estimated water demand function is 
therefore acceptable for the model. The numbers of observations are n=141 
instead of 149, because 8 farmers operate dry-land farming, therefore no irrigation 
water for them is demanded.  
To get profit function, we need firstly to obtain the inverse water demand function 
from equation (6.3). The inverse water demand function is presented as: 
EWIWP ×−×−= 14.001.083.11              (6.4) 
By having the inverse water demand function, we integrate the function. By 
integrating this function over quantities (a linear function becomes quadratic), we 
get the net revenue function (profit function) with respect to the effective water 
consumption: 
207.001.083.11 EWIEWEW −×−=π            (6.5) 
Where π is net revenue of one Mu in the project area, EW is effective water 
consumption per Mu and I is annual investment per Mu in water saving 
technology.  
6  THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
63
This profit function will be directly used as key component of the objective 
function. 
6.2.2 The on–farm water use efficiency function 
Since this study focuses on water use efficiency, the water efficiencies at on-farm 
level are very crucial in the modeling process. In this section we estimate the 
function of on-farm water use efficiency. It will serve as a component for the 
objective function and be a constraint in the programming model. As suggested in 
the previous empirical analysis, higher investment will result in high water use 
efficiency. Based on application of different irrigation technologies by farmers at 
different locations, the corresponding data of the coefficient of water use 
efficiency and the required private investment can be obtained. Linear and 
non-linear functional forms have been tested. Comparing the different fitness of 
the estimated functions, a quadratic functional form is considered being most 
applicable to reflect most closely the relationship between on-farm water 
efficiency and private investment. The on–farm water use efficiency function is 
calculated as follows:  
261094.20025.048.0 IIh ××−×+= −             (6.6) 
 12.66=t   98.11−=t  76.18=t   141=n  
 840.02 =R , 13.361=F , 0000.0.. =Fsign  
Where h is the on-farm water use efficiency (in %) and I is the annual unit private 
investment, measured in Yuan per Mu. 
The values of R2, t and F suggest strong significance, so the equation (6.6) is 
accepted as the most relevant on-farm water use efficiency function.  
6.2.3 The canal water loss rate function 
The function of canal water loss rate is another important component of the 
model. It is related to the public spending on water efficiency in terms of water 
conveyance in the spatial model. The more investment in the canal is undertaken, 
the less water will be lost from the canal. This relationship can be modeled by 
measuring different types of water conveyance systems, i.e., to set different levels 
of canal construction costs. For example, a closed pipe canal system may cost 
10,000 Yuan per km, and it can deliver water 100% to the farm gate without any 
loss. However, a kind of cement-constructed canal may cost only 3000 Yuan per 
km, but it may allow 3.3% water loss (GUO, 1980), while water is flowing in the 
canal, and so forth. This kind of relationship in our model, is reflected by a 
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quadratic canal water loss function, and by doing this, the unit-costs by the length 
of the canal as public investment can be measured. The public investment is 
responsive to distance. The longer the canal is, the more investment in 
construction, maintenances, and operation is needed. In this study we tried to keep 
the public investment simple. It is suggested that we can just multiply the 
unit-length cost by the canal length to get the total public investment. The data of 
public investment have been collected as well from literature as from the local 
water resource department. The life expectancy of different types of canals differs 
in correspondence to their construction level. Some can serve well up to 35 years, 
such as pipe-canals. Some can operate only 3-5 years, such as muddy canals (GUO, 
1980). After some financial mathematics, however, one can make comparison 
among investments. Since the activities incorporated in the model are surveyed 
within one agricultural year, the data of investment in the public canal are also 
taken as annual value.  
Finally the estimated quadratic function of canal water loss rate is specified as 
below:  
74.01025.5000405.0 27 +×+−= − KKa            (6.7) 
 019.5−=t      534.3=t    903.6=t    30=n  
 745.02 =R  02.19=F  0001.0. =Fsig  
Where a is the canal water loss rate (%) per km and K is the annual public 
investment per km in the canal. 
The equation (6.7) will serve as component and constraint in the programming 
model.  
6.2.4 Parameter estimation of the canal water price 
and the groundwater price 
Based on field research, it is evident, that the water price varies with the distance 
getting farther away from the water source (see chapter 3). By analyzing the field 
data, the empirical analysis indicates, that groundwater and canal water have quite 
different starting values and tendencies. The canal water price is cheap at the 
water source, and becomes more expensive when the distance gets farther. 
However, the groundwater price is higher than the canal water price, at the water 
source, due to its pumping costs. So farmers have no incentive to use groundwater 
in the upstream area. The groundwater price also increases with the distance 
getting farther, but it varies less as compared to the canal water price. The 
differences of pumping costs mainly depend on the actual depth of a tubewell. 
6  THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
65
With distance getting farther, it is assumed that the depth of the tube well 
increases.  
However, since no groundwater was used at the water source in the study area, no 
field data for the groundwater price at the water source area was available. By 
getting help from local technical experts, the groundwater price and the electricity 
costs for pumping based on well depth nearby are considered and calculated. By 
doing this, potential groundwater prices at the head area (upstream) are obtained. 
The data suggest that the canal water price and the groundwater price are given as 
being parallel over different locations. Quadratic functional forms are chosen to 
model the relationship between both price and location. The function of canal 
water price is expressed as: 
26 )105.4(0071.013.0 ddCWP ××−+×+= −           (6.8) 
 938.16=t  709.61=t  004.15−=t  141=n  
 99.02 =R  53.14759=F  0000.0. =Fsig  
Where CWP is the public canal water price, and d is the distance from the canal 
water source to farmer's field.  
Next the function of the groundwater price is specified below as: 
26 )10698.8(006.0475.0 ddGWP ××−+×+= −           (6.9) 
 935.42=t  918.35=t  104.20−=t   141=n  
 98.02 =R  17.2006=F  0000.0. =Fsign  
Where GWP is the private groundwater price, and d is the distance from the canal 
water source to farmer's field. 
These two functions will serve as parameters in the programming model. 
6.3 Summary 
The net revenue function, the on-farm water use efficiency function, the canal 
water loss function, and the functions for the canal water price and the 
groundwater price have been obtained by using regression methods. These 
functions will serve as key components in the spatial mathematical model. A 
detailed discussion of the mathematical programming modeling is presented in the 
next chapter.
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7 THE SPATIAL MATHEMATICAL 
PROGRAMMING MODEL 
An econometric model, which serves the programming model, was presented in 
the previous chapter 6. In this chapter, the spatial mathematical programming 
model will be introduced. It is a GAMS model. In the way of GAMS 
requirements, we present the objective function and the constraints of the 
approach. Functions estimated in the previous chapter will serve as empirical 
components of the objective function and outlined constraints in the modeling 
process. As generally well known, a programming model consists of four basic 
elements, the objective function, several optional activities, constraints, and a 
matrix of technical coefficients. In this chapter the four elements will be presented 
in line with the GAMS code, instead of a pure mathematical presentation.  
7.1 Overview of relevant variables, parameters and data 
All relevant variables, parameters and scalars are given as basic components of a 
mathematical programming model. Before we start to discuss the modeling 
process, it is necessary to clarify all of them in relation to the present study. 
Variables are listed in Table 7.1 and expressed in the GAMS code. These variables 
can be divided into endogenous and exogenous ones, which mainly depend on the 
role they play in the model internally or externally. Specifically in the SWAM 
model, the endogenous variables include canal water demand, groundwater 
demand, private investment in on-farm water saving technologies and public 
investment in the water conveyance system. Furthermore, the canal length, the 
on-farm water use efficiency, the canal water loss rate as well as the quantity of 
canal water remaining and the groundwater remaining at any location along the 
canal are considered. All of them will be determined by the programming model 
endogenously.  
The spatial programming model is initially a static model within one time period. 
From the aspect of space change, it can be treated as a dynamic process in the 
present study. An important common character is that an index "j" is appended to 
all the endogenous and exogenous variables as well as parameters, specifying a 
location. "j" represents a stretch of 50 meters along the canal. In j, the movement 
of water at any location along the canal as well as the investment in water 
conversation can be described and tracked homogenously. It suggests that all the 
variables and parameters concerned in the model are location wise (spatially) 
varying while the locations being connected. However, the model is discrete. 
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Table 7.1: List of variables, parameters and scalars of the model  
GAMS 
code Interpretation Measure unit 
Status in  
the model 
Variables 
SW Social welfare Yuan Endogenous 
NR (j) Net revenue at location j Yuan per Mu Endogenous 
LA (j) Land rent at location j Yuan per Mu Endogenous 
WA (j) Water rent at location j Yuan per Mu Endogenous 
CW (j) Canal water consumption at j  m3 per Mu Endogenous 
GW (j) Groundwater consumption at location j m3 per Mu Endogenous 
CREM (j) Canal water remains at location j m3 Endogenous 
GREM (j) Groundwater remains at location j m3 Endogenous 
I (j) Private investment in irrigation technology at location j  Yuan per Mu Endogenous 
K (j) Public investment in canal at location j Yuan per km Endogenous 
a(j) Canal water loss rate at location j % Endogenous 
h (j) On-farm water efficiency at location j % Endogenous 
Parameters 
C0 (j) Coefficient of net revenue function  Exogenous 
C1 (j) Coefficient of net revenue function  Exogenous 
C2 (j) Coefficient of net revenue function  Exogenous 
C3 (j) Coefficient of private investment   Exogenous 
E0 (j) Coefficient of on-farm water efficiency function  Exogenous 
E1 (j) Coefficient of on-farm water efficiency function  Exogenous 
E2 (j) Coefficient of on-farm water efficiency function  Exogenous 
R0 (j) Coefficient of canal water loss rate function  Exogenous 
R1 (j) Coefficient of canal water loss rate function  Exogenous 
R2 (j) Coefficient of canal water loss rate function  Exogenous 
CWP (j) Price of canal water Yuan per m3 Exogenous 
GWP (j) Price of groundwater Yuan per m3 Exogenous 
 Scalars   
CW0 Canal water stock at source m3 Exogenous 
GW0 Initial groundwater stock m3 Exogenous 
Beta Water recharge rate to groundwater % Exogenous 
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Parameters, matrixes, or scalars are exogenous elements. They were obtained 
either from the econometric model or directly from the database of the model. The 
parameters of the presented model are all from the estimated functions. They 
include several coefficients for the revenue function, the on-farm water efficiency 
function, the canal water loss rate function and the prices of groundwater and 
canal water. Some of them can vary with location depending on the conditions. 
Scalars are also exogenous to the model, and they were obtained via interviews 
with technical staff from the local water resource department and individual 
farmers as well as from the relevant literature. Also the model contains two 
different water recharge rates for groundwater, an initial water stock at the source 
and an initial groundwater stock. These starting conditions are given in the 
modeling process.  
7.2 The objective function of the spatial programming model 
7.2.1 General presentation of the objective function 
The objective function of the spatial programming model is used to maximize the 
social welfare in the survey area by focusing on efficient uses of water. It is 
calibrated with the estimated profit function. The optimization of social welfare is 
investigated by considering the water related net revenue of the survey area minus 
the expenditure on water conservation technologies. The net revenue is usually 
expressed as gross margin or as revenue minus the main variable input costs, such 
as seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, labor, and land preparing costs. Since the special 
emphasis of the study is on water use efficiency, all main variable input costs, 
such as fertilizer, pesticides and labor costs are kept constant and being deducted 
already. They do not vary with locations. The programming model hence 
considers only water-related costs. The water-related costs of the model 
incorporate public expenditure on water transportation in the conveyance system 
and individual farmers' investment in on-farm irrigation technologies. A detailed 
discussion about the objective function will be given in a later chapter due to 
technical needs. A more general description of the objective function is expressed 
as below: 
Social welfare = net revenue – private investment in irrigation technology – public investment 
in the water conveyance system – canal water costs – groundwater costs      
                    (7.1) 
In line with a mathematical formulation the objective function can be presented as 
below: 
( ) ∑∑ ∑∑∑ −×−×−−= j jj j jjjjj jj j KCWGWPCWCWPISWMax 05.015 π      (7.2) 
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Where j = location, it ranges from 1 to 200, and it represents a stretch every 50m 
along the canal, i.e., the length of irrigation system is 10km. 
 sw= social welfare over the irrigation area  
 πj = net revenue in Yuan/ Mu at location j 
 Ij = annual private investment in technology in Yuan/Mu at location j 
 Kj = annual public investment in water conveyance in Yuan/km at location j 
 CWPj = price of canal water at location j 
 GWPj = price of groundwater at location j 
 CWj = canal water consumption at location j 
 GWj = groundwater consumption at location j 
Employment of coefficient “15” is Mu related. It converts to Chinese land 
measurement in hectare. 
The first argument of the right hand side (RHS) ∑ j jπ15  represents the sum of net 
revenue of every unit at location j. As defined in previous chapter, a stretch of j is 
50 meters long; the length of the whole project area is assumed 10,000 m long and 
200 m wide. It suggests that one unit area what j represents is 50×200 = 10,000m2, 
which is either equal to 1 hectare or 15 Mu. Since π represents the net revenue per 
Mu, ∑ j jπ15  is therefore a representation of the sum of net revenues over all 
locations. The second argument ∑ j jI15  of the RHS represents the sum of private 
investment in irrigation technology at every location j. The third and fourth two 
arguments in the bracket are total canal water costs and groundwater costs 
respectively. The last argument ∑ j jK05.0 of the RHS represents the sum of public 
investment in the canal system at every location j. Since K is measured in 
Yuan/km, one unit of j (50m) is equivalent of 0.05 length of one kilometer.  
7.2.2 Components of the objective function and constraints of the model 
The net revenue function and the on-farm water use efficiency function are the 
key components of the objective function of the programming model. They were 
already estimated in the previous chapter 6 and are presented in this chapter again 
in way of the GAMS code:  
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The net revenue function is: 
207.001.083.11 jjjjj EWIEWEW −×−=π           (7.3) 
Where EWj is the effective water use, which will be replaced by TWj×hj in the 
programming model, Ij is the investment. So the net revenue function is newly 
specified as: 
2)(07.0)(01.0)(83.11 jjjjjjjj hTWIhTWhTW ××−×××−××=π      (7.4) 
Where TWj is the total water demand in the area of 1Mu and hj is the on-farm 
water use efficiency at location j  
Our on-farm water use efficiency function: is 
261094.20025.048.0 jjj IIh ××−×+= −            (7.5) 
The water use efficiency function is directly used in the objective function as one 
component of the net revenue function. It contributes to the measurement of the 
effective water consumption, but also serves as one constraint.  
The canal water loss function is: 
271025.5000405.074.0 jjj KKa ××+×−= −           (7.6) 
Where aj is the water loss rate at location j, Kj is annual public investment per km 
at location j. This canal water loss function will serve as a component of the 
equations of motion for canal water and groundwater and as one constraint of the 
optimization process as well.  
7.3 Key constraint conditions of the model 
7.3.1 The equations of motion of water movement 
Equations of motion are the most important constraints in a dynamic model. In 
this model they are transferred as location wise function. Technically one speaks 
of differential equations. For us, they are the central elements to solve a location 
problem. Since canal water is moving between locations and the groundwater 
stock also changes at locations, differential equations can be expressed as 
equation of spatial motion respectively.  
The equation of (spatial) motion is a classical concept of dynamic optimization 
procedures (CHIANG, 1992). The simplest problem is an optimal control problem. 
It can be expressed as below: 
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 Maximize  ∫= T dtuytFV 0 ),,(            (7.7a) 
 Subject to   ),,( uytfy =&             (7.7b) 
     Ay =)0( , )(Ty  free,   (A,T are given)  
and    Utu ∈)( , for all ],0[ Tt ∈  
Three types of variables are presented in the problem statement (7.7a): t 
(time-location), y (state) and u (control). The presence of the control variable u 
necessitates a linkage between u and y, to reflect how u will specifically affect the 
course taken by the state variable y. This linkage is provided by the equation 
),,( uytfy =& where the dotted symbol y& , denotes the time (change in location) 
derivative dtdy / . At the initial time (location), the first two arguments in the 
function must take the given value t = 0 and y(0) = A. Only the third argument is 
open for us to choose. What this setting does, therefore is to provide the 
mechanism whereby our choice of the control variable u can be translated into a 
specific pattern of movement of the state variable y over time (location). For this 
reason, the equation is referred to as the equation of motion for the state variable 
(or the state equation for short) (CHIANG, 1992).  
For the general interpretation, normally, equations of motion for the stated 
variables are expressed as dynamic functional forms, i.e., differential equations 
with respect to time t. However they can also serve as a differential equation with 
respect to location. This is exactly what is employed in the present study. For the 
optimal control theory presented above, the equation of motion is always 
connected to three different stages of the state variable, the initial condition, a 
terminal condition and a state in between of them. In this study, it is assumed that 
a relatively closed spatial water supply system exists in the project area, and the 
area has a stretch “j”. “j” substitutes "t". The framework was given in Figure 5.2. 
It implies that surface water and groundwater are jointly used along "j". It also 
implies that at a certain point farmers will use groundwater rather than canal 
water due to the fact that canal water is running out. Therefore, to optimize the 
model, the equations of motion for canal water and for groundwater must be taken 
into account simultaneously.  
The equation of motion for canal water flows is an application of equation (7.7a) 
and (7.7b) under special terminal condition, i.e., 0)( =jy . )( jy  is the canal water 
consumption at location j (j can be a location where canal water is used up in this 
case). The equation suggests that the state variable y(j) is no longer free of 
restrictions as presented in the equations (7.7a) and (7.7b) before. In GAMS 
modeling, we do not need and cannot pre-determine the terminal condition, since 
the end point of canal water will be decided by the model internally. The equation 
of motion for canal water flow in this model is thus expressed as a way of model 
7  THE SPATIAL MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING MODEL 
 
73
requirements (MCKINNEY & SAVITSKY, 2003; DELLINK, SZONYI, & BARTELINGS, 
2001). It can be specified as below:  
Initial condition: 
101 15 cwcwcrem ×−=                (7.8a) 
Discrete flow motion: 
jjjj cwcremacrem ×−×−= −− 15)1( 11             (7.8b) 
The equation (7.8a) is the initial condition for canal water flow, where cw0 
represents the canal water supply at the water source. “cw1“ is the quantity of 
canal water consumed by the first farmer within first 50 meters, crem1 is therefore 
the canal water that remains after the first farmer and then passes down to the next 
farmer, i.e., the next location.  
Then equation (7.8b) describes the amount of canal water that remains at location 
j, which starts from the second farmer and is going to be delivered to the next 
farmer. It is the general function of motions. It is expressed as a value of water 
that remains from the previous location j-1 minus water consumption at the 
present location j. Where cremj represents the canal water that remains, i.e., the 
canal water stock at location j. In the equations, cremj-1 represents the canal water 
that remained from the previous farmer's location j-1. Additionally we introduce 
the canal water loss rate aj-1 defined as before, it represents the canal water loss 
rate at location j-1.  
This was the canal water movement. In principle, the equation of motion is the 
same for groundwater motion. The initial point starts from the head of the survey 
area. It implies that there is an initial condition Ay =)0( . Specifically “grem1” is 
the groundwater remaining at the first location of the survey area. In terms of 
terminal condition, however, groundwater is free of restrictions and gives a lower 
bound of zero in the optimization process. The only difference is, that the 
groundwater extraction starts at point C (as shown in Figure 5.2) instead from the 
first location as for canal water. 
It is important to recognize that the groundwater aquifer can be recharged by 
water leaking from the canal and seepage from farmer's fields. It is therefore, 
suggested that the groundwater stock will increase all the time due to the recharge 
from both sources and without any extraction before point C. It is further noticed 
that, the canal water is so cheap that farmers have no incentive and no need to 
pump underground water until C. After point C, there is minor water flowing in 
the canal, and groundwater extraction starts from this point. This implies that the 
7  THE SPATIAL MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING MODEL 
 
 
74
fraction recharged from canal water becomes zero. The groundwater stock can 
only be recharged by seepage from farmer's fields. These stages will be also 
specified in the equation of motion. The mathematical formulation of the equation 
of motion for groundwater change is presented as below: 
Initial condition: 
11101 1515)1( gwtwhgwgrem ×−××−×+= β           (7.9a) 
Discrete flow motion: 
jjjjjjj twhgwcremagremgrem ××−×+×−××+= −−− 15)1(15111 ββ     (7.9b) 
Equation (7.9a) describes the initial condition for groundwater change. Where 
grem1 represents the groundwater remaining at location 1 which will be available 
for the second location, gw0 represents the groundwater base stock at the head 
location, i.e., the groundwater stock at the first farmer's field. The second part is 
the fraction of groundwater recharged from the first farmer’s field, since no water 
recharged from canal is observed at the first location due to zero distance from the 
water source. In this part, tw1 is the joint conjunctive water used at the first 
location, β is defined as the recharge rate for groundwater, and h is the water 
efficiency in farmers’ field. gw1 is the groundwater consumption at the first 
location. Equation (7.9b) is the change of groundwater stock at any location 
except the first location. The gremj represents the groundwater remaining from the 
previous farmer to the next farmer at location j, here j starts from farmer 2. β is 
recharge rate for groundwater, so 11 −− ×× jj cremaβ  represents the water loss 
fraction at the location j-1 from the canal and can be recharged to the aquifer. gwj 
is the groundwater quantity extracted by an individual farmer at location j. As 
defined before, h is the effective water use function, therefore jj twh ××−× 15)1(β  
represents the fraction of pumped groundwater and surface water loss from a 
farmers' field which recharges the groundwater aquifer at location j. It can be used 
by farmers at the next location.  
These equations of motion for canal water flow and groundwater change for each 
location will serve as the most important constraint conditions in this spatial 
model. 
7.4 Technical coefficients  
Quite fortunately, we are getting most of the coefficients from the econometric 
model, we do not have many technical coefficients directly to incorporate into the 
programming process. As an important starting point for the model, we have 
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initial canal water and groundwater capacity at the first location, measured in m3. 
They are specified:  
000,3000 =cw ; 10000 =gw  
And we also have two different recharge rates of groundwater stock, which are 
3.0=β  and 8.0=β  respectively.  
These coefficients will serve as scalars in the programming model directly.  
7.5 Review of employed modeling approaches of the study 
From chapter 5 to the present chapter, the structure and methodology of SWAM 
model have been discussed. By using econometric model and duality approach of 
profit function, the net revenue function of water was obtained. This procedure 
provided an important premise for formulating the objective function of the 
programming model. The latter achieved on-farm water use efficiency function 
and canal water loss function also simultaneously serve to the objective function 
and constraints conditions.  
 
As mentioned already, the equation of motion is the most important character of a 
dynamic model. Normally a dynamic model is related to time. In the present study, 
the model we built can be considered as a static approximation of a dynamic 
problem, which is merely related to space change. For the time being, the model 
is run within one time period, in line with the public and private investment to the 
water conservation being fixed at one time period too. This is a limitation of the 
model. In future, it is necessary to consider a more complicated situation, for 
instance, to run the model with time and space change simultaneously, so that the 
model’s usefulness can be extended while time changing. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has given a presentation of the spatial programming model in a way 
of GAMS requirements. The relevant variables and parameters were presented. 
The objective functions and constraints as well as technical coefficients were also 
discussed and translated into the GAMS language. The most important features of 
the spatial model, the employment of equations of motion for canal water and 
groundwater were stressed in this chapter. The applied modeling approaches of 
the study and the limitation of the spatial model have been briefly reviewed. 
Based on the establishment of the programming model, some different policies 
oriented scenarios will be discussed in the coming three chapters.
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8. IMPACTS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT STATUS 
CHANGE ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND WATER 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION  
The core of this study is to investigate the impacts of improving water use 
efficiency through public and private investment on social welfare and allocation 
of water resources. The model structure and the optimization process were 
introduced in previous chapters. Based on those outlines, different polices 
oriented scenarios will be discussed in the current and the next two chapters. The 
selected scenarios are supposed to value the impacts of water efficiency on social 
welfare and allocation of water resources. Indicators, such as: 
z Land rent,  
z Revenue,  
z Water rent,  
z Canal water demand,  
z Groundwater demand,  
z Private investment,  
z Public investment,  
z Water use efficiency at on-farm level, and  
z Water use efficiency in conveyance system,  
will be modeled within these chapters. Among them, private investment and 
public investment are two critical variables in the study. To investigate the role 
they play in water saving and the relationship between them, we focus on these 
variables. They are the main concerns of the study. 
8.1. Specification of elements concerning the modeling process  
8.1.1 Specification of objective function and related concepts  
The general form of the objective function has already been introduced in the 
previous chapter 7. To explore the movement of private and public investment and 
their consequent impacts in more detail, the general objective function will be 
specified as three different forms to model the impacts of different policies 
orientations. In the present chapter, the impacts of public investment status change 
on social welfare and water resource allocation will be assessed. Again, this study 
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solely focuses on water related social welfare. It is therefore suggested that 
merely the revenue associated with water use and water project spending is 
incorporated into the objective function. Actually, social welfare would be an 
economic surplus, i.e. the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Since 
we investigate production of a small area, we think that this does not impact on 
prices. Hence, it makes sense to focus on producer surplus only.  
The objective function is expressed in such a form in GAMS modeling:  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )∑
∑
××+××+×+×−
×××+××+×××=
j jjjjjj
jjjjjjjjjjj
gwgwpcwcwpIk
htwIchtwchtwcwelfareSocial
15151505.0
21015 2
  (8.1) 
Where  
c0j, c1j and c2j are coefficients of the revenue function. They were obtained by 
integrating the inverse water demand function.  
twj is water demand per Mu at location j.  
hj is a function of on-farm water use efficiency at location.  
Ij is private investment in irrigation technology at location j. measured in Chinese 
currency RMB Yuan/Mu annually. 
kj is public investment at location j. measured in Chinese currency RMB Yuan per 
km annually. 
cwpj is a parameter of canal water price at location j. 
cwj is canal water demand per Mu at location j. 
gwpj is a parameter of groundwater price at location j. 
gwj is groundwater demand per Mu at location j. 
All definitions of economic welfare are narrowed within water related issues. By 
doing so, the model can better clarify relationships among different variables. 
Such questions as how much a variable react to another when any relevant 
element changes. For instance, the following definitions of revenue, land rent and 
water rent are narrowly defined within water related domain (UMETSU, 1995). 
They are specified as below:  
Revenue: The revenue computed in the current study is part of total revenue of the 
apple production. It is related and derived from water consumption in the current 
study. Revenue from rainfed apple production is considered fixed and will not be 
concerned in the study. Only irrigation water is investigated. In a certain 
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acceptable limit, the more water is consumed, the higher the revenue will be. Its 
mathematical value is: 
nfunctiodemandwaterinversefromnintegratioofncomputatio
water)irrigationwithd(associateRevenue
=    (8.2) 
Land rent: This is a concept that is related to land productivity and capacity as 
well as to the expected return from the production activity per Mu. The land rent 
increases with higher productivity due to irrigation. In this study rents are 
calculated by subtracting water costs and private investment in on-farm activities 
from revenue. Note, the private investment in this study is only limited to 
investment in irrigation technology. The land rent is hence specified as: 
technologyirrigationininvestmentprivate
costsrgroundwatecostswatercanalrevenuerentLand
−
−−=       (8.3) 
Water rent: In this study, this term is related to the public sector. It is considered a 
sum of collected water fee from farmers less the public expenditure on water 
conveyance system. It is specified as below:  
conveyancewaterininvestmentpublic
tsrgroundwatetswatercanalrentWater
−
+= coscos
        (8.4) 
8.1.2 Specification of variables and programming 
Before going to programming, it is necessary to clarify some more variables and 
some more modeling aspects. Please note: A model is to reflect the reality, but it 
cannot precisely duplicate the complex situation of reality due to its technical 
limitations. On the other hand, we need a model to show the implications from 
changing conditions that bring about reality. 
To make the model neat and simplified, we assume that the canal length in the 
model is 10 km and, correspondingly the initial canal water capacity is given as 
300,000 m3, i.e., cw0=300,000 m3.  
On groundwater, in reality groundwater stock can never be 0. Hence we assume 
that the initial groundwater stock is 1000 m3 before any recharge emerges, i.e., 
gw0= 1000 m3. So the total water capacity defined by the model is 301,000m3. We 
also assume there are 200 ha land, i.e., 3000 Mu in the modeling process. One Mu 
can therefore get 100.3 m3 irrigation water on average (rainfall is not considered 
in the study) according to the total water capacity. For apple growing in the 
survey area, within an average year, about 104 m3/Mu irrigation water is required; 
within a dry year, about 170 m3/Mu irrigation water is required (BUREAU OF 
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WATER RESOURCES OF LIQUAN COUNTY, 1999). Taken them all into account, we 
assume that unit water consumption under 170 m3/Mu is within a reasonable 
water requirement for apples. This assumption further indicates, within this limit, 
the more water is consumed, the higher revenue will be. 
In this study, a positive lower bound of total water consumption at any location j 
is used in the modeling process to ensure that farmers at any location can get a 
minimum amount of water, either from canal or underground. In the current 
model, it is set at twj = 20 indicating that the minimum amount of water a farmer 
can get at any location, is 20 m3 water. 
Soil permeability is an important element in the model. Different soil conditions 
will cause considerable difference in model results. The survey area is situated at 
the edge of the Guanzhong Basin, where soils are most loess. The permeability of 
loess is moderate, ranging from 0.25-0.4 in the survey area (BUREAU OF WATER 
RESOURCES OF LIQUAN COUNTY, 1999). In the present study, a seepage rate of 
water (or recharge rate of groundwater) is considered which is identical to soil 
permeability in the area. We take 0.3 as low soil permeability and 0.8 as high soil 
permeability, for such soil as loess and sand soil, to model the different impacts 
on water resource allocation.  
The modeling process used to be very difficult to get through. Since the objective 
function and constraints are highly non-linear, it is difficult to solve the model by 
only using the Conopt solver (GAMS solver). In order to achieve the optimal 
solution, a second solve option of Minos (GAMS solver) was added after the first 
solve.  
8.2 Public investment policy scenarios analysis 
This chapter will focus on investigating the impacts of public investment status 
change. As mentioned already, the role, which private and public investments are 
playing in water saving activities, is one of the main concerns of this study. After 
investigating a base run model, which keeps public and private investment 
endogenous in the optimization procedure, further two scenarios are chosen to 
model the impacts of public investment rather than private investment due to 
internal properties of private investment (it will be discussed later in this section). 
Furthermore in order to make the model’s application more broadly and close to 
reality, two types of soil permeability, which are represented by the recharge rate 
of groundwater, are introduced into the scenario analysis. One of them works with 
endogenous public investment and the other works with exogenous public 
investment. The selected scenarios are specified in Table 8.1 respectively: 
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Table 8.1: Scenario groupings, names, abbreviations, and descriptions for assessing 
impacts of public investment status change 
Group/Name Abbreviation Description 
Scenarios of public investment policy:  
 
 
Optimal public investment scenario  
Base run model 
 
 
 
 
 
A removal of public investment under 
low soil permeability scenario 
 
 
 
A removal of public investment under 
high soil permeability scenario 
 
 
 
 
LSEK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LSRK1 
 
 
 
 
HSRK1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To maximize the optimal social welfare and water 
resource allocation under endogenous public and 
private investment. It is used as the benchmark 
against which other scenarios are compared so as to 
quantify the likely effects of the status of public 
investment changes being models. 
 
To model the overall impacts of a removal of public 
investment from the water conveyance system 
under low soil permeability without private 
investment being made in irrigation technology 
 
To model the overall impacts of a removal of public 
investment from the water conveyance system 
under high soil permeability without private 
investment being made in irrigation technology 
 
 
All the scenarios analyzed in this study include three parts: 
1) To measure the impacts of variations on aggregate indicators, such as social 
welfare, total water consumption (canal water and groundwater), total private 
and public investment as well as gains from conjunctive water use. 
2) To further investigate the impacts of scenarios on indicators at individual farm 
level by doing mean value analysis and figure illustration at different locations. 
3) To give brief concluding remarks concerning the current scenario and raise 
further research questions. 
8.2.1 Optimal public investment scenario (Base run model) 
The optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) is run without restrictions on any 
endogenous variable. The public investment K and private investment Ι are 
endogenous variables in the model. The recharge rate for groundwater is at 0.3. It 
therefore can be considered a base run model to compare variations with the 
further scenarios.  
8.2.1.1 Impacts on aggregate indicators in the optimal public investment scenario 
The aggregate indicators, such as social welfare, total water consumption, total 
public expenditure on water conveyance as well as irrigated area, are presented in  
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Table 8.2: Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at aggregate level 
in the optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) 
Items LSEK 
Social welfare (Yuan) 1,065,334.88 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 300,000.00 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 56,635.07 
Total water consumption (m3) 356,635.07 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) 55,635.07 
Total public investment (Yuan) 2,431.55 
Switch point (location) 164.00 
Canal water length (meter) 8,200.00 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 2,460.00 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 540.00 
Total private investment (Yuan) 0.00 
Notes: The switch point is at location 164, at which canal water ends and groundwater use starts.    
They are cw164=104.7m3, gw164= 1.87m3, respectively.  
LSEK: It indicates optimal public investment scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
endogenous public and private investment.  
 
Table 8.2. These indicators represent the optimal level of the aggregate social 
welfare and water resource allocation in the irrigation area suggested in the 
optimal public investment scenario (LSEK). The social welfare is reported 1.065 
million Yuan over the irrigation area. It means that a sum of producer surplus over 
the entire irrigation area reaches some 1 million Yuan after deducting basic inputs 
elements and expenditure on irrigation farming. The total canal water 
consumption is 300,000m3, meeting exactly the canal water capacity of the model. 
The canal water being used up indicates that using cheaper canal water is the first 
choice for farmers, as compared to using groundwater. Due to seepage from canal 
and farmers’ fields, the groundwater stock has been actually recharged. After 
canal water is used up, farmers start to take groundwater. The total groundwater 
consumption is observed at 56,635m3. Hence, the conjunctive water (canal water 
and groundwater) consumption over the entire area is 356,635m3 in total. This is 
18.5% more than the initially provided capacity of water supply2 of 301,000m3. 
There is therefore a gain of 55,635m3 water due to conjunctive water usage. The 
model also optimizes the social welfare by undertaking the heavy public 
investment in the canal system, with an average annual costs of 298 Yuan/km and 
2431Yuan in total in the irrigation area. Consequently the canal water reaches 
location 164 (switch point), which covers 82% of the canal length over the 
                                                        
2 It is assumed in the model, the total water capacity is 301,000 m3, of which the initial canal water capacity is 
300,000 m3, and the initial groundwater stock is 1,000 m3.  
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irrigation area with a zero-loss-rate being reported. Thanks to water flowing long 
in the canal, 82% of farmers’ lands are irrigated by canal water, while only the 
remaining 18% are irrigated by groundwater. Total private investment is, 
however, chosen to be 0 over the entire area. Zero private investment shows that 
there is no farmer applying modern water saving technology in the irrigation area. 
The reasons for high public investment and zero private investment chosen by the 
model are discussed as follows: 
Since social welfare of the irrigation area is to be optimized, any investment in 
farming, i.e. expenditure, either private investment in irrigation technology or 
public investment in canal construction, would reduce the entire social welfare. 
The model internally determines that the public investment is heavily made till 
location 163 in order to ensure the canal water can be delivered further with low 
loss rates. It is observed notably, that the public investment is kept 298 Yuan/km 
on average within the 163 locations annually. According to related technical data 
from field survey and model results, this type of investment implies that a 
quasi-pipe canal system is chosen to reduce the canal water loss rate to zero. Also 
heavy public investment suggests a well-managed canal system. The public 
investment, on the one hand, lowers the water costs for all farmers and the entire 
revenue will consequently increase. On the other hand, the public investment is 
calculated in the objective function based on average annual investment instead of 
the huge total project costs3, and moreover, the modeled irrigation area is very 
small and works with merely a 10km-long canal. At last, it is deducted from a 
revenue function directly rather than influenced by the investment. So the model 
result of public investment is relatively small and acceptable for the revenue 
function as compared to the benefit it can bring. That is why public investment 
was accorded the highest value in the model.  
Contrary to the public investment being high, the model has determined the 
private investment to be zero over all locations. It suggests that farmers would 
keep using traditional flood or furrow irrigation rather than adopting any modern 
water-saving technology in this scenario. The reason for zero private investment 
can be justified by considering the component of revenue function and its high 
costs. On the one hand, the revenue function, which is employed in the objective 
function, is defined as merely part of total revenue. It was obtained by integrating 
the inverse water demand function (see Chapter 6). Recalling the water demand 
function, it is a function of water price and private investment in irrigation 
technology, and any positive private investment would reduce the revenue 
                                                        
3 Public lining investment can be very high. Some literatures show a pipe canal system costs 10000 Yuan per 
kilometer, but it can serve 25-30 years or so. This study just roughly takes an average annual cost into account. 
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according to the mathematical formula. Moreover, the year when the data were 
collected was a bad year for most of the farmers. This also results in low revenues 
and low capability to afford the expensive irrigation technology. Lastly, the 
irrigation technology costs are quite high compared to the value of the partial 
revenue4.  
On the other hand, the partial revenue mainly is contributed and measured by 
apple trees’ water consumption according to its component of the mathematical 
form. In the current study, we assume that apple trees are watered within a 
reasonable limit. The more water is given, the higher yields will be. The private 
investment of zero represents that farmers adopt traditional flood and furrow 
irrigation technologies in the study. It is to be noted further traditional irrigation 
technique application consumes more water than modern irrigation technologies. 
The employed mathematical model endogenously determines to consume as much 
water as possible in order to maximize the social welfare. Taking both views into 
account, it is understandable why the model in the base run (optimal public 
investment scenario LSEK) keeps private investment to be zero over all locations. 
Based on this background, all further scenarios of public investment policy will 
not force any private investment to influence the optimization procedure. The 
impact of positive private investment will be further investigated in the coming 
two chapters. Considering the relationship between private and public investment 
in the model, the model results suggest a kind of combination between both. In 
this case, however, private investment is kept zero over all locations, it therefore 
requires public investment to make more efforts to ensure the water use efficiency 
for the irrigation area. The model results are also consistent with the actual 
situation in the survey area, where farmers are poor, and they seldom adopt 
modern irrigation technologies. However the local government has to support the 
whole irrigation system.  
8.2.1.2 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
The overall impacts on the social economy and allocation of water resources in 
the irrigation area have been discussed. How are the situations of economy and 
water distribution for individual farmers? These questions will be investigated in 
the current section. 
Mean figures of some relevant variables under different farmer categories are 
analyzed and compared. The reason for this is, that the model is a location 
                                                        
4 Investment in modern irrigation technology can be very costly for individual farmers. According to the field 
survey, the costs range from 150-500 Yuan/Mu annually. 
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specific one and contains 200 locations. It suggests that every variable would get 
200 different figures. Due to limitation of space, it is not wise to list and 
investigate all 200 values of each variable in the study. But it is reasonable to list 
the most relevant variables employed in the model and compare their mean 
figures under different scenarios. Variables, such as land rent and revenue, are 
considered the relevant variables associated with farmers’ economic situation, 
while other variables, such as water rent, water consumption as well as public and 
private investment in line with efficiency of water conveyance system and 
on-farm level, are taken into account to analyze water resource allocation at 
individual farmers’ level. According to the characteristics of the model results, 
three different categories of water users are established. They are specified as 
categories of all users (AU), canal water users (CWU) and groundwater users 
(GWU). The number of AU is the sum of CWU and GWU, and equals to 200 in 
this study (in the following analysis, it is assumed that one location represents one 
farmer. In reality, one location could situate more than one farmer). However the 
numbers of CWU and GWU are varying, which depends on where the canal water 
end point is. Beside tables, some diagrams may also be required in order to 
investigate more clearly the change of tendency of one variable or the relationship 
among different variables. The comparison of the impacts on the individual 
farmers’ economic situation and water resource allocation is listed in Table 8.3. 
Except the public investment, which is measured by Yuan/km, all the other 
variables are calculated based on the Chinese land unit Mu.  
Table 8.3: Mean values of indicators at farm level in optimal public investment 
scenario (LSEK) 
LSEK  Items AU CWU GWU %(CWU&GWU)
Revenue (Yuan) 445.26 451.24 418.02 7.95 
Land rent (Yuan) 355.92 371.73 283.93 30.92 
Aggregate water demand (m3) 118.88 121.95 104.88 16.28 
Water rent (Yuan) 88.53 78.53 134.09 -41.43 
Private investment (Yuan/Mu) 0.00 0.00 0.00
On-farm water use efficiency 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.00 
Public investment (Yuan/km) 243.16 298.35 0
Water conveyance loss rate 0.00 0.07
Notes: AU=All users; CWU = Canal water users; GWU = Groundwater users.  
As shown already in Table 8.2, the switch point is at location 164, on which canal water 
ends and groundwater use starts. They are cw164=104.7m3, gw164= 1.87m3, respectively. 
The groundwater use is so little at switch point that it is ignored when mean analysis is 
made. The number of CWU and GWU are therefore 164 and 36 respectively.  
LSEK: It indicates the optimal public investment scenario, which is run under low soil 
permeability, endogenous public and private investment.  
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We start from the farmers’ economic situation. The average unit revenues are 
445.26 Yuan/Mu and 451.24Yuan/Mu for all water users (AU) and canal water 
users (CWU), respectively. Only a tiny difference in revenue of 5.98 Yuan/Mu is 
observed between farmer category AU and CWU. The reason for this is CWU 
account for 82% users of AU. The unit revenue made by CWU, therefore, at a 
large extent, can represent the performance made by AU. A decline of 7.95% of 
revenue is reported by GWU as compared to CWU due to less water consumption 
and high water costs. It indicates that farmers using canal water can make higher 
revenue than those using groundwater.  
A considerable decrease of 30.92% of land rents for GWU is observed compared 
to that for CWU. This is mainly due to higher groundwater costs. Since no private 
investment is made under this scenario, the reduction of land rent has merely 
contributed to increasing water costs. But these water costs do not stimulate 
purchase of technology due to high costs. The model results clearly suggest, that 
the land rent will decrease over distance. At the first location, it ranks in the top 
position of 458.25 Yuan/Mu. This is 1.65 times higher than the lowest land rent of 
277.44 Yuan/Mu found at the last location. The average land rent for CWU is 
371.73 Yuan/Mu, which is 30.92% higher compared to 283.93 Yuan/Mu for GWU. 
The average aggregate water consumption per Mu for AU over the irrigation area 
is 118.88m3. This amount of water consumption is less than that for CWU and 
more for GWU. CWU on average consume the biggest volume of water at unit 
level, i.e., 121.95 m3/Mu, due to the relatively low costs of water. Used water is 
16.28% more than that consumed by GWU. As shown later in Figure 8.1, the 
tendency of aggregate water demand from water source to tail declines gradually 
due to increasing water price over distance. The high public investment ensures 
that the canal water is with a zero-loss-rate before it is used up so that more 
farmers can benefit from the canal water with relative low costs.  
A water rent as defined before, is a concept associated with a water supplier, who 
collects a water fee from water users. It is closely tied to public investment, since 
the collected water fee will be used to build and operate a water conveyance 
system. Water rent is therefore expressed as a form of water charges less the 
public investment. Specifically, in the model, the average unit water rent for AU is 
88.53 Yuan/Mu, which is slightly higher than that for CWU, and much lower than 
that for GWU. The unit average water rent for GWU is up to 134.09 Yuan/Mu, 
with an increase of 41.43% compared to that for CWU. Comparing a decrease of 
41.43% of water rent and an increase of 16.28% of water consumption, the two 
figures indicate that the price difference between canal water and groundwater is 
the major determining factor for the volume of water consumption.  
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A base water use efficiency rate of 0.48 at on-farm level is reported over all 
locations due to zero private investment. The base on-farm water efficiency 
indicates that farmers will apply traditional surface irrigation technology instead 
of adopting any modern water saving techniques. Again it is noted that, public 
investment is suggested to be 243.16 Yuan/km on average over the whole area. 
For CWU, it is observed to be 298.45 Yuan/km; in line with a zero-loss rate until 
location 163. After location 164, there is no more water available in the canal. 
Naturally the conveyance costs become zero, and in line with a base loss rate 0.07 
for GWU.  
There are only two figures on water consumption and revenue changing presented 
in this section. We will give more figure illustration in the later scenarios, so that 
the same variables can be compared among different scenarios. Figure 8.1 
describes in more detail the unit water consumption along the canal. The curve of 
water demand indicates, that the unit water consumption declines gradually with 
the distance getting farther from the water source. As further found in model 
results, the canal water consumption at the first location is 138.64m3, the highest 
water demand over the whole area. Contrary, the farmer at the last location takes 
the least consumption of 103.35m3 water. The water remaining in the canal is 
getting less and less due to farmers’ extraction and finally becoming zero at 
location 165. Location 164 is the last location where canal water is still available. 
It is also at this location, that a tiny complementary part, solely 1.81 m3 of 
groundwater is taken due to insufficient canal water supply. After location 164, 
there is no longer water available in the canal. Farmers switch to groundwater 
completely.  
Normally there are two factors that drive farmers to switch to groundwater. One 
is, when the canal water is used up. In this case, the price of canal water is lower 
than that of groundwater at all time. The other factor is, when the price of canal 
water is getting higher than that of groundwater somewhere. No matter what kind 
of situation, the outcome is always the same, i.e., farmers will use up all the canal 
water before its price gets higher than that of groundwater.  
The shape of the revenue is illustrated in Figure 8.2. It is clearly shown that the 
unit revenue decreases with distance getting farther from the water source due to 
increasing costs. Farmers at the water source will get the highest revenue among 
all the farmers. The model results show that the unit revenue at the water source 
can be up to 477.26 Yuan/Mu. However, it is only 414.6 Yuan/Mu at the last 
location, which is 13% lower than that at the water source. The average revenues 
for CWU and GWU are 451.25 Yuan/Mu and 418.02 Yuan/Mu respectively. 
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Figure 8.1: Conjunctive water uses over distance for CWU and GWU in optimal public 
investment scenario (LSEK) 
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Figure 8.2: Changing in unit of revenue for CWU and GWU over distance in optimal 
public investment scenario (LSEK) 
8.2.2.3 Concluding remarks of optimal public investment scenario (LSEK)  
The optimal public investment scenario investigates the impacts on social welfare 
and water resource allocation by keeping the private and public investment 
endogenous to the model. As regards to the aggregate social economy and water 
resource allocation, the model results suggest that, social welfare reaches some 1 
million Yuan over the whole irrigation area. A gain from conjunctive water use is 
up to 55,635 m3. As regards the average level of individual farmers, it is 
suggested by the model that revenue, land rent and water consumption decline 
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with distance from the water source. Thanks to the increasingly higher water price 
over the distance, the water rent however increases with distance from the water 
source. The model results also reveal that the public investment is determined 
internally by the model, being at a high level, and it suggests that a quasi-piped 
canal system with zero-loss-rate is chosen by the model. However the private 
investment is chosen to be zero over all locations in the model due to its high 
costs. The outcomes of public and private investment indicated, for a poor area, 
such as the survey area, government has to take all the responsibility for water 
saving activity, since ordinary farmers cannot afford the costly modern irrigation 
technologies. Based on this characteristic, the further scenario will focus on the 
impacts of public investment policy change under two different soil conditions.   
Further research questions are: Is it possible to model the performance of private 
investment that was unable to do in the present scenario? This will be discussed in 
the next two chapters.  
8.2.2 A removal of public investment under low soil permeability scenario 
The impacts on social welfare and water resource allocation have been discussed 
in the optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) with private and public 
investment remaining endogenous. Due to the characteristics of the variable of 
private investment, which was discussed in previous scenario, we will explore the 
impacts on social welfare and water resource allocation by changing the status of 
public investment. The question is: What will happen to social welfare and water 
resource allocation after the public investment is removed from the irrigation 
system? In the current scenario, the variable of public investment is no longer 
endogenous. It is exogenously fixed at 0 over all locations. Zero public 
investment indicates that government will do nothing to improve the water 
conveyance efficiency in the irrigation system. The recharge rate for groundwater 
is still at 0.3 in the current scenario. 
8.2.2.1 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
The indicators of social welfare and allocation of water resources are shown in 
Table 8.4. It is observed that in current scenario of a removal of public investment 
under low soil permeability, namely LSRK1, merely 0.6 million Yuan of social 
welfare is achieved, a decrease of 43.4% compared to a social welfare of 1.06 
million under scenario LSEK. Total canal water consumption declines sharply due 
to less water availability in the canal. It shows that the total canal water 
consumption falls to 66,027 m3 compared to a consumption of 300,000 m3 in 
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Table 8.4: Comparison of indicators at aggregate level between optimal public 
investment scenario (LSEK) and a removal of public investment under low 
soil permeability scenario (LSRK1)  
Items LSRK1 LSEK % 
Social welfare (Yuan) 612,782.89 1,065,334.88 -42.48 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 66,027.23 300,000.00 -77.99 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 96,554.60 56,635.07 70.49 
Total water consumption (m3) 162,581.82 356,635.07 -54.41 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 0.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) -138,418.18 55,635.07 -348.80 
Total public investment (Yuan) 0.00 2,431.55  
Switch point (Location) 37.00 164.00 -77.44 
Canal water length (m) 1850.00 8200.00 -77.44 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu)  555.00 2460.00 -77.44 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 2445.00 540.00 352.78 
Total private investment (Yuan) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes:  Farmers take last chance to get canal at location 37, then switch to groundwater 
completely from location 38. 
LSRK1: It indicates a removal of public investment under low soil permeability scenario, which 
is run under low soil permeability, exogenous public investment and endogenous 
private investment. 
LSEK:  It indicates the optimal public investment scenario, which is run under low soil 
permeability, endogenous public and private investment.  
scenario LSEK. It further implies that 77.99% of canal water is lost due to the 
poorly operated conveyance system. It is not surprising to note that groundwater 
consumption increases significantly by 70.49%. A large amount of canal water 
leaks from the canal due to a poorly operated water conveyance system and 
recharges the groundwater stock. However, the use of groundwater is very 
expensive compared to that of canal water. That is why an increase of 
groundwater use deteriorates the entire social welfare so much. Total water 
consumption also declines sharply, with a decrease of 54% compared to scenario 
LSEK. Only a total of 162,581.82 m3 water is consumed over the whole area, in 
comparison to a total water supply capacity of 301,000 m3. It demonstrates, that 
138,418,18 m3 water, almost half of the water capacity, is lost due to huge water 
losses in the water conveyance system and seepage from farmers’ field. A net 
water loss of 138,418 m3 is reported in the scenario LSRK1. As a most general 
result: A poor managed canal system results in a huge water loss. The canal water 
is used up already at location 37, and it consequently decreases the canal 
irrigation area by 77.44%, while the area irrigated by groundwater triples.  
All the above indicators strongly suggest that a removal of public support for the 
water conveyance system under low soil permeability will largely hamper the 
social economy as well as worsen the allocation of water resources.  
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8.2.2.2 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
Does a removal of public support for the water conveyance system also 
deteriorate much individual farmers’ economic situation and water resource 
allocation? Table 8.5 gives more detailed information to analyze these questions. 
Due to significant water seepage from the canal, the canal water can be used up 
only over a very short distance. Insufficient water supply can result in decreasing 
output and hence worsen the farmers’ economic situation. It is shown, that the 
average unit revenue for all the farmers falls by 45.5% to 242.52 Yuan/Mu, as 
compared to scenario LSEK. Revenue made by CWU decreases slightly. It drops 
to 436.17 Yuan/Mu compared to that of 451.24 Yuan/Mu in scenario LSEK. This 
result suggests that CWU can still get considerable revenue compared to their 
counterpart GWU, since they still have access to cheaper canal water. However 
the unit revenue for GWU decreases sharply by 52.5% to 198.56 Yuan/Mu, 
compared with scenario LSEK. GWU averagely make unit revenue only of 
198.56 Yuan/Mu, which is less than half of revenue made by CWU within the 
same scenario and 52.2% less than that in scenario LSEK. The tendency of unit 
revenue changing in the current scenario LSRK1 demonstrates that under a poorly 
operated water conveyance system, most farmers’ interests would get damaged 
due to lack of access to cheaper canal water. However few of them, who have 
access to canal water, can still assure their income. At a certain point, a removal 
of public investment could be harmful to social efficiency and equity. It worsens 
not only the overall social economy but also individual farmers’ economic 
situation. It also enlarges the income gap between upstream farmers and 
downstream farmers. 
The same situation happens with regard to land rent. The average unit land rent 
for the AU is 204.26 Yuan/Mu, which is 42.61% lower than that in scenario 
LSEK. Exceptionally for CWU, the land rent is 406.75 Yuan, 9.4% higher than 
that in scenario LSEK of 371.73 Yuan. The reason is that the number of CWU 
contains merely 37 upstream water users in the current scenario, while it contains 
164 users in scenario LSEK. The closer a farmer is located to the water source, 
the cheaper the water price and hence the higher the land rent will be. The mean 
value of unit land rent with respect to the 37 farmers, is naturally higher than that 
for 164 farmers. That is why the average unit land rent can be higher in the 
current scenario for CWU. However for GWU, the situation is opposite. Average 
unit land rent is only 158.30 Yuan/Mu, with a decrease of 44.25% as compared to 
that in scenario LSEK. It also shows a decrease of 61.08% compared with their 
counterparts CWU in the current scenario LSRK1.  
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The water resources are mismanaged and largely lost from the water conveyance 
system. The average joint water consumption per Mu over the whole area is 
merely 54.19 m3, reduced by 54.5% compared with that in scenario LSEK. For 
CWU, the unit canal water consumption shows a slight decline in scenario 
LSRK1. It is 118.97 m3/Mu, compared to 121.95 m3/Mu in scenario LSEK. It 
seems, that there is only a slight drop for CWU in scenario LSRK1. It is noticed 
again that, in scenario LSEK water can be delivered till location 164. In other 
words, farmers within the 164 locations can benefit from the cheaper public canal 
water. But in scenario LSRK1, canal water will be used up till location 37. It 
implies that only 37 farmers can benefit from the public canal water system, and 
the entire canal irrigation area decreases by 77.43%. Groundwater use starts 
earlier at location 38 in scenario LSRK1, because canal water is no longer 
available. The average consumption of groundwater is reported at 39.49 m3/Mu, 
reduced by 62.35% as compared to that in scenario LSEK.  
The water rent also shows a decreasing trend. This trend is opposite to that in 
scenario LSEK, in which the water rent increases with distance. A decreasing 
water rent implies that the farmers consume less water, therefore less water fee 
can be charged. Considering the definition of water rents, public investment 
would be deducted from the water rent. The public investment is kept at 0 in the 
current scenario LSRK1, even though it doesn’t help to prevent the water rent 
from falling. It is reported by the model that the average water rent for AU is 
down by 56.85% to 38.25 Yuan/Mu, as compared to that in scenario LSEK. For 
CWU, the water price is still low, but water consumption decreases sharply. So 
the collected water rent becomes lower too. It accounts for merely 37.46% of the 
water rent collected in scenario LSEK. The same situation happens to GWU. The 
water rent for GWU in scenario LSRK1 is reported to be 40.26 Yuan/Mu, 
compared to that of 134.09 Yuan/Mu in scenario LSEK, a decrease by 70%. 
Falling water rents result in decreasing income of the water supplier. In particular 
for the public water supplier, it gets worse off and could not accumulate enough 
capital to maintain or construct a new irrigation project. Such a performance can 
be illustrated in Figure 8.3.  
Since the removal of public investment from the water conveyance system is the 
key feature of the current scenario, it is supposed to focus on analyzing its impact 
on the movement of canal water and groundwater remaining over distance. Two 
diagrams (Figures 8.4 and 8.5) describe water movement in canal and 
underground. Figure 8.4 compares the different movements of groundwater 
remaining under different situations. Remember, in scenario LSEK, there is no 
canal water lost before it reaches location 164 thanks to heavy public investment. 
Before this point, it is shown in the Figure 8.4, that the groundwater stock is 
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Figure 8.3: Vicious circle of a removal of public investment under low soil permeability 
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Figure 8.4: Comparison of groundwater remaining between optimal public investment 
scenario (LSEK) and a removal of public investment under low soil 
permeability scenario (LSRK1) 
recharged only by water lost from farmer’s field, and moreover no groundwater 
extraction occurs. So the groundwater stock gradually increases till location 164, 
and then starts to fall from location 165, where farmers start to take groundwater. 
However, in scenario LSRK1, it is obviously suggested that the slope of 
groundwater remaining curve is much deeper than in scenario LSEK. It 
demonstrates that the groundwater stock is recharged very quickly due to double 
loss of water from the irrigation system, i.e., conveyance loss and on-farm loss. It 
also implicates that the peak of groundwater remaining in scenario LSRK1 is 
much higher than that in scenario LSEK due to more canal water going down to 
recharge the groundwater stock. Farmers start to consume groundwater very early, 
as there is no canal water available.  
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Figure 8.5: Comparison of canal water remaining between optimal public investment 
scenario (LSEK) and a removal of public investment under low soil 
permeability scenario (LSRK1) 
Figure 8.5 indicates the same phenomenon as described above, here the water 
movements are analyzed from the aspect of canal water remaining instead of 
groundwater remaining. We find the canal water remaining in scenario LSEK is 
able to travel a longer distance gradually. However in scenario LSRK1 it is 
exhausted very fast, due to huge water losses from the canal system and farmer’s 
extraction.  
Some further figures related to revenue, land rent and water rent will be provided 
later in this chapter, while comparing will be made with the other scenarios.  
8.2.2.3 Concluding remarks of a removal of public investment under low soil 
permeability scenario (LSRK1) and further research questions 
This scenario investigates the impacts on social welfare and water resource 
allocation by removing public investment from the water conveyance system 
under low soil permeability. The model results suggest that both social welfare 
and water resource allocation get worse. Specifically the social welfare decreased 
by almost half, and the water consumption also declines sharply. The area 
irrigated by canal water largely shrank to one-third of the area in the optimal 
public investment scenario LSEK. Overall water rents decreased too, and it 
further results in a scarce public budget for water projects. All these indicators 
strongly suggest that public investment plays a very important role in optimal 
water resource allocation and improvement of social welfare.  
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Further research questions: Different soil permeability can retain different levels 
of water. The scenario LSRK1 only discussed the situation under a low soil 
condition. Low soil permeability indicates that only small portions of surface 
water can go down to recharge the groundwater aquifer. That is why a 
well-managed water conveyance system can be so crucial for such an irrigation 
scheme. The further question is: How the situation will be if the irrigation scheme 
is operated under high soil permeability? This will be investigated in the next 
scenario.  
8.2.3 A removal of public investment under high soil permeability scenario 
In the previous two scenarios, the impacts on social welfare and water resource 
allocation are investigated by changing the status of public investment. Both were 
undertaken under low soil permeability, with a recharge rate of 0.3. As observed 
in the scenario of a removal of public investment under low soil permeability 
(LSRK1), the entire welfare and water consumption are much worse off in the 
project area, if public investment in the canal is removed. The current scenario 
will discuss the impacts of high soil permeability on social welfare and water 
resource allocation. The aim of doing so is to enable the model to be broadly 
applicable under different geographical conditions. 
As higher soil permeability, i.e., higher recharge rate, we assume a recharge rate 
of 0.8, which indicates that 80% of the lost water, either from the canal system or 
from the farmers’ field, will go underground to recharge the aquifer. The public 
investment will remain zero exogenously in the current scenario of a removal of 
public investment under high soil permeability (HSRK1).  
8.2.3.1 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
Model results of scenario HSRK1 are presented in Table 8.6. It is surprisingly 
observed that the aggregate social welfare achieved in scenario HSRK1 is 
1,062,254 Yuan, which is only 0.29% lower than in the optimal public investment 
scenario LSEK, and 73.35% higher than in the scenario under low soil 
permeability (LSRK1). It indicates, because of higher soil permeability and 
recharge rate, that groundwater use becomes more available and profitable. Due to 
the considerable canal water loss rate (without lining investment) and high 
recharge rate, the total canal water consumption slightly increases by 15.93% 
compared to scenario LSRK1, but dramatically decreases by 74.49% compared to 
scenario LSEK.  
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Remarkable change appears in groundwater consumption. Total groundwater 
consumption reaches 362,341.81m3, 2.75 times higher than in scenario LSRK1, 
and 5.4 times higher than that in scenario LSEK. Consequently the total water 
consumption over the entire irrigation area is 4,388,824.47m3, which is 1.7 times 
higher than in scenario LSRK1 and 23.06% more than it in scenario LSEK. In the 
current scenario, the gain from conjunctive water use is quite significant. It 
achieves 137,884.47 m3, almost half of the capacity of water supply. It is 
correspondingly 1.48 times of the gain in scenario LSEK. These results seem not 
correct intuitively. The reason for these results is, that the higher recharge rate 
results in groundwater being able to be pumped more conveniently and 
abundantly. Due to high soil permeability, farmers have to pump more frequently 
to meet their water requirement. The model calculates these volumes of 
accumulated pumping and re-pumping, it hence results in such a bigger total 
water consumption, even much more than its actual capacity. In other words, 
water is re-used in the current scenario, and it is calculated as long as this takes 
place.  
It is noticed that the area irrigated by canal water decreases sharply due to huge 
water losses from the canal system and farmer’s fields. The canal water is almost 
used up already at location 31, i.e., after 1550 meters, the shortest distance within 
the three scenarios. On the one hand, the irrigated area by canal water is down to 
465 Mu, a decrease by 16.22% and 81.1% respectively compared to scenario 
LSRK1 and scenario LSEK. On the other hand, the area irrigated by groundwater 
grows dramatically, with a considerable increase by 3.68% and 369.44% 
respectively compared to scenario LSRK1 and scenario LSEK. 
Model results of scenario of a removal of public investment under high soil 
permeability imply that the overall social economy and water resource allocation 
does not get much worse, as compared to the scenario of optimal public 
investment (LSEK), moreover it gets much better than the scenario of removal of 
public investment under low soil permeability (LSRK1). Probably, it could be 
reasonable and economic to abandon public investment in the canal system, if the 
soil permeability is very high. We will further analyze the other indicators at the 
farm level and see how it is going on with individual farmers. 
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8.2.4.2 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
Table 8.7 gives more detailed information about the impacts on individual 
variables at farm level in the irrigation area. The average unit water consumption 
is reaching up to 146.3m3/Mu for AU in scenario HSRK1, which is the highest 
water consumption level among the three scenarios, mainly due to re-pumping 
water from underground. It is 2.7 times higher than that in scenario LSRK1, and 
23.06% higher than that in scenario LSEK. In terms of canal water use, the model 
result suggests the same up-tendency. But the consumption volume increases not 
so significantly as compared to that for AU. On average the unit canal water 
consumption is 164.61m3, ranking in the top place among the three scenarios. In 
terms of groundwater consumption, a considerable difference between the current 
scenarios HSRK1 and the previous two is observed. Unit groundwater 
consumption in scenario HSRK1 also ranks in the highest position among the 
three scenarios. It reaches a volume of 142.94 m3, 3.7 times of that in scenario 
LSRK1 and 36.29% more than in scenario LSEK. High seepage rates result in 
less water availability in the canal and huge groundwater recharge, and hence 
enforce farmers to pump groundwater. Variables, such as revenue, land rent, and 
water rent are following the tracks of movement of joint water consumption. They 
show a strong signal of overall better off in scenario HSRK1. 
8.2.3.3 Concluding remarks of scenario of a removal of public investment under 
high soil permeability and research limitation 
The scenario of a removal of public investment under high soil permeability 
(HSRK1) demonstrates, that the social welfare and the water resource allocation 
are only slightly worse off compared to the optimal public investment scenario, 
which is a scenario with high public investment. Farmers are much better off as 
compared to scenario LSRK1, which is a removal of public investment with a low 
recharge rate. This indicates clearly, that a suitable policy or public expenditure 
with respect to a canal system is needed. It has to take the local natural conditions, 
such as climate, soil condition etc, into account. As discussed already, the status 
of soil permeability is so important that it can have totally different impacts on the 
same project. In an area with low soil permeability, it is necessary to invest more 
in the water conveyance system, as shown in the optimal public investment 
scenario as compared in an area of high permeability. However, if an area has 
very high soil permeability, and, if the local community is facing budget shortage, 
it might be wise not to invest much into the canal system as demonstrated in the 
current scenario HSRK1. The model results of scenario HSRK1 actually suggest a 
basin wide optimal rather than a point optimal solution.  
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Research limitation of the current scenario: It is suggested by the model that more 
water consumption will bring higher output. Though the model simulates the 
groundwater price over distance, it does not consider the pumping costs. In the 
current study, the groundwater price is reflected only by electricity costs. It is far 
from enough to reflect the real pumping costs. That is a main reason why a large 
amount of re-pumping still does not influence social welfare much in current 
scenarios. In future work, pumping costs are needed to be modeled more 
precisely. 
8.2.4 Comparison of indicators among scenarios at spatial level  
In previous sections, three scenarios were made to evaluate the different impacts 
on social welfare and water resource allocation. A comparison of some crucial 
variables will be reviewed in this section. Since most of the relevant variables 
already have been presented by using tables, we will employ more diagrams 
(Figure 8.6-8.13) to describe different performances of these crucial variables. 
A comparison of canal water consumption over distance among scenarios of 
removal of public investment under high (HSRK1) and low soil permeability 
(LSRK1) as well as optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) is illustrated in 
Figure 8.6. In scenario HSRK1, the canal water starts from the top level but ends 
quickly over a short distance. In scenario LSRK1 it also starts from a relatively 
high level and is used up quickly too. The common reason for quick ending of  
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Figure 8.6: Comparison of canal water consumption at different locations among optimal 
public investment scenario (LSEK) and scenarios of removal of public 
investment under low (LSRK1) and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
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Figure 8.7: Comparison of groundwater consumption at different locations among 
optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) and scenarios of removal of 
public investment under low (LSRK1) and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
canal water use is the removal of public investment in both scenarios, so that the 
water in the canal suffers a high base water conveyance loss rate of 0.07. In 
scenario LSEK the canal water has traveled the longest distance, due to its 
improved water conveyance system.  
In the following Figure 8.7, we can compare the groundwater consumption at 
different locations under the three scenarios. It is easy to understand that the track 
of groundwater movement is exactly opposite to that of canal water. For instance, 
as shown in Figure 8.6, canal water in scenario HSRK1 travels the shortest 
distance; hence in Figure 8.7, groundwater use, in scenario HSRK1, appears early 
at location 32 and travels the longest distance.  
Both figures indicate, that the tendency of canal water movement changes more 
dramatically than that of groundwater movement. The reason for this is, that canal 
water movement is influenced by a double loss of water, i.e., conveyance water 
loss and on-farm water loss, and moreover the farmers’ extraction. Canal water 
therefore, is reduced faster than groundwater. Groundwater movement can be 
influenced by the on-farm water loss rate and less extraction by groundwater 
users. Consequently they perform in such a tendency.  
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Figure 8.8: Comparison of total water consumption among optimal public investment 
scenario (LSEK) and scenarios of removal of public investment under low 
(LSRK1) and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
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Figure 8.9: Comparison of total revenue among optimal public investment scenario 
(LSEK) and scenarios of removal of public investment under low (LSRK1) 
and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
Figure 8.8 describes the total canal water and groundwater consumption in 
different scenarios. It shows clearly that the biggest groundwater consumption 
appears in scenario HSRK1, mainly thanks to its huge conveyance water loss rate 
and a higher recharge rate to the groundwater aquifer. The smallest one is found in 
scenario LSEK, due to zero-loss rate in the canal and low recharge rate to the 
groundwater aquifer. However, the biggest canal water consumption is found in 
scenario LSEK thanks to its dominant canal system. The chart also suggests that 
the aggregated water consumption (sum of canal water and groundwater 
consumption) in scenario HSRK1 ranks in the top place among the three 
8  IMPACTS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT STATUS CHANGE 
 
 
104
scenarios, since re-pumping is very popular in this scenario. Due to seepage and 
recharge, there also exists a gain from the use of return flows. As stated already, 
the total water capacity in the model is 301,000 m3. Total water consumption in 
scenario HSRK1 is almost 1.5 times the initial water capacity in the irrigation 
area. In scenario LSEK, a gain of 55635.07m3 water consumption is also 
observed. But contrary to scenario HSRK1 and scenario LSEK, a net water loss is 
reported in scenario LSRK1, mainly due to its huge water loss from the 
conveyance system and low recharge rate of groundwater. 
Next Figures 8.9-8.10 compare different performances of revenue under the three 
scenarios presented. We start firstly to analyze the total revenue. As shown in 
Figure 8.9, total revenue of scenario HSRK1 ranks in the top, but it is mainly 
from groundwater use. Contrary to scenario HSRK1, the total revenue of scenario 
LSEK, which ranks in the second position, are mainly contributed by canal water 
uses. This is plausible given the model assumption. Scenario HSRK1 is under 
high seepage rate and a poorly operated canal system, so farmers use more 
groundwater. However, scenario LSEK is under low seepage rate and a 
well-operated canal system, so farmers go for canal water. Lastly, the total 
revenue of scenario LSRK1 is the worst, due to insufficient water availability.  
The movements in unit of revenue over distance, under the three scenarios, give 
the same results. The unit revenue, in scenario HSRK1, starts from the canal 
source at its highest level, and then declines gradually, though slowly. It can be 
observed that the curve of revenue change in scenario HSRK1 keeps staying 
above all the other ones for all locations. The second highest revenue starts from 
the canal source in scenario LSRK1, but it drops sharply and eventually falls 
down to a very low level in comparison with the other two scenarios. Further, the 
revenue in scenario LSEK starts from a relatively low level and then too declines 
slowly. This curve is positioned below the revenue curve of scenario HSRK1 and 
above that of scenario LSRK1. The revenue in scenario LSRK1 undoubtedly is 
the lowest one among the three. The curve of revenue in scenario LSEK looks 
similar to that in scenario HSRK1, though they are modeled with much different 
background. Scenario HSRK1 is optimized under a very high recharge rate of 0.8, 
while scenario LSEK is optimized under a moderate recharge rate of 0.3. And 
moreover, in scenario HSRK1 the public investment is removed from the 
irrigation system, while in scenario LSEK government makes high public 
investment in canals. From the performance of unit revenue in the different 
scenarios, a conclusion can be drawn: The revenue is closely tied with water 
consumption. The more water is consumed, the higher revenue will be.  
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Figure 8.10: Comparison of unit revenue for CWU and GWU among optimal public 
investment scenario (LSEK) and scenarios of removal of public investment 
under low (LSRK1) and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
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Figure 8.11: Comparison of unit water rent for CWU and GWU among optimal public 
investment scenario (LSEK) and scenarios of removal of public investment 
under low (LSRK1) and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
Figure 8.11 shows the situation of the unit water rents in different scenarios. The 
highest unit water rent, at water source, emerges in scenario HSRK1. Farmers in 
this case get the largest amount of water as compared to the other scenarios. After 
farmers switch to groundwater use in scenario HSRK1, a jump between unit canal 
water rent and groundwater rent can be observed. Further note that water rents 
decrease wages. The main reason for this development is, that the price of 
groundwater is considerably higher than that of canal water; it therefore causes a 
big jump in residual wages from canal water to groundwater rent.  
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The second highest unit water rent also occurs at the water source in scenario 
LSEK, and then it moves up gradually with the water price getting higher. Due to 
a better managed canal system, canal water dominates the most part of the 
irrigation area in scenario LSEK. Unit water rent of groundwater in LSEK shows 
no big difference compared to canal water when water flows close to the tail of 
the canal. Here the price of canal water becomes closer or even higher than that of 
groundwater. That is why the curve moves relatively smoothly without any 
sudden jump as happened in scenario HSRK1.  
The lowest unit water rent is again observed in scenario LSRK1. An interesting 
phenomenon appears in the curve of canal water rent in scenario LSRK1. The 
movement of canal water rent first goes up, then goes down before it switches to 
the groundwater. By checking the model result, the point of water rent going 
down is reported at location 25. The reason is, that water leaks so fast in the canal, 
that farmers get much less water as compared to their upper stream counterparts 
(those situated before location 25). The rent collected within these locations is 
therefore even lower than in previous locations, despite they are charged a higher 
water price than previous users. After location 38, the groundwater rent starts 
picking up, and it moves rather strait and stays at the lowest level due to 
decreasing water availability.  
Figure 8.12 further compares the accumulated water rents in the irrigation area 
among the three scenarios. As defined already, the water rent is closely tied with 
the public sector. More precisely, it is the canal water rent that influences the 
public sector much more rather than the groundwater rent. Since the public water 
supplier collects canal water rents, rents are directly portrayed. However the 
groundwater rents cannot directly go to the water related authority. For instance, 
in the survey area, the groundwater rents are used to cover expenses of the 
electricity by authority. Finally after a second time distribution, part of money 
could go to water related projects. The model results are consistent with the real 
situation. With relatively high water rents in scenarios like LSEK, the public 
water supplier can maintain its conveyance system and therefore can create more 
sources to support the system. Contrary to scenario LSEK, a removal of public 
investment from the irrigation system in scenario LSRK1 can result in less canal 
water supply, and finally the system might collapse. This ends the whole public 
water irrigation system. Scenario HSRK1 is a special case, since it optimizes 
under high soil permeability. In this situation, a public expenditure is not strongly 
suggested. A removal of public investment might be more economic.  
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Figure 8.12: Comparison of accumulated water rents for CWU and GWU among optimal 
public investment scenario (LSEK) and scenarios of removal of public 
investment under low (LSRK1) and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
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Figure 8.13: Comparison of unit land rent for CWU and GWU among optimal public 
investment scenario (LSEK) and scenarios of removal of public investment 
under low (LSRK1) and high soil permeability (HSRK1)  
Figure 8.13 describes the change of the unit land rent in different scenarios. The 
land rent, in scenario HSRK1, still starts at the highest level from the first 
location. It declines gradually with distance getting farther. After the 31st location, 
farmers switch to groundwater. The land rent therefore goes down and we notice a 
down-jump from canal water area to groundwater area, thanks to the high 
groundwater price. That is exactly the opposite of the previous description of the 
water rent, when it turns out to up-jump. A slight difference with respect to the 
land rent exists between scenario HSRK1 and scenario LSEK. The development 
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suggests, that sufficient groundwater, at a certain point offsets a negative impact 
due to higher water charges. It didn’t reduce the land rent much as seen in 
scenario HSRK1. Scenario LSEK shows a smoothly declining curve of land rent 
for the whole area. The curve is lying between scenario HSRK1 and scenario 
LSRK1. The starting point of the unit land rent in scenario LSRK1still ranks the 
lowest. And it declines sharply, as compared to scenario HSRK1 and scenario 
LSEK. Groundwater is not sufficiently recharged in this scenario due to a 
relatively low seepage rate. Consequently the entire irrigation area suffers water 
shortage. Eventually the canal water irrigated area shrinks, output declines and the 
land rent goes down inevitably. 
The outputs of the models may be a surprise for people. Due to unexpectedly 
better outcome from scenario HSRK1, as opposed to expectations from scenario 
LSEK, a request for explanation appears. Between the two different recharge 
rates, in the irrigation systems, scenario LSEK is with a quasi-piped canal system 
investment. Whereas scenario HSRK1 is without any public investment at all. 
Surprisingly no big gap of social welfare and other important economic indicators 
exists between both scenarios. Especially, in the one without public investment, a 
bad canal system even makes revenue higher than the one that was better 
managed. This reminds policy makers to collect as much information as possible 
and compare their impact before they take any decision.  
8.3 Summary and further research questions 
Three scenarios have been made by focusing on investigating the impact of 
changing public investment status. The model results suggest optimal solutions 
for an irrigation system with low and high soil permeability, respectively.  
Since the private investment in irrigation technology is a very heavy expenditure 
for farmers, the base run optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) internally 
determined a zero investment in irrigation technology over all locations in the 
model. Based on this result, the further selected scenarios hence valued the 
impacts on social welfare and water resource allocation merely by focusing on the 
role the public investment plays. They have been undertaken with public 
investment being made or removed under two different soil conditions. If the soil 
permeability is low, public investment will largely improve the aggregate social 
welfare and water resource allocation. However if the soil permeability is very 
high, an irrigation system without public investment shows that the social welfare 
and water resource allocation are only slightly worse off. This indicates that 
public investment will do especially well in improving water resource allocation 
and social welfare in a system under low soil permeability. But its effects to social 
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welfare and water resource allocation are much smaller under high soil 
permeability.  
Further research work is needed on questions such as how to avoid limitation in 
explored scenarios, which failed to model the impacts of private investment 
participation. This limitation will be improved in the next two chapters.
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9  IMPACTS OF DIFFERENT DISTRIBUTIONS OF 
IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY ON SOCIAL 
WELFARE AND WATER RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION  
So far the impacts of the status of public investment change on social welfare and 
water resource allocation have been modelled in the previous chapter. To solve 
the remaining problem in the previous public investment policy scenarios, where 
private investment was chosen being zero endogenously over all locations, an 
extended optimization model is introduced into the present chapter. The way the 
extended optimization model works is to optimize the social welfare in the project 
area by introducing a coefficient for private investment in the objective function, 
so that the model can distinguish a positive solution for private investment from 
public investment. 
9.1 Specification of an additional coefficient on private investment 
and the extended optimization model 
9.1.1 Specification of the coefficient on private investment  
The employment of an additional coefficient on private investment is a key 
feature of the extended optimization model. The purposes of employing such a 
coefficient are: One is to investigate the effects of different policy orientations, 
the other is to enable positive private investment (adoption of modern irrigation 
technology) in the modeling process. The additional coefficient is actually derived 
from a scaled function of private investments over various locations. The way the 
function of scaled private is derived is given as follows: As observed from the 
field survey, the likelihood of the adoption of modern irrigation technologies 
increases with the distance from farm-gate to water source that gets longer. The 
reason is that, water is becoming more expensive with the distance getting longer 
due to increasing costs of canal construction, lining up and operation costs. Based 
on this background, a compound function of a scaled private investment over 
location is estimated, by using regression methodology. The estimated function is 
specified as below: 
)(028.1045.0 jordjSPRI ×=               (9.1) 
06.558=t  336.3=t  141=n  
63.02 =R  74.238=F , 0000.0. =Fsign  
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Where SPRIj is the scaled private investment at location j, which is different from 
the previous definition of the actual private investment. The empirical 
observations of actual private investment are scaled by 50 before regression 
analysis is made. It means that, if farmers invest 500 Yuan in irrigation 
technology, then the 500 Yuan will be scaled down to 10 in the estimated 
function.  
ord(j) is the ordinal number along all the locations. It depicted 200 locations in the 
current model. So we have ord(j) =1,2,3,…,200, respectively. As known already, 
we have a canal of 20 km in the survey area. A unit j represents 50m in the model. 
So we would have 400 locations in total if the entire survey area were involved. 
For speeding up the model’s running, we scale the 400 locations to half, i.e., 200 
locations.  
By doing so, the private investment becomes much smaller than the initial value, 
which now ranges from 0.046 to 11.468. SPRI is a more artificial argument 
compared to the real term of private investment, but it mirrors the relationship 
between private investment and distance. It is understood reasonably to consider 
SPRI as an additional coefficient to the real term of private investment in the 
modelling process. As presented in the objective function (see equation 8.1), we 
had already coefficient c1 and c2 for net revenue function. To keep the model neat 
and consistent, we use c3 to replace SPRI.  
This approach indicates that, in the extended optimization model, the variable of 
private investment will be multiplied by a coefficient c3 at every location, i.e., 
with every index j. By computing the equation (9.1), 200 figures of c3 can be 
obtained and will serve as parameter for private investment at every location in 
the modelling process. 
9.1.2 Specification of the extended optimization model 
Most components of the extended optimization model are the same as those of the 
initial model, except the introduction of a coefficient c3. The presentation of 
objective function with c3 can be further specified as below:  
costsrgroundwatecostswatercanalinvestmentpublic
cwithinvestmentprivatecwithrevenuenetwelfareSocial
−−−
−= )3()3(
  (9.2) 
Its mathematical formulation is expressed in the following form:  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
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Where c0j, c1j and c2j are coefficients taken directly from the net revenue 
function, respectively. They are obtained by integrating an inverse water demand 
function. The parameter c3j serves as an additional coefficient for private 
investment. The definitions of rest variables and parameters have been already 
given in the previous chapter.  
For further discussions: A critical point of the extended optimization model is the 
employment of c3. The entry of c3 to the extended model has two advantages. 
From a technical point of view, it helps in making the model flexible to handle the 
options of private investment. From a policy point of view, it helps government to 
predict effects of different distributions of irrigation technology, so that 
governments can choose where and when to support individual farmers to adopt 
modern water saving technologies. It is necessary to clarify that c3 works only 
within the framework of objective function of the extended model, i.e., within 
which the arguments are associated with private investment I. The constraints, 
which are also associated with private investment I, are kept the same so that the 
initial relationships among different variables are still valid. Based on these facts, 
it becomes clear, that social welfare in the extended optimization model is not 
comparable with that of the initial model, but the other individual indicators are 
still comparable between the two models. 
9.2 Simultaneous private and public investment undertaken 
scenarios analysis 
9.2.1 Specification of the selected scenarios  
As mentioned already, the main concerns of this study are to explore the role, 
which both investments - public and private-, are playing and the relationships 
between them. The role public investment is playing in water saving activities, 
has been investigated already in the previous chapter of public investment policy 
scenarios analysis. The studying of private investment was hampered in previous 
scenarios due to the internal definition of objective function and perhaps high 
costs as associated with the case study. The extended optimization model is to 
focus on the role of both investments. In particular, the impacts of private 
investment are emphasized.  
As mentioned already, the coefficient c3 has been obtained by estimating a 
function of the scaled private investment based on empirical data. But one thing is 
needed to mention is that, the empirical data were obtained from the field survey, 
in which wealthier farmers situated at the tail end area of canal. This kind of 
geographical allocation is less common in reality. Normally richer farmers gather 
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at the head area instead of the tail end area of a canal thanks to good access to 
water. To make the model more broadly applicable, we can model the adoption of 
irrigation technology by altering the order of c3. By doing so, a nearly real 
situation and a potential requirement of government intervention could be 
modeled. 
The nearly real situation indicates that, wealthier farmers situated at the upstream 
area would adopt modern irrigation technology. This situation is modeled by 
giving a normal order, i.e., an ascending order of coefficient c3. Since c3 will 
multiply the variable of private investment in the model, an ascending order of c3 
will lead to a decreasing private investment along the canal. This decreasing 
private investment indicates that upper stream farmers will more likely adopt 
modern irrigation technology than downstream farmers. This possibility of 
adoption will decrease with location getting farther, as farmers’ economic 
situation gets worse with distance, and they cannot afford the costs of modern 
irrigation technology. 
 
The potential requirement of government intervention assumes, that downstream 
farmers would apply modern irrigation technology. This situation is modeled 
under a reverse order, i.e., a descending order of c3. A descending order of c3 will 
result in an increasing private investment along the canal. The increasing 
investment indicates that downstream farmers will adopt modern irrigation 
technology rather than upstream farmers. Since farmers in downstream area are 
poor, they can hardly afford the costly irrigation technology. For a potential 
requirement of government intervention, this scenario is to test how much farmers 
can afford, and how much the government shall support.  
 
Five scenarios focusing on different distributions of irrigation technologies are to 
test in this chapter. They are listed in Table 9.1. The first two scenarios (LSDI and 
LSAI) will be done under two different orders of c3. The third scenario LSFI is 
modelled under a choice of fixed technology promoted by government. The last 
two scenarios (LSRK2 and HSRK2) are to investigate the impacts of removal of 
public investment under the extended optimization model.  
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Table 9.1: Scenario groupings, names, abbreviations, and descriptions for assessing the 
impacts of different distribution of irrigation technology 
Group/Name Abbreviation Description 
Scenarios of different allocation of 
irrigation technology under the 
extended optimization model:  
 
Nearly real situation scenario  
 
 
Potential requirement of government 
intervention scenario 
 
 
Government promotion of a fixed type 
technology scenario 
 
A removal of public investment under 
low soil permeability scenario in the 
extended model 
 
A removal of public investment under 
high soil permeability scenario in the 
extended model 
 
 
 
 
 
LSDI 
 
 
LSAI 
 
 
 
LSFI 
 
 
LSRK2 
 
 
 
HSRK2 
 
 
 
 
To model the impacts of allocation of modern 
irrigation technology gathering at the upstream area. 
 
To model the impacts of allocation of modern 
irrigation technology gathering at the downstream 
area.  
 
To model the impacts of adoption of one fixed type 
modern irrigation technology over the whole area.  
 
To model the overall impacts of a removal of public 
investment with private investment participation 
under low soil permeability 
 
To model the overall impacts of a removal of public 
investment with private investment participation 
under high soil permeability 
9.2.2 Nearly real situation scenario  
The recharge rate is set at 0.3. Public investment K and private investment I are 
endogenous variables to the model. Coefficient c3 enters in a normal order, i.e. 
ascending order. The purpose of this scenario is to analyze the impact of a 
decreasing private investment on aggregate social welfare and water allocation in 
the irrigation area.  
9.2.2.1 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
The aggregate economic and water-related indicators are presented in Table 9.2. 
The social welfare is reported at 1,096,337 Yuan over the whole area. The total 
canal water consumption is 299,998.47m3. Groundwater consumption is reported 
at 46,635m3. Thus the total water consumption over the whole area achieves 
346,634 m3. Compared to the total water supply capacity, a gain of 45,634 m3 
water is reported thanks to conjunctive water use. As happened in the previous 
scenarios of public investment policy, the model chooses public investment at the 
highest level to ensure a zero loss rate of water conveyance. In the current 
scenario, the total public investment is observed at 2,579.31 Yuan, which covers 
174 locations along the canal, i.e., 8700m within a 10,000-meter-long canal. The 
area irrigated by canal water achieves a high of 2,602.2 Mu, 6.54 times more than 
that by groundwater. The whole area is dominated by canal water irrigation. 
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Table 9.2: Impacts on social welfare and water resource allocation at aggregate level in 
nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
Items LSDI
Social welfare (Yuan) 1,096,337.38 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 299,998.47 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 46,635.30 
Total water consumption (m3) 346,633.77 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) 45,633.77 
Total public investment (Yuan) 2,579.31 
Switch point (Location) 174.00 
Canal water length (m) 8,700.00 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 2,602.20 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 397.80 
Total private investment (Yuan) 138,470.08 
Notes: In scenario LSDI, the switch point is observed at location 174, at which canal water 
becomes insufficient. It is reported an extraction volume of 56.62 m3 canal water and 
61.76 m3 groundwater taking place at location 174. So the item of area irrigated at this 
location is calculated by considering the ratio of their contribution at this point. They are 
0.48 and 0.52 for canal and groundwater respectively.  
LSDI: It indicates the nearly real situation scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
endogenous public and private investment, c3 in an ascending order.  
But as a difference, total private investment in irrigation technology is now found 
at 138,470 Yuan. It is in line with 89 positive observations of irrigation 
technology users, over the irrigation area.  
9.2.2.2 Impacts on social welfare and water resource allocation at farm level 
Our new mean analysis of unit economic and water-related items, based on 
different categories, is documented in Table 9.3. Two new categories are added 
from now on, they are specified as modern irrigation technology users (MTU) and 
traditional technology users (TTU). The modern technologies in the study refer to 
actively pro-water saving technologies, such as drip irrigation, sprinkler irrigation 
and seepage irrigation, etc. The traditional technologies refer to water-consuming 
techniques, such as flood irrigation and furrow irrigation.  
The unit aggregate water demand for AU is observed at 115.54m3/Mu, which 
slightly differentiates it from 115.29 m3/Mu of CWU and 117.23 m3/Mu of GWU. 
However it is higher than 105.13 m3 of MTU. It becomes very obvious as shown 
in Table 9.3, that the water consumption of MTU is 15.15% lower than that of 
TTU, thanks mainly to the adoption of modern water saving technologies. This 
change suggests, that no big differences from most items are observed among the  
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Table 9.3: Mean values of indicators at farm level in nearly real situation scenario 
(LSDI) 
Items AU CWU GWU MTU TTU %(M&T)
Aggregate water demand (m3) 115.54 115.29 117.23 105.13 123.90 -15.15 
Revenue (Yuan) 435.53 434.23 444.02 410.63 455.49 -9.85 
Land rent (Yuan) 295.67 296.15 292.49 258.63 325.36 -20.51 
Water rent (Yuan) 92.85 83.88 151.53 47.28 129.38 -63.45 
Private investment (Yuan) 46.16 53.21 0.00 103.72 0.00 
On-farm water use efficiency 0.58 0.59 0.48 0.70 0.48 44.96 
Public investment (Yuan/km) 257.93 298.19 0.00 298.19 0.00 
Water conveyance loss rate 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 
Notes: All items are measured based on Chinese land unit Mu except public investment, which 
is based on kilometre. 1Mu=1/15 hectare.  
LSDI: It indicates the nearly real situation scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
endogenous public and private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
category of AU, CWU and GWU. But it shows that the double water saving 
system narrows the gap between CWU and GWU. However, significant 
differences are mostly found between MTU and TTU. The average unit revenue 
for MTU is reported at 9.85% less than that for TTU, due to the costly modern 
irrigation technologies and less water demand. A significant decline of 20.51% of 
land rent on average is also reported for MTU compared to that for TTU. As a 
consequence of the expensive investment in irrigation technologies, land becomes 
less scarce. The average level of water rent drops by 63.45% due to less water 
being taken by MTU. The private investment is on average suggested to be 
103.72 Yuan/Mu and results in average on-farm water use efficiency achieving a 
high of 0.7 for MTU, improved by 45% compared to base water use efficiency of 
0.48 for TTU.  
9.2.2.3 Illustration of movement and relationships between some key indicators at 
spatial level 
As already said the aim of the study is to investigate the impacts on economic, 
social and natural resources in an irrigation area, connected with the adoption of 
modern irrigation technology and improvement of the water conveyance system. 
In terms of the public expenditure, there exist little controversies, since it plays a 
positive role in the optimization process all the time, as proved already in 
previous chapter 8. In terms of private investment, this is somewhat different. The 
aim of the study is also to demonstrate or model different situations (scenarios). 
For example, we want to find at which location farmers will adopt modern 
technology and where it will be optimal for the whole irrigation area? Which 
technology could be adopted? What happens, if upstream farmers adopt modern 
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technology contrary to their downstream counterparts? The big advantage of such 
a modeling exercise is, that it can simulate different kinds of assumptions and 
then compare the results. In other words, the advantage of a model is that of its 
simulations rather than showing the real world only.  
Based on this background, the movement of selected indicators will be illustrated 
in detail, in order to answer the above-mentioned questions and provide designers 
of irrigation project or policy makers accurate and clear information on individual 
farmers at different locations. Moreover, it will be very helpful for evaluating the 
entire impacts of an irrigation project from the aspect of individual farmer’s 
economic situations.  
Since private investment is the focus of this section, this requires investigating its 
performance. Figure 9.1 illustrates the relationship between private investment in 
irrigation technology and on-farm water use efficiency. The more investment is 
undertaken, the higher the water use efficiency will be. As shown in Figure 9.1, 
the distribution of irrigation technology gathers together at the upper area of the 
canal, and decreases with the canal. The highest water use efficiency rate of 0.88 
is observed at the water source, in line with an investment of 214 Yuan/Mu at this 
place. With the distance becoming longer, the investment declines. When farmers 
stop to invest in irrigation technology at location 90, consequently the on-farm 
water use efficiency falls down to its lowest level, at a base on-farm water use rate 
of 0.48.  
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Figure 9.1: Illustration of private investment and water use efficiency in nearly real 
situation scenario (LSDI) 
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Figure 9.2: Movement of unit revenue and private investment in nearly real situation 
scenario (LSDI) 
In order to better explore relationships among different variables after private 
investment being undertaken, several diagrams will be provided to fulfill this task. 
Figure 9.2 graphs the movement of unit private investment and revenue over 
distances together. On one side, it is clearly shown, that the lowest level of 
revenue 331.23 Yuan/Mu is found at the first location, afterwards it goes up 
steadily, and then reaches a peak of 471.05 Yuan at location 90. After this point 
until to the final farmer, no penny is invested in modern irrigation technology. On 
the other side, the highest private investment is made at the first location, and it 
declines gradually till 0 at location 90. Location 90 is such a point, where revenue 
reaches a peak and private investment falls to bottom. This movement suggests 
that private investment in irrigation technology means a considerable expenditure 
for farmers. This can be large enough to consume all their revenue in certain 
situations. Model results tell us that the private investment ranges from 214.01 
Yuan at the first location to 1.03 Yuan at location 89. This implicates, that the 
choice of irrigation technologies varies and downgrades over space. For instance, 
the private investment at first location is reported 214.01 Yuan per Mu annually, 
which ranks in the top over the area. According to the investment requirements of 
different technologies, it indicates, that farmers at this location apply kinds of 
mixed technologies, such as primary sprinkler and seepage irrigation (locally 
produced drip irrigation). With the distance getting farther and the water price 
getting higher, farmers reduce the investment in irrigation technology rapidly.  
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Figure 9.3: Illustration of relationship between water rent and water consumption in 
nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
Such a distribution of private investment suggests that upstream farmers rather 
than downstream farmers would apply modern irrigation technologies. This result 
seems to be paradoxical and unrealistic compared to the field survey results. As 
we explained already, it could be an exception that richer farmers gathered at 
downstream instead of upstream area in the survey area, as compared to the 
reality. Normally farmers situated at upstream area are better off than that at 
downstream area. To make the model be broadly applicable in general irrigation 
project, the solution should not be regionally confined within the field survey 
findings. It is understandable that farmers situated at upstream area are the mostly 
likely group to adopt the modern irrigation technology.  
Figure 9.3 investigates the relationship between water rent and water 
consumption. One of the premises of the study is, that the water price increases 
with the distance getting longer. This must be kept in mind all the time. It is 
observed that the lowest level of water consumption is at the water source due to 
the highest investment in irrigation technology at this point, and then it increases 
gradually, while the grading of irrigation technology goes down. The highest 
water consumption is at location 90, at which no water saving technology is 
employed, and the water price there is lower than afterwards, so a peak of water 
consumption occurs. The water consumption eventually goes down due to an 
increasing water price. This too can be observed in the curve of the water rent. 
Normally the water rent goes up with distance, mainly due to the increasing water 
price if no big differences are reported in water consumption among different 
water users. It is suggested in Figure 9.3 that the curve of water rent goes up 
sharply compared to that of water consumption before it reaches location 90  
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Figure 9.4: Illustration of relationship among revenue, land rent and private investment 
in nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
(within MTU).The reason for this is that, the water rent is not only influenced by 
the water price, but also by the largely reduced water consumption at upper 
stream. Due to expensive investment in water saving technology and the public 
expenditure on the conveyance system, water values more. After location 90, the 
water rent still keeps going up, thanks to a dramatic increase of the water price 
and gradual reduction of public expenditure on the canal, though the water 
consumption shows a decline after location 90.  
Figure 9.4 unveils the relationship among revenue, land rent and private 
investment. It is understood that the curve of revenue stays above the other two all 
the time. Location 90 still remains the crucial point while comparing the model 
results. Recalling the definition of land rent, it was defined as an equation of 
revenue less private investment in the present study. Figure 9.4 exactly describes 
this kind of relationship. The lowest land rent occurs at the water source due to its 
highest expenditure on irrigation technology. With investment decreasing, land 
rent therefore is increasing. The land rent reaches its peak exactly at the point, 
where the private investment touches its bottom, i.e., no private investment is 
undertaken any longer. It too suggests that adoption of modern technology is 
indeed a big investment for farmers. That also explains why the zero-private 
investment is kept all the time in the initial optimal model.  
9.2.2.4 Concluding remarks of the nearly real situation scenario  
The nearly real situation scenario investigates the impacts of distribution of 
irrigation technologies on social welfare and water resource allocation with the 
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help of an additional coefficient c3 for private investment. The modern irrigation 
technologies are adopted by upstream farmers in this scenario. And moreover, the 
grade of irrigation technologies varies in the current scenario instead of being held 
zero under the public private investment scenarios. With the variation of irrigation 
technology, water resource allocation is changing too:  
1. Considering the switch point in this scenario, it is somewhat different from 
previous scenarios of public investment policy, which are run under an initial 
optimization model. The switch point in this scenario is the point where MTU 
switches to TTU. However the switch point in the initial optimization model 
was the point where CWU switches to GWU, since no any irrigation 
technology was adopted by farmers. It is very important to note that, in the 
current nearly real situation scenario, the appearance of modern technologies 
at a certain point changes the allocation of water resources and farmers’ 
behavior over space. For instance, without using modern technology, farmers 
have consumed the biggest amount of water at the water source as suggested 
in the previous public investment policy scenarios. In contrast, now they 
consume the smallest amount of water after the modern technology has been 
adopted. Affording modern technologies needs a change in the revenues, 
perhaps due to changes in the cropping pattern. Moreover, farmers located at 
the tail of the project area normally get insufficient water due to an overuse of 
water by their upper stream counterparts. After modern technology is applied 
on the upper stream, more water in the canal can be left for downstream 
farmers. As suggested in the previous optimal public investment scenario 
(LSEK), the longest canal water length can be till location 164, but it now can 
be extended until location 174 in the current scenario. By applying modern 
irrigation technologies at upper stream areas, we see large benefits for those 
living downstream. 
2. One might be skeptical that upstream instead of downstream farmers would 
apply the modern water saving irrigation technology. Normally upstream 
farmers are better off, and they are the most likely group to afford the 
expensive equipment compared to their downstream counterparts. So they 
might have incentive to do that. As they can get sufficient and cheaper water 
from the water source, finance is available. For a country like China, with 
80% rural population and an increasing threat of water shortage, it could 
happen one day, that the irrigation water is no longer cheap, as it happens 
already today in western US, let alone in Israel. For the government, the 
critical point is to save water so as to let the water flows longer to benefit 
more people. This will improve social welfare and water allocation for the 
whole area. Intuitively imagine, if more water could be saved at the upstream, 
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then the more water would be left in the canal to serve additional people 
downstream. Moreover, modern irrigation technologies can not only save 
water, but also improve the quality and quantities of the crops considerably as 
presented in the field survey. Based on these arguments, it is, however, still 
plausible and closer to reality that upstream farmers would adopt modern 
irrigation technologies. The nearly real situation scenario will therefore also 
serve as a benchmark for a comparison with the coming scenarios. 
9.2.3 Potential requirement of government intervention scenario  
9.2.3.1 Specification of the additional coefficient on private investment in a 
reverse order 
The intention of the potential requirement of government intervention scenario 
(LSAI) is to model the impacts of private investment increasing with distance as 
based on government concern for social welfare and water resource allocation. By 
employing the coefficient c3 for private investment in a reverse order, this can be 
matched. In the previous nearly real situation scenario (LSDI), the coefficient c3 
has been employed in a normal order. It was suggested in scenario LSDI that 
farmers would adopt modern water saving technologies at the upper canal area; 
especially those situated at the water source would undertake the highest 
investment under market conditions.  
In the current scenario, we will investigate a situation of government intervention 
by applying c3 in a reverse order, i.e., descending order. Note that, the change in 
coefficient c3 is associated with government supports based on ground of equity. 
For poor farmers situated in the downstream area, will it be possible for them to 
apply modern irrigation technology? How much can they afford? And how much 
shall the government support them? How is the situation of social welfare and 
water resource allocation if distribution of irrigation technology changes from 
upstream to downstream area? 
9.2.3.2 Impacts on aggregate indicators  
It is assumed that all the other conditions, except coefficient c3, are kept the same 
as in the nearly real situation (LSDI), i.e., the recharge rate is still at 0.3, and 
private and public investments are endogenous in the model. But c3 is in 
descending order contrary to the ascending order in scenario LSDI.  
Table 9.4 shows the aggregate impacts on social welfare and water resource 
allocation with a distribution of technology at downstream area. Social welfare is  
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Table 9.4: Comparison of indicators at aggregate level between nearly real situation 
scenario (LSDI) and potential requirement of government intervention 
scenario (LSAI) 
Items LSDI LSAI %
Social welfare (Yuan) 1,096,337.38 1,136,078.96 3.62 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 299,998.47 300,000.00 0.00 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 46,635.30 45,088.61 -3.32 
Total water consumption (m3) 346,633.77 345,088.61 -0.45 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 0.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) 45,633.77 44,088.61 -3.39 
Total public investment (Yuan) 2,579.31 2,357.24 -8.61 
Switch point (Location) 174.00 160.00 -8.05 
Canal water length (m) 8,700.00 7,900.00 -9.20 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 2,602.20 2,370.00 -8.92 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 397.80 630.00 58.37 
Total private investment (Yuan) 138,470.08 219,114.08 58.24 
Notes: The switch point in scenario LSAI is suggested at location 160, at which farmers start to 
take groundwater completely. The number of MTU in scenario LSAI is 93, against 89 in 
scenario LSDI. 
LSDI: It indicates the nearly real situation scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
endogenous public and private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
LSAI: It indicates the potential requirement of government intervention scenario, which is run 
under low soil permeability, endogenous public and private investment, c3 in a 
descending order. 
observed at 1,136,079 Yuan over the entire irrigation area, which is a slight 
growth of 3.62%, as compared to that in scenario LSDI. The total canal water 
consumption shows little change, with merely a volume of 1.53 m3 more than in 
scenario LSDI. Total groundwater consumption is reported slightly declining 
compared to scenario LSDI, with a decreasing rate of 3.32%. This is mainly due 
to the water saving technologies being largely adopted at downstream areas. Total 
consumption of canal water and groundwater shows a small decline, with a tiny 
rate of 0.45% compared to scenario LSDI. So a gain from conjunctive water use is 
reported of 44,089 m3, and it is 3.39% lower than in scenario LSDI. Due to more 
water consumed at the upper canal area, canal water length gets shorter than that 
in scenario LSDI, shortened by 9.2%. Consequently the public investment is 
reduced by 8.61% in the current scenario. Contrary to a decrease of the area 
irrigated by canal water by 8.92%, the area irrigated by groundwater increases by 
58.37%. Significant increase takes place in total private investment, with a growth 
of 58.24% compared with scenario LSDI. The model results also suggest, that the 
number of farmers adopting modern technology rises to 93 against 89 in scenario 
LSDI. More advanced technology, say modern sprinkler irrigation, is adopted 
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broadly at the tail of the irrigation area. The significant increase of private 
investment suggests that a high water price will drive more farmers to go for 
modern irrigation technology. 
9.2.3.3 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
Table 9.5 investigates the impacts on different indicators at farm level. In the 
current scenario LSAI, modern water saving technology is largely adopted by the 
GWU. The average water demand in unit for all farmers shows negligible 
differences between scenario LSAI and scenario LSDI, with a tiny drop of 0.45%. 
For CWU, it increases to 125.79 m3/Mu, with a growth of 9.11% compared to that 
in scenario LSDI. It is however significantly reduced for GWU by 37.46% 
compared to scenario LSDI, mainly due to GWU adopting modern water saving 
technology. Due to different location, the average water consumption by MTU in 
scenario LSAI is 16.54% lower than that in scenario LSDI. The area, where MTU 
situates in the current scenario LSAI, is from location 108 till the end of the 
irrigation area. Groundwater use starts from location 160 in this scenario. This 
information indicates that more than half MTU are using groundwater in the 
current scenario LSAI. However all the modern technology users in scenario 
LSDI use canal water. Therefore MTU in scenario LSAI consumes less water than 
in scenario LSDI. The same reason can explain why TTU in scenario LSAI 
consumes more water than in scenario LSDI.  
Let’s come to unit revenue now. For AU, the average unit revenue does not 
change much, while comparing both scenarios. The biggest decline is observed in 
farmer category GWU, with a drop of 30.12% compared to scenario LSDI. This is 
due to the higher investment in irrigation technology being made in scenario 
LSAI as compared to scenario LSDI.  
It is observed evidently, that land rent falls down sharply for GWU in scenario 
LSAI, with an average negative value of 33.47 Yuan/Mu being reported, 
compared to a positive one of 292.49 Yuan/Mu in scenario LSDI. The reason for 
this is that more advanced irrigation technology is applied at the tail area, and 
hence the biggest expenditure is also made at this area.  
The biggest change of water rent is found in MTU. It reports a growth of 101.04% 
against a decline of the other categories compared to scenario LSDI. Obviously 
this takes place, because the MTU in scenario LSAI are mostly located 
downstream and have to pay higher water prices. Though the water consumption 
by MTU is reduced due to adopting the water saving technology, the higher water 
prices still push the water rent up. 
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Private investment increased by 58.24% for all farmers on average in scenario 
LSAI. The highest investment of 250.57 Yuan/Mu is observed in GWU compared 
with a zero-investment in scenario LSDI, in line with on-farm water use 
efficiency reaching 0.92, improved by 91.47%. Comparing the investment for 
MTU between the both scenarios, an increase of 51.43% in scenario LSAI is 
found. This indicates, that farmers in scenario LSAI on average apply more 
advanced technology than in scenario LSDI. For instance, the highest investment 
for MTU in scenario LSAI and scenario LSDI are 280.21 and 214.01Yuan/Mu 
respectively, in line with an average on-farm water efficiency of 0.77 being 
reported in scenario LSAI against one of 0.70 in scenario LSDI.  
9.2.3.4 Illustration of movement and relationships between some key indicators at 
spatial level 
Several figures are given below to describe relationships between some crucial 
variables under different scenarios. Figures 9.5 and 9.6 compare the movement of 
revenue in scenario LSAI and scenario LSDI, and they further investigate the 
relationship between revenue and private investment. It is clearly shown in Figure 
9.5, that the highest revenue is reported at the water source in scenario LSAI. 
However it is suggested at location 90 in scenario LSDI. Though the scenarios 
indicate different peaks of revenue, the common reason for this is the private 
investment. 
At the water source area, as shown in Figure 9.6 for scenario LSAI, farmers 
undertake zero investment in modern irrigation technology. So they get the 
highest revenue mainly due to zero expenditure in irrigation technology and the 
best geographical position as well as the cheapest water available. However in the 
scenario LSDI, farmers invest most in modern irrigation technology at the water 
source (see Figure 9.2). The lowest revenue hence is observed at the water source 
area despite of the lowest water price charged here too. Figure 9.6 explores more 
about the relationship between revenue and private investment in scenario LSAI. 
As shown in this figure, before private investment is made, the curve of revenue 
goes down quite smoothly and flat due to the influence of only one indicator, the 
price of water. The area, where TTU situates, is covered completely by the public 
canal water system in the current scenario. This indicates, that the water price is 
relatively low and changes little. From location 108 farmers start to invest in 
water saving technology, the revenue falls quickly. Figure 9.6 shows an exact 
opposite direction of the two movements. Where the revenue hits a peak, the 
private investment falls at its bottom. 
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Figure 9.5: Comparison of revenue between potential requirement of government 
intervention scenario (LSAI) and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI)  
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Figure 9.6: Illustration of relationship between revenue and private investment in 
potential requirement of government intervention scenario (LSAI)  
Figure 9.7 compares the movement of the water rent in the current scenario LSAI 
and scenario LSDI. Due to the adoption of modern technology at the tail of the 
area, the water consumption is largely reduced in this area. As shown in Figure 
9.7, the water rent in scenario LSAI at the beginning slightly goes up. With the 
distance becoming longer, it reaches a peak at location 108, where the farmers 
switch from TTU to MTU. After location 108 it suddenly goes down due to the 
adoption of modern water saving technology. The longer the distance is, the more 
private investment occurs. This is also shown in Figure 9.7. An up-jump of the 
water rent is observed at location 160 within TTU, at which groundwater 
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Figure 9.7: Comparison of water rent between potential requirement of government 
intervention scenario (LSAI) and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI)  
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Figure 9.8: Illustration of relationship between water rent and water consumption in 
potential requirement of government intervention scenario (LSAI)  
taking starts. This causes a small up-jump of the water rent. Differently from 
scenario LSAI, the water rent in scenario LSDI moves up more smoothly. It hits 
the lowest water rent at the water source, due to the lowest water price and the 
highest water saving technology being used.  
Figure 9.8 describes in more detail the relationship between water rent and water 
consumption in scenario LSAI. As shown in the figure, the lowest water rent 
appears at the water source due to a low price. At this point the biggest water 
consumption is reported. With distance getting longer, the water rent increases  
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Figure 9.9: Comparison of land rent between potential requirement of government 
intervention scenario (LSAI) and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI)  
quickly due to a continuously rising water price. For TTU despite of a decline of 
water consumption, prices continue to rise. After farmers start to apply water 
saving technologies, water consumption has been reduced considerably. Next 
shown in the figure, the curve of water consumption goes down sharply after the 
switch point of technology is being taken. However the curve of the water rent 
moves downward relatively smoothly due to the effect of an increasing water 
price.  
It is clearly shown in Figure 9.9 that the land rent in scenario LSAI moves 
towards an opposite direction as compared with that in scenario LSDI. Due to a 
different distribution of water saving technology, this move occurs. In scenario 
LSAI, farmers adopt modern water saving technology at the downstream area. In 
this area, the land rent decreases quickly with the private investment getting 
higher. Especially from location 172 to 200, negative land rents are observed 
within these locations. This indicates, that the high private investment is a heavy 
burden for farmers, in particular those, situated at the tail of the irrigation area. So 
an intervention of subsidy from government to support poor farmers to adopt 
modern irrigation technology is required. 
Moreover, the application of water saving technology narrows the difference 
between CWU and GWU. And it enlarges the difference between TTU and MTU. 
As shown all the time under the extended model, only in which private investment 
becomes endogenously, the switch point for all individual variables is between 
TTU and MTU rather than CWU and GWU. As further shown in Figure 9.10, the 
land rent is closely tied with private investment and water costs. The land rent 
decreases naturally and smoothly with distances getting further away. From  
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Figure 9.10: Illustration of relationship between land rent and private investment in 
potential requirement of government intervention scenario (LSAI)  
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Figure 9.11: Illustration of relationship between water use efficiency and private 
investment in potential requirement of government intervention scenario 
(LSAI) 
location 108, from which farmers start to invest in modern irrigation technology, 
the land rent goes down dramatically. By investments getting densely and heavily, 
the land rent falls deeply and eventually becomes negative. At the end of the 
irrigation area the investment hits its peak, while the land rent falls to the bottom.  
Apparently, on-farm water use efficiency varies with the private investment in 
water saving technology. As shown in Figure 9.11, when investment keeps zero, 
the on-farm water use efficiency can only achieve the baseline on-farm water use 
efficiency at 0.48. After private investment increases in the irrigation area, the 
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on-farm water efficiency improves. At the tail area, with the highest investment of 
280.21 Yuan/Mu, an ever-high rate of on-farm water use efficiency of 0.95 is 
reported.  
9.2.3.5 Concluding remarks of potential requirement of government intervention 
scenario  
The above scenario analysis has been done with an increasing private investment 
over distance, i.e., a distribution of technology gathering in the downstream area. 
The model results suggest that the social welfare in the current potential 
requirement of government intervention scenario (LSAI) is slightly increased with 
a growth of 3.6% in comparison to the nearly real situation scenario (LSDI). The 
on-farm water use efficiency is considerably improved due to heavy private 
investment in water saving technology. Different distributions of irrigation 
technology change the water resource allocation. The tail end area becomes the 
area, where the modern technology concentrates and the lowest amount of water 
is consumed there. Contrary to the current scenario LSAI, the modern water 
saving technology concentrates at the head area in scenario LSDI, at which the 
lowest water consumption is reported. In the case of scenario LSAI, the opposite 
occurs. The comparison shows how important structural conditions are.  
In total the average on-farm water use efficiency is increased and the total water 
consumption over the project area is more reduced in scenario LSAI as compared 
to scenario LSDI. From the point of view of water saving, scenario LSAI is more 
optimal than scenario LSDI. But considering the required private investment, it 
becomes tricky to judge. The average on-farm water use efficiency is improved 
from 0.58 in scenario LSDI to 0.62 in scenario LSAI, however the total private 
investment over the irrigation area is required to reach 219,114 Yuan, an increase 
by 58.24%. Moreover, excluding social welfare and on-farm water use efficiency, 
the other indicators of social economy and water resource allocation are worse 
off. This refers to additional revenue, land rent and water rent. Especially the land 
rents observed become negative within the last 29 locations, due to the heavy 
investment needed. Such model results strongly call for government subsidy to 
support poor farmers to adopt modern irrigation technology.  
As regards public investment in the conveyance system, model results suggest a 
decrease in scenario LSAI as compared to scenario LSDI due to the much heavier 
private investment. But the relationship between public and private investment is 
still a combination of a complementary rather than substitution. They are 
primarily complementary. In the current case, the increasing private investment 
results in a reduction of public investment. This can be explained as a partial 
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substitution with respect to absolute costs. An improvement of water efficiency 
needs participations from both sectors. The relationship between public and 
private investment still needs to be further investigated in the coming scenarios.  
The model results of current scenario LSAI actually suggest a potential possibility 
and requirement for government intervention to help farmers, who lack 
self-finance, to adopt modern water saving technology. Comparing the model 
results, as unveiled by scenario LSDI and scenario LSAI, it looks reasonable, to 
keep the coefficient c3 in a normal instead of a reverse order in the programming 
process. Since the public investment only focuses on the water conveyance 
system rather than on-farm water efficiency in the current study, c3 in a normal 
order reflects private incentives and is more close to reality. Therefore, the 
following scenarios will be modeled only under c3 in a normal order.  
9.2.4  Government promoted scenario  
In the previous two scenarios, the impacts of private investment on the social 
economy and water resource allocation, as caused by a different distribution of 
irrigation technology, i.e., a concentration at the head area in nearly real situation 
scenario (LSDI) and at the tail end area in the potential requirement of 
government intervention scenario (LSAI), were discussed. Now we seek to know 
how government promotes farmers to adopt modern irrigation technology. For 
instance, we will investigate what happens if the government promotes that all the 
farmers adopt one type of modern irrigation technology in the whole irrigation 
area. Will this be associated with an improvement or a worsening of the social 
welfare and water resource allocation and how does it affect the water use 
efficiency? These questions are investigated in the current government promoted 
scenario (LSFI). To be explicit, the current scenario LSFI investigates the impacts 
on social welfare and water resource allocation if the private investment is 
exogenous over all locations. The recharge rate is still at 0.3, public investment is 
still endogenous, and importantly private investment is assumed to hold constant 
at 100 Yuan/Mu exogenously. This implies that the type of locally produced water 
saving technology is applied over all locations. Will this turn out to be more 
optimal than in the nearly real situation scenario (LSDI)? The model no longer 
internally determines the different private investments, i.e., no varied irrigation 
technologies.  
9.2.4.1 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
Table 9.6 compares the aggregate impacts on social welfare and water resource 
allocation between scenario LSFI and scenario LSDI. The only difference 
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Table 9.6: Comparison of indicators at aggregate level between government promoted 
scenario (LSFI) and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
Items  LSFI LSDI %
Social welfare (Yuan) 288,074.95 1,096,337.38 -73.72 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 257,879.17 299,998.47 -14.04 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 9,801.02 46,635.30 -78.98 
Total water consumption (m3) 267,680.19 346,633.77 -22.78 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 0.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) -33,319.81 45,633.77 -173.02 
Total public investment (Yuan) 2,163.23 2,579.31 -16.13 
Switch point (Location) 176.00 174.00 1.15 
Canal water length (m) 8,750.00 8,700.00 0.57 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 2,625.00 2,602.20 0.88 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 375.00 397.80 -5.73 
Total private investment (Yuan) 300,000.00 138,470.08 116.65 
Notes: The switch point in scenario LSFI is found at location 176, at which farmers start to take 
groundwater.  
LSFI: It indicates government promoted scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
exogenous fixed private investment, c3 in an ascending order.  
LSDI: It indicates the nearly real situation scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
endogenous public and private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
between the two scenarios is the status of private investment, which is 
endogenous in scenario LSDI and however exogenously fixed at 100 Yuan/Mu in 
scenario LSFI. The social welfare drops to an ever-lowest level of 288,074.95 
Yuan over the whole area, a decrease by 73.72% compared to scenario LSDI due 
to the heavy expenditure of fixed private investment over all locations. The total 
canal water consumption reaches 257,879 m3, which is a decrease of 14.04% 
compared to that in scenario LSDI. Additionally, the total groundwater 
consumption falls dramatically by 78.98% in comparison to scenario LSDI, 
mainly due to lower water losses from the canal and the fields, imposed by the 
heavy public and private investment in water saving. This is for the first time a 
model results, where still 28,004 m3 of water are left in the groundwater stock at 
the last location. In comparison to all the previous cases, which have been 
reported, always a zero groundwater remains at the last location. High investment 
saves much water. For the first time the aquifer is protected. The result indicates a 
huge positive effect of water saving, which is connected with the scenario; though 
it of course creates a huge expenditure. The private investment is observed to 
reach as high as 300,000 Yuan in total, with a growth of 116.5% compared to the 
investment in scenario LSDI. The public investment, however, reaches only 2163 
Yuan in total, which means a drop of 16.13% as compared to scenario LSDI. Due 
to the substitution relationship between the two investment activities, the 
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government saves money. The area irrigated by canal water and the canal water 
length is extended slightly, though public investment is reduced significantly. The 
benefits from broadly adopted modern irrigation technology, save water in 
farmers’ field and hence leave it more available in the canal. Consequently the 
switch point of the area is at location 176, on which farmers start to take 
groundwater. The canal water length is reported to reach 8750 m, which is 50m 
more than that in scenario LSDI, in line with a slight increase of 0.88% of the area 
irrigated by the canal. Table 9.5 demonstrates that if private investment is heavily 
undertaken, the public investment could be reduced correspondingly without 
affecting much the aggregated water use efficiency over the project area. This 
result suggests, as regards the effects of water saving, the public and private 
investment are complementary to each other. Both will do good to improve water 
efficiency. As regards absolute costs, they show a substitutional relationship. That 
is, one increasing will result in another one’s decreasing. 
9.2.4.2 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
Table 9.7 further explores the impacts on different variables undertaking a mean 
analysis. The average water demand is 89.23 m3/Mu for AU in the current 
scenario, as compared to a consumption of 115.54m3/Mu water in scenario LSDI, 
which is a decrease by 22.78%. For CWU, the water demand is reduced, with a 
drop of 14.79% as compared to scenario LSDI. The most significant change of 
unit water consumption is observed in GWU, with a decrease of 77.71% as 
compared to scenario LSDI. Since it is now supposed that all farmers over 
locations will invest 100 Yuan for a certain type of technology, the number of 
MTU is actually the same as that of AU in the current scenario. Thanks to the 
heavy flat private investment in irrigation technology over all locations, the unit 
water consumption for MTU in the current scenario is 15.12% lower than that in 
scenario LSDI, in which the varied technologies are distributed at different 
locations.  
Note further, the revenue of all water user categories decreases sharply as 
compared to that in scenario LSDI. In particular for GWU, unit revenue shows the 
biggest drop of 63.53% compared to scenario LSDI, due to huge decreases in 
water consumption. The slightest decrease of revenue is observed in CWU with a 
fall of 7.44%, only. The land rent too goes down, with a decrease of 28.45% for 
AU as compared to scenario LSDI. The deepest fall of land rent is reported for 
GWU, with a drop of 90.34% as compared to scenario LSDI. There are even 
negative values of land rent at the last 5 locations. The unit water rent for AU falls  
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with a drop of 35.74%. The biggest drop of 77.75% of water rent is observed for 
groundwater users due to lower water consumption. A positive growth of water 
rent on average is observed for MTU, with a rate of 26.19% more than in scenario 
LSDI. The reason is that in the current scenario MTU and AU are overlapping 
each other, so that it covers 200 users. However the MTU, in scenario LSDI, 
cover only 89 users and all of them have access to cheap canal water. Strongly 
influenced by the high groundwater price, the water rent for MTU in the current 
scenario turns out to be higher than that in scenario LSDI.  
The private investment in unit is observed to be increasing over all categories 
except a tiny decrease of 3.59% for MTU, as compared to scenario LSDI. The 
reason is that farmers have chosen the various technologies internally in scenario 
LSDI, and some of them went for a more advanced technology. That did not fix 
their choice at the level of 100 Yuan. In line with the heavy investment in 
irrigation technology, on-farm water use efficiency is improved from 0.58 to 0.70 
over the whole irrigation area. A significant improvement from 0.48 to 0.71 is 
shown for GWU, with a considerable increase of 45.83%. Public investment for 
CWU shows a decrease of 10.99 %, in line with a slight water loss rate of 0.02 
reported in CWU and MTU as compared to a zero loss rate in scenario LSDI. 
9.2.4.3 Illustration of movement and relationships between some key indicators at 
spatial level 
After the relevant variables have been discussed by doing mean analysis, we will 
next employ some diagrams to investigate them spatially. The first question is 
how unit revenue is affected. Figure 9.12 compares the move of unit revenue 
between the current scenario LSFI and scenario LSDI. The diagram clearly shows 
that the curve of revenue for AU in scenario LSFI is pretty plain before it reaches 
the downstream area due to the slow change of canal water consumption and a 
constant expenditure on irrigation techniques. It goes downward sharply after 
farmers switch to groundwater. Particularly at the upper area of the canal the 
revenue is higher than in scenario LSDI. Later, it keeps staying below the curve in 
scenario LSDI till the end of area. More precisely, it is at location 47, that the 
revenue in scenario LSDI exceeds that in the current scenario. At location 47, 
where the revenue in scenario LSDI reaches 419.36 Yuan/Mu compared to 
418.77Yuan/Mu in the current scenario. The reason is that farmers have 
undertaken the heaviest investment at the upper area in scenario LSDI as 
compared to a moderate fixed investment of 100 Yuan in scenario LSFI. The high 
investment made in scenario LSDI lowers revenue deeply at the upper area of 
canal (before location 47). Due to a continuously rising water price, however, the 
revenue in scenario LSFI falls gradually. Close to the switch point (location 176),  
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Figure 9.12: Comparison of revenue between government promoted scenario (LSFI) and 
nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
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Figure 9.13: Comparison of water rent between government promoted scenario (LSFI) 
and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
where farmers switch to groundwater, the revenue falls very quickly. Farmers 
situated at the tail area suffer not only from a high groundwater price, but also 
from the expensive fixed investment in irrigation technology. Consequently an 
almost vertical drop of revenue after groundwater extraction is observed. 
Figure 9.13 describes the tendency of water rent in the two different scenarios. It 
shows, in scenario LSFI, that the water rent slowly goes up with the distance 
getting farther. It also implies that the water price is increasing with the distance. 
Thanks to the adoption of the same irrigation technology on each location, the 
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water consumption within CWU shows only a slight difference. The tendency of 
the water rent, hence, follows the track of a continuously rising water price within 
CWU. It increases firstly due to the rising price and negligible change of water 
consumption volume, and then falls dramatically due to a largely reduced 
groundwater consumption, which is contributed by application of water saving 
technology. This happens, though a higher groundwater price is suggested in this 
area. The water rent, however, in scenario LSDI shows an ever-up tendency 
compared to the downward trend in scenario LSFI, since merely 89 farmers at the 
upper area apply water saving technology. The rest of farmers still applies 
traditional irrigation techniques. That is why considerable groundwater 
consumption can be observed at the tail of the irrigation area in scenario LSDI.  
Let us turn now to land rents. Figure 9.14 describes the situation of land rents in 
the current scenario LSFI and scenario LSDI. The curve of land rents in scenario 
LSFI moves similar as that of revenue in this scenario. Based on the same 
expenditure on irrigation technology, the decisive indicators for the land rent at 
different locations are actually the revenue and the water costs. The upper canal 
area has access to cheap and to abundant water, so it possesses the lowest water 
costs and highest revenue. Consequently the highest land rent is observed in this 
area. With the water price increasing, the land rent decreases with the distance. 
Due to the heavy burden of the adoption of modern irrigation technology, the land 
rent becomes negative at the last 5 locations. This suggests, that it would be no 
longer profitable to do any production at the tail area of the canal in this case, 
except that investments are subsidized. 
For comparison, the land rent in scenario LSDI developed somewhat differently. 
In scenario LSDI, the lowest land rent is reported at the water source due to the 
high investment in irrigation technology there. The peak of the land rent is 
reached at location 90, where the private investment becomes 0. Finally, on 
average, thanks to the heavy expenditure in irrigation technology, the average 
land rent in scenario LSFI is 28.45% lower than that in scenario LSDI. 
Now we come to public investment that is endogenous in the current scenario 
LSFI. Figure 9.15 compares the public investment undertaken in scenario LSFI 
and scenario LSDI. It shows that public investment in scenario LSDI keeps a 
constant level of 297.27 Yuan/km with the exception of one single sky-high 
observation of 474.16 Yuan/km reported at location 150. This kind of level of 
investment indicates a quasi-piped canal, which is suggested until location 173. 
As described already, the water can flow in the canal till location 174. However, 
in scenario LSFI, the model proposes a constant public investment level of 297.27 
Yuan/km, but this is only undertaken till location 92. After location 92, the public 
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Figure 9.14: Comparison of land rent between government promoted scenario (LSFI) and 
nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
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Figure 9.15: Comparison of public investment between government promoted scenario 
(LSFI) and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
investment reduces gradually and finally it stops completely after location 163. 
Even in this case, the water can still flow in the canal till location 175. The main 
reason for this is that a relatively heavy private investment in water saving 
technology is made over all locations and offtakes public investment. So more 
water is left in the canal despite the fact that the loss rate of the water conveyance 
system increases slightly due to a decrease of public investment.  
As happens in previous scenarios, the canal water is normally used up at the 
location next to the end point of public investment. For instance, in scenario 
LSDI, the canal water ends at location 174, and the public investment ends at  
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Figure 9.16: Comparison of water conveyance efficiency between government promoted 
scenario (LSFI) and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
location 173. But in the current scenario LSFI, this is different. The public 
investment ends at location 163, and the canal water still flows till location 175. 
These tendencies can be assigned to the combined relationship between private 
and public investments. Both investments are substitutes in this case, since the 
increase of one can balance the decrease of the other. As indicated in scenario 
LSFI, private investment is undertaken heavily, with an average of 100-Yuan/Mu 
over all locations, and consequently the pubic investment is reduced as compared 
to scenario LSDI. Finally this does not affect the water supply system too much. 
Thanks to the considerable adoption of water saving technologies, farmers get 
sufficient water. Canal water flows till location 175, even one location more than 
in scenario LSDI. But we see a drop of public investment by 10.99% as compared 
to scenario LSDI. This indicates, that heavy private investment can, at a certain 
level, offset the effects of falling public expenditures.  
Further more, a constant public investment results in constant water use efficiency 
in the conveyance system. As shown in Figure 9.16, in scenario LSDI, the water 
loss rate is kept at 0 before it reaches location 174, and is kept at 0.07 of the base 
loss rate after location 174. This indicates that a quasi-piped canal with the same 
quality is required before location 174 in this scenario. However in the current 
scenario LSFI, the canal water loss rate at the beginning is kept at 0 before it 
reaches location 92. It then increases after location 92 due to a gradual decrease of 
public investment, and is kept at 0.07 of the base water loss rate after location 
163. This varied water loss rate suggests that a well-managed canal exists at the 
upper canal area, and then it deteriorates due to poor lining and maintenance at 
the downstream area. Notice finally it is abandoned to operate at all.  
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Such a performance of public investment in scenario LSFI suggests that: If private 
investment is kept heavy and constant over all locations exogenously, public 
investment will vary and decrease gradually rather than keeping at a constant 
level, as happened in scenario LSFI. Moreover the decreased public investment 
will not reduce the social welfare much, thanks to the substitutional function of 
private investment. As proved already in previous scenarios, public investment 
always plays a positive role in the water saving activity and improves the social 
welfare. Private investment is also a very important factor to influence the social 
welfare and water resource allocation. The participations of private investment not 
only can ease the burden of public expenditure, but also improve the water use 
efficiency considerably due to incentives from individual farmers. Such a 
complementary relationship between private and public investment is very 
essential for managing an irrigation project. 
9.2.4.4 Concluding remarks of government promoted scenario  
After analyzing and comparing the government promoted scenario (LSFI) and the 
nearly real situation scenario (LSDI), the following conclusion can be drawn: For 
the whole irrigation area the impacts on social welfare are negative if a relative 
strong and fixed water saving irrigation technology is adopted over all locations. 
Revenue, land rent and water rent will decrease in comparison to a system with a 
varied irrigation technology. However, the effect of water saving in the irrigation 
area is significant due to the considerable contribution of water saving technology 
and well-managed canal system. But the investment requirements are heavy and 
might be shouldered by the poor. The model results indicate that the optimal 
solution still might be to adopt different technologies at different locations rather 
than going for one kind of technology. This would not only reduce total costs, but 
also ensure social welfare and water use efficiency.  
9.2.5 A removal of public investment with private investment participation 
scenario under low soil permeability 
The previous three scenarios focused on investigating the different impacts on the 
social economy and water resource allocation caused by altering the distribution 
of irrigation technology over the irrigation area. In other words, the analysis has 
stressed the role of private investment in water saving activities. As discussed 
already in those public investment policy scenarios (see chapter 8), public 
investment always plays a positive role in maximizing social welfare. But the 
limitation of the previous public investment policy scenarios is that no private 
investment is undertaken while public investment was being made. Now the 
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questions could be: How much will such a removal influence social welfare and 
water resource allocation? Further, how much will it influence the private 
investment? The removal of public investment with private investment 
participation scenario under low soil permeability (LSRK2) will analyze the 
above-mentioned questions. The groundwater recharge rate is still held at 0.3, and 
public investment is fixed at 0 exogenously.  
9.2.5.1 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
Table 9.8 investigates the impacts of a removal of public investment on social 
welfare and water resource allocation with private investment participation under 
low soil permeability, and it compares the results with scenario LSDI, which is 
with endogenous public investment. It clearly shows that the overall social 
welfare is decreasing with a drop of 39.43% compared to that in scenario LSDI. 
The total canal water consumption declines sharply by 83.36% due to a large 
amount of water lost from the canal system. This occurs in line with a rapid 
increase of groundwater consumption by 92.5% as compared to that in scenario 
LSDI. The total water consumption reaches 139,684.85 m3, which is 59.7% lower 
than in scenario LSDI. This means a net water waste of 161,315.15 m3 in scenario 
LSRK2, as compared to a net gain of 45,633.77m3 water in scenario LSDI. As a 
consequence of public investment, if this is removed, the canal water end point 
emerges as early as at location 42, compared to location 174 in scenario LSDI. It 
too shows that the length of canal water shortens by 75.86%, and the area 
irrigated by canal water shrinks sharply by 75.92%. Indicators, such as the 
groundwater consumption, the area irrigated by groundwater and the private 
investment, increase significantly as compared to those in scenario LSDI. Due to 
huge water losses from the water conveyance system, canal water is used up very 
quickly. Farmers have to start to pump groundwater from location 42. Therefore 
the area irrigated by groundwater increases by 496%, however the groundwater 
consumption shows only a moderate increase of 92.51% compared to the increase 
of area irrigated. This indicates that the entire system is short of water; as there is 
only 30% of water that goes down to recharge the aquifer. As a major 
consequence, the removal of public investment results in huge water losses and 
water shortage over the entire irrigation system. This drives farmers to adopt 
modern irrigation technologies to use the water available more efficiently. The 
total private investment in irrigation technology shows an increase of 54.88% as 
compared to that in scenario LSDI. This indicates, that very high efforts in private 
investment are required, if no public investment is undertaken in water saving 
activities. 
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Table 9.8: Comparison of indicators at aggregate level between scenario of a removal 
of public investment with private investment participation under low soil 
permeability (LSRK2) and nearly real situation scenario (LSDI) 
Items  LSRK2 LSDI %
Social welfare (Yuan) 664,009.66 1,096,337.38 -39.43 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 49,907.62 299,998.47 -83.36 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 89,777.24 46,635.30 92.51 
Total water consumption (m3) 139,684.85 346,633.77 -59.70 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 0.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) -161,315.15 45,633.77 -453.50 
Total public investment (Yuan) 0.00 2,579.31 
Switch point (Location) 42.00 174.00 -75.86 
Canal water length (m) 2,100.00 8,700.00 -75.86 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 626.70 2,602.20 -75.92 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 2,373.30 397.80 496.61 
Total private investment (Yuan) 214,455.86 138,470.08 54.88 
Notes: The switch point in scenario LSRK2 is at location 42, on which cw42=38.34, gw42=11.02. 
Area irrigated by canal water is therefore calculated based on the ratio of canal water of 
0.78, however, of groundwater of 0.22. 
LSDI: It indicates the nearly real situation scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
endogenous public and private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
LSRK2: It indicates the scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under low soil permeability, which is run under exogenous public 
investment, endogenous private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
9.2.5.2 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
Table 9.9 studies further the impacts on the level of individual variables given 
average unit level and compares them with scenario LSDI. The average unit water 
demand for all farmers reaches 45.56 m3/Mu, which is a decrease by 59.7% as 
compared to scenario LSDI. This shows additionally that water consumption 
decreases by 30.92% and 67.73% for CWU and GWU, 40.92% and 74% for 
MTU and TTU, respectively, again as compared to those in scenario LSDI. A 
comparison between different farmer categories within the current scenario 
LSRK2 also shows, CWU still consume the highest amount of water, with a 
volume of 79.64 m3, and TTU consume the least amount of water, with a volume 
of 32.21 m3. The reason is that TTU are all located distant from the water source; 
they suffer water shortage instead of saving water.  
The biggest revenue decrease is observed in TTU, with a drop of 63.55 % as 
compared to scenario LSDI. The second largest drop is reported in GWU, with a 
decrease of 53.63%, since TTU and GWU overlap each other. Both suffer water 
shortage; moreover both have to afford the high groundwater price due to their  
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less-favored geographical position. That is why they loose much in revenue. The 
smallest revenue loss is shown in CWU, with a decrease of 17.37% compared to 
scenario LSDI. The CWU in the current scenario LSRK2 contains only 42 
farmers. These farmers still benefit from their location, i.e., where there is access 
to convenient canal water.  
Land rents follow the same story, and decline in all user categories. Especially the 
land rent of TTU shows the biggest decrease of all categories, i.e., 60.42%, as 
compared to scenario LSDI. The water rent of CWU shows a decrease of 74.94%. 
This is the biggest decrease among all the categories. There are two main reasons 
for this: One is, that not enough water is available in the canal. The other is that 
all CWU are also MTU in this case, so they actively save water by using modern 
irrigation technology. These two reasons together reduce canal water consumption 
and hence lower the water rent so much for CWU in scenario LSRK2. Private 
investment shows significant increases, i.e., 54.88% for AU, 224.49% for CWU 
and 43.58% for MTU, as compared to scenario LSDI. Especially an average unit 
investment of 44.77 Yuan/Mu is undertaken for GWU as compared to zero 
investment in scenario LSDI. This indicates that water shortage is the main 
incentive for farmers to adopt water saving technology. Note that public 
investment is removed in current scenario, so that a base loss rate of 0.07 is 
observed over the whole area.  
9.2.5.3 Illustration of movement and relationships between some key indicators at 
spatial level 
Finally several figures will be given to describe the relationship among different 
indicators spatially. Figure 9.17 investigates the relationship between revenue and 
investment based on farmer category CWU and GWU. As shown in Figure 9.17, 
the highest revenue occurs at the water source due to the relative sufficient water 
availability. Farmers start to adopt modern irrigation technology from the water 
source, but the highest level of irrigation technology appears not at the water 
source. With the distance getting bigger (water price getting higher), we observe 
an increase of private investment. Hence, the revenue goes down gradually till 
location 42. This location can be called a first switch point in the current scenario 
LSRK2. Here exactly the private investment reaches its peak and the canal water 
is used up. After location 42, the water price becomes higher than at previous 
locations, due to the start of groundwater use. Farmers gradually reduce their 
costly investment in irrigation technology; and this results in an up-going curve of 
revenue for a certain area. Later revenue drops again due to the high groundwater 
price, and farmers eventually give up applying any water saving technology after 
location 96. This can be considered as a second switch point after which 
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Figure 9.17: Illustration of relationship between revenue and private investment for CWU 
and GWU in scenario of a removal of public investment with private 
investment participation under low soil permeability (LSRK2)  
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Figure 9.18: Illustration of relationship between water consumption and revenue in 
scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under low soil permeability (LSRK2) 
farmers stop to invest in irrigation technology and the curve of revenue becomes 
pretty plain.  
What the diagram is telling us is, that private investment performs well and 
efficient when water is becoming scarce. In such a situation farmers will adopt 
modern technology, in particular more likely as compared to a situation of 
abundant water. Moreover by adopting modern technology MTU farmers can  
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Figure 9.19: Illustration of relationship between water rent and water consumption for 
MTU and TTU in scenario of a removal of public investment with private 
investment participation under low soil permeability (LSRK2) 
make a better return as compared to TTU farmers, if they can afford the high costs 
for the technology.  
For further discussion, two factors strongly influence the revenue in the present 
study. One is private investment in irrigation technology, which has been 
investigated so far, and the other is water consumption. Figure 9.18 describes the 
relationship between revenue and water consumption. It shows that the highest 
revenue occurs at the place of highest water abundance, where exactly the water 
consumption takes place. Figure 9.18 demonstrates that the development of 
revenue is closely tied to water consumption, especially in such a situation of 
severity of water shortage. The more water is available, the higher the revenue 
will be. 
Figures 9.19 illustrate the relationship between water rent and water consumption 
(based on categories MTU and TTU). In Figure 9.19, it comes out clearly again 
that the water rent increases with the distance becoming larger. The highest water 
consumption occurs at the first location, but the lowest water rent is also found at 
the same position. This indicates that the water price at the water source area is 
very low. Before location 42, which is the area dominated by canal water in 
scenario LSRK2, the water rent increases slowly thanks to the low canal water 
price. After location 42, where the groundwater use starts, a sharp up-jump of the 
water rent is observed. This demonstrates that a higher groundwater price results 
in a big gap of water rent between CWU and GWU farmers. Water rent keeps 
increasing further after farmers switch to groundwater. At location 85, the highest 
water rent of 44.49 Yuan/Mu is reported. Afterwards, the water rent goes down  
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Figure 9.20: Illustration of relationship between land rent and private investment for 
CWU and GWU in scenario of a removal of public investment with private 
investment participation under low soil permeability (LSRK2) 
 
until to the end of the project area. Note, normally the groundwater price changes 
slowly and smoothly over space compared to the canal water price. It therefore 
creates a relatively flat groundwater consumption and water rent, as shown in 
both curves of water rent after location 96. Before reaching the location 96, the 
water consumption and the water rent, are fluctuating dramatically due to the 
varied irrigation technologies being applied.  
The land rent is also an important concept to be investigated. Figure 9.20 
illustrates the relationship between the land rent and private investments. As 
mentioned already, the land rent is related mainly to water costs and private 
investment in the current study. Since water costs are relatively small compared to 
the expensive investments in irrigation technology, the figure investigates how the 
land rent is influenced by private investment. As shown in Figure 9.20, the highest 
land rent naturally is observed at the water source, where private investment starts 
from a relatively low level. The land rent decreases gradually with private 
investment increasing over space. At location 42, the private investment reaches 
its peak of 242.91 Yuan/Mu. This suggests that kinds of sprinkler or drip irrigation 
techniques are adopted at this point, which is an important result. Model results 
also show that the location 42 is a switch point of CWU and GWU, where the 
canal water is used up, and small parts of groundwater are taken as a complement 
(a share of 22% of total water consumption at this location). However, at the next 
location 43, the lowest land rent of 8.17 Yuan is observed, since the farmers have 
to switch to expensive groundwater completely while expenditure on irrigation  
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Figure 9.21: Illustration of relationship between private investment and water use 
efficiency in scenario of a removal of public investment with private 
investment participation under low soil permeability (LSRK2) 
technology remains very high. After location 42, farmers reduce private 
investment gradually, and the land rent starts to rise again within GWU. It reaches 
the second biggest amount of 170.63 Yuan/Mu at location 91, where probably the 
water price is not very high as compared to the latter locations and private 
investment is also almost close to zero. After the peak of location 91, private 
investment stops soon at location 96. Afterwards land rent decreases smoothly 
over distance. 
Since water use efficiency is a prime concern, we document it in Figure 9.21. The 
diagram shows that on-farm water use efficiency increases with investment 
getting higher. It reaches its peak rate of 0.91 at location 39 to 44, in line with the 
investment ranging from 236.61 to 235.39 Yuan/Mu. This indicates that farmers 
situated within these 6 locations adopt kinds of modern irrigation technologies 
i.e., sprinkler and seepage irrigation (the type of locally produced drip irrigation 
technique). After the peak area, investment decreases, and hence the water use 
efficiency drops until 0.50 at location 96, after which no farmer will invest in 
irrigation technology. A flat base rate of 0.48 of water use efficiency is reported 
for TTU from location 97 till the end of area. 
9.2.5.4 Concluding remarks of scenario of a removal of public investment with 
private investment participation under low soil permeability  
One decisive conclusion can be drawn from the above analysis: The overall social 
welfare and water allocation decreases if public investment is removed. The 
whole irrigation area suffers from water shortage. Consequently the revenue, the 
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land rent, and the water rent decreases sharply due to insufficient water supply in 
the system as compared to the nearly real situation scenario (LSDI). A notable 
change is that private investment increases significantly compared to that in 
scenario LSDI. This indicates that more farmers adopt modern water saving 
technologies than in scenario LSDI due to water scarcity. The average on-farm 
water use efficiency is hence improved in the current scenario. However this 
scenario demonstrates again that water shortage will create the highest incentive 
for farmers to adopt modern irrigation technologies. It also indicates that, if public 
investment falls short, private investment has to bridge the gap.  
9.2.6 A removal of public investment with private investment participation 
scenario under high soil permeability 
All the previous scenarios were analyzed under a soil condition of moderate 
permeability, i.e., the recharge rate was fixed at 0.3. To make the model broadly 
applicable, as it was exercised in the public investment policy scenarios, a higher 
recharge rate for groundwater will be tested in the following scenarios. The 
previous scenario LSRK2 has discussed the comprehensive negative impacts on 
social welfare and water resource allocation when public investment is removed 
from the irrigation system under a recharge rate at 0.3. What will happen if soil 
conditions change? Will the social welfare decline and water resource allocation 
worsen under higher soil permeability? How does it affect allocation of private 
investment? These research questions will be discussed in the current scenario. 
The current scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under high soil permeability (HSRK2) assumes that other conditions 
remain equal in comparison to scenario LSRK2, i.e., the private investment is 
endogenous in the model and public investment is removed from the system. 
Public investment is held constant at 0 in the modeling process. Importantly the 
recharge rate is increased to 0.8.  
9.2.6.1 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
The overall impacts on social welfare and water resource allocation is 
investigated in Table 9.10. The social welfare is surprisingly preserved at 
1,068,977.80 Yuan over the whole area, which is now 60.99% higher than in 
scenario LSRK2. The total canal water consumption also increases, with a growth 
of 29.82% as compared to scenario LSRK2. Considering groundwater, the growth 
of total groundwater consumption is significantly doubled, with an increase of 
279.22% due to a higher recharge rate to groundwater as compared to scenario 
LSRK2. To sum up, the total water consumption over the irrigation area reaches  
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Table 9.10: Comparison of indicators at aggregate level between scenarios of a removal 
of public investment with private investment participation under high soil 
permeability (HSRK2) and low soil permeability (LSRK2) 
Items HSRK2 LSRK2 %
Social welfare (Yuan) 1,068,977.80 664,009.66 60.99 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 64,789.70 49,907.62 29.82 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 340,457.07 89,777.24 279.22 
Total water consumption (m3) 405,246.76 139,684.85 190.12 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 0.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) 104,246.76 -161,315.15 
Total public investment (Yuan) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Switch point (Location) 35.00 42.00 -16.67 
Canal water length (m) 1,750.00 2,100.00 -16.67 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 520.61 626.70 -16.93 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 2,479.39 2,373.30 4.47 
Total private investment (Yuan) 68,257.55 214,455.86 -68.17 
Notes: The switch point of scenario HSRK2 is observed at location 35, where the canal water 
and groundwater are co-used, and cw35=78.39, gw35= 32.42, respectively. All the related 
items of scenario HSRK2 are calculated based on the ratio of canal water and 
groundwater use, and they are 0.71 and 0.29 respectively. 
HSRK2: It indicates the scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under high soil permeability, which is run under exogenous public 
investment, endogenous private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
LSRK2: It indicates the scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under low soil permeability, which is run under exogenous public 
investment, endogenous private investment, c3 in an ascending order.  
405,246.76 m3, which is an increase of 190.22% and almost the double water 
consumption shown in scenario LSRK2. This consequently produces a net gain of 
water use of 104,246.76 m3, compared with a net loss of 161,315.15 in scenario 
LSRK2. The switch point is now at location 35, at which the canal water ends and 
the groundwater use starts. Already after location 35, canal water is no longer 
available. Farmers switch to groundwater completely. The canal length is 
suggested at 1750m, which is 350m shorter than that in scenario LSRK2. In line 
with canal water shortage, the area irrigated by canal water is reduced by 16.93%, 
and however the area irrigated by groundwater increased slightly by 4.47% 
respectively, as compared to scenario LSRK2. The total private investment is 
suggested to decline compared with scenario LSRK2, with a significant drop of 
68.17%. Overall, the Table 9.9 indicates that, except private investment and canal 
water length, all the other indicators show a strongly positive impact compared to 
scenario LSRK2. 
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9.2.6.2 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm  
level 
Table 9.11 investigates the impact of scenario HSRK2 on social economy and 
water allocation at the farm level, as based on different farmer categories and 
compares it with scenario LSRK2. All the indicators suggest that the water supply 
becomes sufficient thanks to a much higher recharge rate of groundwater in 
scenario HSRK2. As shown in the table, the average unit water demand for AU is 
suggested at 135.0 m3/Mu, which is 1.9 times water demand in the previous 
scenario LSRK2. The biggest increase of unit water consumption is observed in 
TTU and GWU, with growths of 337.37% and 263% respectively compared to 
those in scenario LSRK2. In the current scenario HSRK2, the TTU are completely 
covered by GWU. That is why the two groups possess the highest increase among 
all the other categories.  
The revenue increases over all as compared to scenario LSRK2, with a growth of 
96.66%. The highest increase is observed in TTU and GWU, with rises of 
188.92% and 130.09%, respectively, compared to those in scenario LSRK2. The 
reason is not only because farmers have access to abundant groundwater, but also 
that there is no need for them to invest in irrigation technology compared to their 
counterparts CWU and MTU. In scenario HSRK2, the number of CWU is 35, and 
that of MTU is 79, therefore the CWU overlaps with MTU completely since the 
water saving irrigation users are centered in the upper area in this case. As 
explained already, the revenue made by CWU farmers and MTU farmers 
increases, but with only limited growth of 22.54% and 42.48% respectively 
compared to their counterparts GWU and TTU.  
The land rent increases largely, with an average growth of 143.96% over the 
whole area for AU, as compared to that in scenario LSRK2. The biggest increase 
of 159.22% is still reported in GWU, while the land rent in TTU ranks second. 
Surprisingly the land rent for MTU increases by 139.15%, ranking third. The 
average private investment in scenario HSRK2 is much lower than that in 
scenario LSRK2. This is mirrored by the land rent, which is calculated by 
deducting private investment and water costs from the revenue. That is why the 
land rent for MTU is suggested to increase significantly compared with that in 
scenario LSRK2.  
The water rent, based on all categories, is reported to increase considerably. The 
average water rent for AU shows a growth of 256.08% compared to that in 
scenario LSRK2. The highest increase of water rent is observed for TTU, which 
increase by 327.65% compared to that of scenario LSRK2. GWU ranks second, 
with a growth of 272.85%. CWU shows the lowest increase of 49.24% compared  
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to the other categories, because they apply water saving technologies and 
therefore consume relatively less water.  
A notable fact is that the average private investment decreases based on all 
categories. For AU, it is reduced by 68.17%. For CWU and GWU, it is reduced by 
57.88% and 72.62%, respectively. Comparing the private investment for MTU in 
the two scenarios, there is a drop of 61.32% in the current scenario HSRK2. The 
falling of private investment suggests that farmers reduce to invest in water saving 
technology and downgrade the level of technologies employed thanks to the 
sufficient water supply. In line with the reduction of private investment, the 
on-farm water use efficiency decreases to 0.53, compared with an efficiency rate 
of 0.62 in scenario LSRK2. The deepest reduction of water use efficiency is 
reported for CWU: 0.65 against that of 0.82 in scenario HSRK2, a drop of 
21.08%. 
9.2.6.3 Illustration of movement and relationships between some key indicators at 
spatial level 
Further, with the help of diagrams (Figure 9.22-9.27), the movement over distance 
and relationships between different indicators become visible. A comparison 
between different scenarios can be now more clearly presented. Figure 9.22 
describes the relationships between revenue and private investment based on 
canal water users and groundwater users. It suggests that the connecting point 
between CWU and GWU becomes the key switch point for revenue in scenario 
HSRK2. As shown in Figure 9.22, before the switch point, i.e., until location 35, 
the average unit revenue declines gradually mainly due to an increase of private 
investment. After location 35, the revenue goes up while investment is going 
down, regardless whether farmers start to take the expensive groundwater. Figure 
9.22 indicates, that private investment is the most important factor being able to 
influence farmer’s revenue. The price gap between canal water and groundwater 
affects the revenue, too. As shown in Figure 9.22, as farmers still have access to 
cheap canal water, they can afford to increase investment in irrigation technology. 
After they switch to use groundwater, they have to go for the expensive 
groundwater and hence reduce their investment quickly. Till location 80 the 
investment in irrigation technologies drops to zero, and the revenue hits a peak of 
487.28 Yuan/Mu. Finally after location 80, the revenue declines smoothly due to 
the relatively straight groundwater price and only tiny differences in groundwater 
consumption occur.  
Figure 9.23 explores the relationship between revenue and water consumption in 
scenario HSRK2. It shows a similar track of both curves. Again, water  
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Figure 9.22: Illustration of relationship between revenue and private investment for CWU 
and GWU in scenario of a removal of public investment with private 
investment participation under high soil permeability (HSRK2)  
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Figure 9.23: Illustration of relationship between revenue and water consumption in 
scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under high soil permeability (HSRK2)   
consumption is a very important indicator to measure revenue in an irrigation 
project. The more water is consumed, the higher the revenue will be. There exists 
a strong positive relationship between both as shown in Figure 9.23. The highest 
revenue of 487.28 Yuan /Mu is observed at location 80, from which the biggest 
volume of water consumption is reported. This corresponds with the definition of 
the revenue function, which was obtained by integrating an inverse water demand 
function.  
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Figure 9.24: Comparison of revenue for CWU and GWU between scenarios of a removal 
of public investment with private investment participation under high soil 
permeability (HSRK2) and low soil permeability (LSRK2) 
Figure 9.24 compares the revenue achieved by farmers in scenario HSRK2 and 
LSRK2. It obviously suggests that the revenue in scenario HSRK2 is higher than 
that in scenario LSRK2. Public investments are removed in both scenarios; the 
only difference is a recharge rate of groundwater. The different recharge rates 
result in different water supply capacities. In scenario LSRK2, the model results 
show that the whole irrigation area suffers from water shortage due to the huge 
water loss from the canal. And moreover, the low soil permeability prevents the 
underground aquifer from recharging. This explains, why the peak of revenue 
occurs at the water source instead of elsewhere in scenario LSRK2, as the biggest 
volume of water consumption is also observed there. However in scenario 
HSRK2 there is no water shortage at all. With a higher recharge rate, more canal 
water is lost than in scenario LSRK2, but the groundwater gets sufficiently 
recharged. Since canal water ends at location 35 in the current scenario HSRK2, 
more than 3/4 of the irrigation area is being controlled by groundwater. It is 
surprising to see that the consumption of groundwater in the current scenario 
HSRK2 is even higher than that of canal water. Moreover the CWU apply modern 
irrigation technologies and most GWU do not. That is why the peak of revenue in 
the current scenario HSRK2 occurs at location 80, at which water consumption 
hits its highest level and farmers also stop investing in irrigation technologies. 
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Figure 9.25: Illustration of relationship between water rent and water consumption for 
MTU and TTU in scenario of a removal of public investment with private 
investment participation under high soil permeability (HSRK2) 
Figure 9.25 studies the relationship between water rent and water consumption 
based on categories MTU and TTU at different locations. Over all the water rent 
goes up with the distance. In the current scenario it is mainly influenced by water 
costs, as the public investment is zero. Figure 9.25 clearly suggests an up-jump of 
water rent at location 36, at which farmers switch to expensive groundwater 
completely. As suggested in the model, the highest investment is made at location 
35, so the lowest water consumption among all locations is observed at this point. 
As shown in Figure 9.25, the highest water consumption is observed at location 
80, at which farmers stop to invest in water saving technology completely. The 
up-going curve of water rent is relatively plainer compared with that before 
location 80, mainly due to the small difference of groundwater consumption after 
farmers stop investing in irrigation technologies. Naturally the increasing 
groundwater price still pushes the water rent going up till the end of the irrigation 
area. 
It is noticed again that the difference between scenario LSRK2 and HSRK2 is soil 
permeability. Different soil permeability results in different groundwater capacity. 
Figure 9.26 compares water rent between the two scenarios. As already presented, 
the total water consumption increases considerably in scenario HSRK2, and 
therefore it leads to a significant high level of water rent. The price gap between 
canal water and groundwater is responsible for the up-jumps of the water rent in 
both scenarios when farmers switch from canal water to groundwater.  
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Figure 9.26: Comparison of water rent for CWU and GWU between scenarios of a 
removal of public investment with private investment participation under 
high soil permeability (HSRK2) and low soil permeability (LSRK2) 
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Figure 9.27: Comparison of private investment between scenarios of a removal of public 
investment with private investment participation under high soil permeability 
(HSRK2) and low soil permeability (LSRK2)  
Figure 9.27 compares the different level of private investment between the two 
scenarios. Due to water scarcity in scenario LSRK2, farmers make more efforts to 
save water than they do in scenario HSRK2. The average private investment 
undertaken by farmers in scenario LSRK2 is 68.17% higher than that in scenario 
HSRK2. The highest level of irrigation technology adopted by farmers with an 
investment of 242.91 Yuan/Mu in scenario LSRK2 is undertaken, which is a kind 
of modern sprinklers and advanced locally produced drip irrigation technology. 
They can improve the water use efficiency up to 0.91. However, in scenario 
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HSRK2, farmers reduce the private investment sharply mainly due to the 
relatively sufficient water supply (mostly from groundwater) and expensive 
groundwater costs. The highest technology level of scenario LSRK2 is achieved 
with an investment of 95.78 Yuan/Mu, which is kind of low level instead of 
advanced locally produced drip irrigation; in line with a reported water use 
efficiency rate of 0.69. Moreover, only 79 farmers have adopted water saving 
technologies in scenario HSRK2 against a number of 96 in scenario LSRK2. All 
the above-mentioned results suggest that an environment of abundant water 
supply will certainly hamper the adoption of modern water saving technologies. 
9.2.6.4 Concluding remarks of scenario of a removal of public investment with 
private investment participation under high soil permeability 
The scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under high soil permeability (HSRK2) showed big differences 
compared with the previous one under low soil permeability (LSRK2). Contrary 
to indicators of social economy and water resources worsening in scenario 
LSRK2, indicators are largely improved in scenario HSRK2. The reason is that 
the high soil permeability results in considerable recharge to groundwater. The 
social welfare is improved by 60.99% and the total water consumption almost 
doubles. A further notable change is that the private investment is reduced 
considerably by 68.17% compared to that in scenario LSRK2. The reasons for this 
development are: with high soil permeability, on one hand, farmers loose the 
incentive to invest more in their fields to save water. On the other, the water 
supply is so abundant that there is no need to apply modern advanced water 
saving technologies, especially for groundwater users.  
9.2.7 Comparison of indicators among scenarios in the extended 
optimization model 
After analyzing the different scenarios one by one, a review of model results 
among scenarios and indicators is given in Table 9.12. All the relevant indicators 
at aggregate and at farm level are listed in the table, which can be a reference for 
comparison among different scenarios in the extended optimization model. 
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Table 9.12: Comparison of indicators among scenarios in the extended model 
Items at aggregate level LSDI LSAI LSFI LSRK2 HSRK2
Social welfare (Yuan) 1,096,337.38 1,136,078.96 288,074.95 664,009.66 1,068,977.80 
Total canal water 
consumption (m3) 299,998.47 300,000.00 257,879.17 49,907.62 64,789.70 
Total groundwater  
consumption (m3) 46,635.30 45,088.61 9,801.02 89,777.24 340,457.07 
Total water  
consumption (m3) 346,633.77 345,088.61 267,680.19 139,684.85 405,246.76 
Capacity of water  
supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 301,000.00 301,000.00 301,000.00 
Gain from conjunctive  
water use (m3) 45,633.77 44,088.61 -33,319.81 -161,315.15 104,246.76 
Total public  
investment (Yuan) 2579,31 2,357.24 2,163.23 0.00 0.00 
Switch point (location) 174.00 160.00 176.00 42.00 35.00 
Canal water length (m) 8,700.00 7,900.00 8,750.00 2,100.00 1,750.00 
Area irrigated by  
canal water (Mu) 2,602.20 2,370.00 2,625.00 626.70 520.61 
Area irrigated by  
groundwater (Mu) 397.80 630.00 375.00 2,373.30 2,479.39 
Total private  
investment (Yuan) 138,470.08 219,114.08 300,000.00 214,455.86 68,257.55 
Items in unit at farm level  
Water  
demand (m3/Mu) 115.54 115.03 89.23 46.56 135.08 
Revenue (Yuan/Mu ) 435.53 426.82 371.92 237.94 467.95 
Land rent (Yuan/Mu ) 295.67 273.20 211.54 131.57 320.98 
Water rent (Yuan/Mu ) 92.85 79.80 59.67 34.88 124.21 
Private investment 
(Yuan/Mu ) 46.16 73.04 100.00 71.49 22.75 
On-farm water  
use efficiency 0.58 0.62 0.70 0.62 0.53 
Public investment 
(Yuan/km) 257.93 235.72 216.32 0.00 0.00 
Notes: LSDI:It indicates the nearly real situation scenario, which is run under low soil 
permeability, endogenous public and private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
LSAI: It indicates the potential requirement of government intervention scenario, which is run 
under low soil permeability, endogenous public and private investment, c3 in a 
descending order. 
LSFI: It indicates government promoted scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
exogenous fixed private investment, c3 in an ascending order.  
LSRK2: It indicates the scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under low soil permeability, which is run under exogenous public 
investment, endogenous private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
HSRK2: It indicates the scenario of a removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under high soil permeability, which is run under exogenous public 
investment, endogenous private investment, c3 in an ascending order. 
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9.3 Summary and research questions 
In chapter 9, we extended the initial optimization model by introducing an 
additional coefficient c3, so as to value the impacts on social welfare and water 
resource allocation by modeling private and public investment simultaneously. 
Five scenarios were tested under the extended model.  
Three different distributions of irrigation technologies were modeled by altering 
the order of coefficient c3. The first distribution is the nearly real situation, in 
which farmers adopt modern irrigation technology at the upper area. The second 
is a prediction for a potential of government intervention, in which farmers adopt 
modern irrigation technologies at the downstream area. And the third is also 
associated with government promotion of the same type irrigation technology 
over all location. The model results of the three scenarios suggest clearly that it is 
more reasonable and economic to adopt various irrigation technology rather than 
fixed type at different locations.  
The normal order, i.e., ascending order of coefficient c3, based on the real 
situation was selected as the default order of c3 in the following modeling 
process. According to this distribution of irrigation technologies, the impacts 
caused by public investment were analyzed under two different soil conditions. 
The two scenarios of removal of public investment with private investment 
participation under different soil condition showed similar results as compared to 
those of without private investment participation in the initial model. The 
differences are that the social welfare and the water resource allocation are not 
only influenced by public investment but also by private investment. This feature 
is given more emphasis under the extended optimization model. If the irrigation 
system is under low soil permeability, the model results suggest that public 
investment will improve social welfare and water resource allocation a lot. 
However less improvement of social welfare and water resource allocation will be 
achieved comparably with high soil permeability. Under high soil permeability, a 
removal of public investment will do less damage. It moreover indicates that the 
relationship between public and private investment shows a kind of substitution 
rather than complementarity in terms of absolute costs under these two scenarios. 
If public investment is removed from the system, farmers will likely increase their 
private investment to ensure water availability. However, if public investment is 
undertaken heavily, the private investment will considerably decline. Another 
feature is that, in a system with low soil permeability, farmers would invest more 
in modern irrigation technologies than in a system with higher soil permeability.  
Based on the results of the five scenarios, the relationship between public and 
private investment can be judged from two aspects: One is the effect of water use 
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efficiency. From this aspect, the relationship between private and public 
investment is complementary. A well managed water conveyance system will 
lower farmers water costs and hence might give them the opportunity to adopt 
modern irrigation technology. However, broadly adopted modern irrigation 
technology by farmers will consume less water, therefore the public canal can 
benefit more farmers. Consequently the overall water efficiency will get improved. 
From another aspect of absolute costs, the relationship between both investments 
is more substitutional, one increasing will lead to the other one decreasing. 
Finally as research questions, we state: 
The impacts of different distribution of private investment are investigated in this 
chapter, but it is with the help of an additional coefficient c3. Will it be possible 
for farmers to afford the costly irrigation technology if we increase the output 
level? And what happens if we let the model endogenously determine the 
distribution of technology? These questions will be further discussed in the next 
chapter.
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10 IMPACTS OF PRICE REGIME CHANGE ON 
SOCIAL WELFARE AND WATER RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION  
Let us have a review here. In chapter 8, the impacts on social welfare and water 
resource allocation have been investigated by changing the status of public 
investment. All the scenarios in chapter 8 suggest that public investment plays a 
very important role in water saving and improving social welfare. However, 
individual farmers do not invest in irrigation technology, due to its high costs. 
Then in chapter 9, with the help of introducing a coefficient c3 for private 
investment, we enforced the model to simulate the impacts of different 
distributions of irrigation technologies and performance of public investment in 
the irrigation area simultaneously. In the present chapter, we will model the 
impacts by changing the output (apple) price and input (water) price. 
Two scenarios are designed to value the impacts of price regime change on social 
welfare and water resource allocation by investigating farmers’ active adoption of 
irrigation technology. As presented in Table 10.1, one is focusing on effects of 
apple price change; the other is dealing with apple price and canal water price 
change simultaneously.  
Table 10.1: Scenario groupings, names, abbreviations, and descriptions for assessing the 
impacts of price regime change 
Group/Name Abbreviation Description 
Scenarios of price regime change:  
 
High output (apple) price scenario 
 
 
 
Simultaneous high output price and 
input (canal water) price scenario 
 
 
 
HA 
 
 
 
HCW 
 
 
To model the likelihood of farmer’s adoption of 
modern irrigation technology if their financial 
situation is improved  
 
To model the likelihood of farmer’s adoption of 
modern irrigation technology if their financial 
situation is improved, but simultaneously the water 
price gets higher than that in HA  
 
10.1 High output price scenario  
10.1.1 Specifications of a high output price scenario  
The background of a high apple price is that, a higher return from apple 
production can provide farmers more opportunities to adopt modern water saving 
technology. As explained already in chapter 3, the year, when the field data were 
collected, was a bad harvest year for apple growers in the study area combined 
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with low prices. That could be one of the reasons why the models in chapter 8 
choose private investment to be 0 for all locations.  
In this chapter we assume that the apple price is 3 times the current price, which is 
not unrealistic, since the apple price at 1999 was only 35% of the average. 
Reflected in the modelling process, this assumption is undertaken by multiplying 
the net revenue function by 3. By doing so, a new revenue function of higher 
return is hence obtained. The other conditions are kept the same as given in 
scenario optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) in chapter 8: Public and 
private investment are endogenous variables, and the recharge rate is set at 0.3.  
The objective function is specified below:  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )∑
∑
××+××+×+×−
×××+××+××××=
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 (10.1) 
The equation (10.1) will serve in the optimization process in the current chapter. 
10.1.2 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
As mentioned already, the only condition change made in the current high output 
scenario (HA) is that, the output price is increased by 3 times, as compared to the 
base run optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) in the initial model. It is 
therefore reasonable to compare the model results of the two scenarios. 
Indicators at aggregate level of the two scenarios are presented in Table 10.2. It is 
evident that, except indicators of social welfare and private investment, only 
negligible differences to the other indicators are found between scenario LSEK 
and scenario HA. Social welfare increases significantly, which is 251.69% more 
than in scenario LSEK, thanks to high selling price of apples. Water 
resource-related indicators do not change much as compared to scenario LSEK. 
As shown in Table 10.2, total canal water consumption remains unchanged. Total 
groundwater consumption decreases slightly. There is still a gain from conjunctive 
water use, which is 2.47% lower than in scenario LSEK. Total public investment 
changes little. The area irrigated by canal water increases by 1.22%, and the area 
irrigated by groundwater decreases by 5.56% correspondingly. A remarkable 
change is given for the total private investment, which is found at 13911.23Yuan 
as compared to a zero-investment in scenario LSEK. As the model results further 
show, from location 66, farmers start to invest in water saving technologies until 
the end of the project area. It means that there are 134 farmers, which accounts for 
67% of all the farmers, they go for water saving technologies. The amount of the 
private investment is still small, but it shows a very clear and positive signal:  
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Table 10.2: Comparison of indicators at aggregate level between high output price 
scenario (HA) and optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) 
Items HA LSEK %
Social welfare (Yuan) 3,746,690.30 1,065,334.88 251.69 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 300,000.00 300,000.00 0.00 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 55,263.21 56,635.07 -2.42 
Total water consumption (m3) 355,263.21 356,635.07 -0.38 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 0.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) 54,263.21 55,635.07 -2.47 
Total public investment (Yuan) 2,437.67 2,431.55 0.25 
Switch point (Location) 166.00 164.00 1.22 
Canal water length (m) 8,300.00 8,200.00 1.22 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 2,490.00 2,460.00 1.22 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 510.00 540.00 -5.56 
Total private investment (Yuan) 13,911.23 0.00 
Notes:  HA: It indicates the high output price scenario, which is run under low soil 
permeability, endogenous public and private investment and 3 times high output price;  
LSEK:  It indicates the optimal public investment scenario, which is run under low soil 
permeability, endogenous public and private investment, low output price.  
Farmers will adopt modern water saving technology actively if they are wealthy 
enough. Note that, the adoption of technology in scenario HA is modelled 
endogenously without help of an additional coefficient, such as c3 in chapter 9. 
The model results strongly support the idea that we have an emphasis on water 
scarcity and high water price. This is a central incentive for farmers to adopt water 
saving technology. But financial availability is the premise to fulfil it.  
10.1.3 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
The indicators of social economy at farm level are presented in Table 10.3. All 
indicators show overall better results as compared to scenario LSEK. The average 
unit revenue doubles for all farmer categories. Land rent also increases by 
251.12%, 241.74% and 304.67% for AU, CWU, and GWU, respectively and 
significantly. Water resource-related indicators change slightly for all categories 
as compared to scenario LSEK. Private investment is undertaken endogenously in 
the current scenario, though it is still at a very low level. For AU farmers, it is on 
average at 4.64 Yuan/Mu. For CWU and GWU farmers, it is 2.95 Yuan/Mu and 
12.89 Yuan/Mu respectively. GWU farmers invest more in irrigation technology, 
since they need to pay high groundwater prices. On-farm water use efficiency 
increases by 2.39%, 1.52% and 6.61% for AU, CWU and GWU respectively, as 
compared to scenario LSEK. It is clear that farmers, who use canal water, have 
less incentive to invest in water saving technology, rather than those using 
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groundwater. The amount of unit private investment, which is made by GWU 
farmers, represents a relatively low level water saving technique. It means farmers 
go for such technologies for instance, basin check irrigation technology, according 
to the field research investigations. Public investment changes little, with tiny 
decreases being observed.  
10.1.4 Comparison of private investment at different locations between high 
output price scenario and optimal public investment scenario  
Since private investments are the main feature of the current high output price 
scenario (HA), we will compare its performance with the optimal public 
investment scenario (LSEK) by using a diagram. Figure 10.1 clearly shows, that 
private investment in scenario HA starts from location 66, by which farmers are 
still covered by the canal water system. This suggests that CWU farmers actively 
apply water saving technology due to the increasing water price over distance. An 
up-jump is observed in Figure 10.1 at location 166, which is at a switch point 
where farmers start to take groundwater. This again suggests that groundwater 
users adopt relatively more advanced technologies than canal water users, as they 
are charged a higher water price. However, the private investment is kept at 0 over 
all locations in scenario LSEK, in which farmers’ income stays at a low level (3 
times lower than in HA), and they do not invest in any modern irrigation 
technology.  
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Figure 10.1: Comparison of private investment for CWU and GWU between high output 
price scenario (HA) and optimal public investment scenario (LSEK) 
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10.2 Simultaneous high output and input price scenario  
10.2.1 Specifications of simultaneous high output and input price scenario 
In the previous scenario HA, impacts of a high output price have been modelled. 
High agricultural returns provide opportunities for farmers to adopt modern 
irrigation technology. This possibility has been proved in the previous scenario 
HA. But the level of adopted technology is very low in scenario HA. The 
questions now are: What happens if the canal water price is raised by 10 times? 
Will the high canal water price enforce more farmers adopt water saving 
technologies? These questions will be discussed in the current simultaneous high 
output and input price scenario (HCW). 
Other things being equal to scenario HA, the canal water price is assumed to 
increase by 10 times in the current scenario HCW, and the groundwater price is 
kept at the same as in the previous scenarios. 
10.2.2 Impacts on aggregate indicators 
The indicators of social economy and water resource allocation at aggregate level 
are listed in Table 10.4. It shows clearly that high costs of water worsen the social 
economy and water resource allocation. Social welfare decreases by 38.58% as 
compared to scenario HA. Total canal water consumption also decreases sharply 
by 40.41%. Since canal water becomes expensive, more farmers go for 
groundwater. Total groundwater consumption increases significantly by 30.98%. 
In total a net water loss of 49,850 m3 is reported in the current scenario HCW, as 
compared to a net gain of 54,263 m3 in scenario LSEK. The reason for this is, that 
expensive canal water reduces farmers’ canal water consumption. Consequently 
more canal water is wasted by seepage during transportation in the canal. Total 
public investment decreases significantly by 74.49% as compared to scenario 
LSEK, since the canal becomes shorter. Consequently canal water is used up only 
until location 119. Public investment has already stopped at location 107. This 
result indicates again that, less canal water is taken by farmers, due to its high 
costs and adoption of water saving technology.  
The area irrigated by canal water declines and, that by groundwater increases. 
Total private investment shows tremendous increase, with a growth rate of 
547.5% as compared to scenario LSEK. This development strongly suggests that 
high water prices drive farmers to adopt modern water saving technology.  
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Table 10.4: Comparison of indicators at aggregate level between simultaneous high 
output and input price scenario (HCW) and high output price scenario (HA) 
Items HCW HA %
Social welfare (Yuan) 2,301,280.02 3,746,690.30 -38.58 
Total canal water consumption (m3) 178,767.10 300,000.00 -40.41 
Total groundwater consumption (m3) 72,382.54 55,263.21 30.98 
Total water consumption (m3) 251,149.64 355,263.21 -29.31 
Capacity of water supply (m3) 301,000.00 301,000.00 0.00 
Gain from conjunctive water use (m3) -49,850.36 54,263.21 -191.87 
Total public investment (Yuan) 621.95 2,437.67 -74.49 
Switch point (location) 119.00 166.00 -28.31 
Canal water length(m) 5,950.00 8,300.00 -28.31 
Area irrigated by canal water (Mu) 1,785.00 2,490.00 -28.31 
Area irrigated by groundwater (Mu) 1,215.00 510.00 138.24 
Total private investment (Yuan) 90,075.76 13,911.23 547.50 
Notes:  HCW: It indicates the simultaneous high output and input price scenario, which is run 
under low soil permeability, endogenous public and private investment, 3 times high 
output price and 10 times high canal water price;  
HA:  It indicates the high output price scenario, which is run under low soil permeability, 
endogenous public and private investment and 3 times high output price.  
10.2.3 Impacts on social economy and water resource allocation at farm level 
Table 10.5 investigates the impacts on individual indicators of social economy 
and water resource allocation at farm level. Similar to the overall impacts in the 
previous table, most indicators of individual variables show negative 
performances as compared to scenario HA. The unit water demand on average 
decreases by 29.31% for AU, 16.88% for CWU, and 45.02% for GWU 
respectively. Average unit revenue and land rent also decline over all farmer 
categories. The water rents show considerable increase for AU and CWU, mainly 
thanks to a high canal water price, though canal water demand falls largely. 
However, the water rent for GWU decreases, since demand for groundwater 
decreases sharply and the price remains unchanged. High water costs drive more 
farmers to adopt more advanced water saving technology. Farmers start to invest 
earlier and invest more in the current scenario than in scenario HA. It is also 
shown, in the Table 10.4, that the unit private investment increases tremendously 
for all farmer categories. The significant increase of unit private investment 
suggests that more advanced irrigation technologies are adopted by farmers, as 
compared to scenario HA. With more private participation in water saving activity, 
public investment decreases. This result suggests again, in terms of absolute costs, 
the relationship between public and private investment is more substitutional 
rather than complementary.  
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Figure 10.2: Comparison of water consumption for CWU and GWU between simultaneous 
high output and input price scenario (HCW) and high output price scenario 
(HA) 
10.2.4 Comparison of some key indicators between simultaneous high output 
and input price scenario and high output price scenario  
The previous discussion of impacts of the price regime is based on static mean 
figures. Now we will compare some key indicators at different locations between 
the two scenarios spatially. Figure 10.2 compares water consumption between 
scenario HCW and HA. The diagram clearly shows that, at most parts the curve of 
water consumption in scenario HCW stays below that of scenario HA. In 
particular within CWU farmers, water consumption declines dramatically due to 
the high water price. After farmers switch to groundwater, water consumption 
becomes stable for GWU in scenario HCW, but the consumption volume is still 
much lower than that in scenario HA. This diagram demonstrates, that a high 
canal water price prevents farmers from taking much water. Compared to the 
previous scenario HA, farmers save more water in scenario HCW. Such 
performance can be a good quantitative example for government to design a water 
price-related policy. The price level should be set at a reasonable level, at which 
social welfare should not be damaged, and water resource can be better allocated.  
Figure 10.3 compares the different performances of private investment between 
the two scenarios. Thanks to high canal water costs, farmers in scenario HCW 
start very early, at location 46, to invest in water saving technology. However in 
scenario HA, farmers start to invest at location 66. Moreover, it is clearly shown 
in Figure 10.3, that the level of private investment in scenario HCW is much 
higher than that in scenario HA. As explained already, scenario HA is modeled  
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Figure 10.3: Comparison of private investment for CWU and GWU between simultaneous 
high output and input price scenario (HCW) and high output price scenario 
(HA)  
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Figure 10.4: Comparison of public investment for CWU and GWU between simultaneous 
high output and input price scenario (HCW) and high output price scenario 
(HA)  
under a high output price. Farmers in scenario HA undertake investment in water 
saving technology already, but with very low level, since they still can get cheap 
canal water and do not want to invest much in water saving. However the 
situation is changed in scenario HCW. Scenario HCW is modeled under the same 
high output price but also under a high water price. Farmers in this scenario have 
to invest more in water saving technology, since they need to lower their water 
costs. Moreover due to the high output price, it is possible for them to invest more 
in water saving technology. The model results strongly suggest: a high water price  
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is the most important incentive for farmers to invest in water saving technology, 
but only financial availability ensures such investment.  
Figure 10.4 further demonstrates the performance of public investment at different 
locations. In scenario HA, public investment is kept constant and a maximal level 
until location 166 occurs. This kind of level of public investment suggests a 
8300-meter-long canal with zero loss rate. Moreover in scenario HA, from water 
source on, high output prices bring high returns. Since the water price is still low 
at the upper area of the canal, farmers invest little money in water saving 
technology. However in scenario HCW, the canal water price sharply increases, 
and hence canal water irrigation becomes expensive and unprofitable. Such 
situation enforces farmers to go for groundwater earlier and adopt modern water 
saving technology. By doing so, they can lower their high costs of water. With 
more farmers going for groundwater and more private investment being made in 
water saving technology, public investment declines gradually over the irrigation 
area. Such a performance suggests again a kind of substituional relationship 
between the absolute costs of public and private investment. 
10.3 Summary 
This chapter discussed the changes in the social economy and water resource 
allocation by a price regime change. The output price was increased 3 times in 
both scenarios. Further in the high output and input price scenario (HCW), the 
input price of canal water was increased simultaneously by 10 times. Model 
results from both scenarios showed significant differences as compared to the 
previous work done in chapter 8 and 9. Private investment is now chosen by both 
scenarios, internally, without the help of an additional coefficient. Especially the 
high output and input price scenario (HCW) showed a significant improvement of 
water use efficiency as compared to the scenario with only output price 
increasing. The highest level of private investment in scenario HCW reaches a 
type of primary locally produced drip irrigation. These performances strongly 
suggest, that a high water price drives farmers to go for water saving technology, 
and moreover, sufficient financial credibility can promote such adoption.  
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11 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter summarizes the main findings of the study, draws the policy 
recommendations and raises questions for future research. 
11.1 Summary of the main results 
In order to deal with the water scarcity problem, public and private sectors have 
made tremendous efforts worldwide. The aim of this study is to provide policy 
makers with a theoretical and quantitative tool to manage public water supply and 
conveyance systems more efficiently and to support the optimal allocation of 
water for irrigation projects. Furthermore, the current situation and potential 
likelihood of adopting modern irrigation technology are taken into account for 
private individuals. 
To achieve the objectives of this study, a spatial mathematic model, SWAM, was 
designed to assess the impacts of public and private investment on social welfare 
and water resource allocation. By analyzing the different status of public and 
private investment in an irrigation project area, this study seeks specifically (1) To 
determine the optimum amounts of surface and groundwater consumption at 
different locations in an irrigation project. (2) To investigate the efficiency of 
water conveyance systems supported by public investment. (3) To investigate 
on-farm water use efficiency by analyzing the private investment undertaken. (4) 
To explore the relationship between public and private investment. (5) To analyze 
different impacts on social economy and water resource allocation by considering 
different amounts of public and private investment. 
11.1.1 Major findings of the field survey 
To fulfill the research target, a field survey was conducted in the cropping season 
of 2000/2001 in Liquan County, Shaanxi, China. A total of 149 farmers were 
interviewed about their agricultural production, socio-economic situation and 
participation in irrigation activities. Besides the interview with farmers, contact 
with key persons and technical staffs in water-related government organizations 
and institutions was also made. 
The results of the field survey described the major socio-economic situations of 
farm households in terms of demographic, resource endowments, education, 
production activities, credit markets, and sources of income, as well as 
participation in irrigation activities. All the interviewed farmers were divided into 
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eight categories based on irrigation technologies adopted. The eight categories 
were specified as Category A for farmers who apply flood irrigation, Category B 
for farmers who apply border irrigation, Category C for farmers who apply 
basin-check irrigation, Category D for farmers who apply seepage irrigation, 
Category E for farmers who apply sprinkler irrigation, Category F for farmers 
who apply drip irrigation, and Category G for farmers who apply dry land 
farming. All the field data were analyzed based on these farmer categories.  
The average family size ranges from 4.0 to 5.2 persons in the survey area. The 
average farm size varies from 6.5 Mu to 14.7 Mu per farm household. Farmers 
situated at the upper area of the canal have smaller farm sizes than those situated 
at downstream area, due to dense population at the upstream area. Landholding 
per person differs from different locations. Farmers at upstream own only 1.3 Mu 
per person on average. However, those located at the downstream can be up to 3.3 
Mu per person. The level of education, at a certain point, can influence the 
adoption of modern irrigation technology. The better-educated farmers are more 
likely to adopt modern irrigation technologies.  
The farming system in the survey area is dominated by apple production, which 
accounts for 79% of the farmland. The credit market in the survey area is not well 
developed. Small farm households have big barriers to access formal financial 
institutions. The main source of income for ordinary farmers is still agricultural 
production, and their main financial expenses are children’s education and health 
caring. Only few wealthy farm households go for irrigation equipment. 
The field survey also reveals that, modern irrigation technology can not only 
improve water use efficiency, but also improve crop quality. Farmers who apply 
modern sprinkler and drip irrigation techniques get the highest output level and 
selling price among all farmer categories. Those farmers who do dryland farming 
get the lowest returns. Modern irrigation technology users consume much less 
irrigation water than those using traditional techniques. The empirical data 
analysis unveiled the following findings: (1) Traditional surface irrigation still 
plays an important role in the survey area. (2) The water price becomes higher 
with the distance to the water source due to an increase of water conveyance 
costs. (3) Increasing water prices motivate farmers to adopt new water saving 
technologies. (4) Compared with imported irrigation technology, locally produced 
seepage irrigation technique under average conditions is more economic and 
practical for low-income farmers to save water, as compared to expensive 
imported technologies, in the survey area. 
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11.1.2 Model and simulation results 
The methodological objective of the study was to build a comprehensive 
modeling framework. A spatial water allocation model (SWAM) was designed. 
The framework contains two packages. One is an econometric model using 
regression methods (SPSS). The other is a mathematical programming model 
employing the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). The employed 
farming system in the survey area is fairly typical for current commercial 
agricultural production in rural China. The natural conditions of agricultural 
activities, such as soil quality, climate, etc., are assumed constant and excluded, 
whereas the heterogeneity of location along the public canal was given priority in 
the optimization. The model's usefulness is, therefore, not regionally confined.  
To deal with the econometric model, Hotelling’s Lemma is applied to obtain a net 
revenue function by integrating an inverse water demand function. Furthermore, 
the on-farm water use efficiency function, the water loss function, and the 
functions for the canal water price and the groundwater price have been estimated 
by using regression methods. These functions served as key components in the 
programming model. 
To deal with the programming model, an objective function and several 
constraints were incorporated. The objective function was formulated in a way to 
maximize the social welfare (related to producer surplus) in the survey area by 
focusing on efficient use of water. The optimization of social welfare was 
investigated by considering the water related net revenue of the survey area minus 
the expenditure on water conservation and other water related costs. The 
constraints include the on-farm water use efficiency function, the canal water loss 
function and equations of motion on water movement. In particular, the equations 
of motion are the most important constraints in the spatial model. Due to the high 
non-linear characteristics of the objective function and constraints, the model was 
solved by using Conopt (GAMS solver) and Minos (GAMS solver), together.  
Three sets of scenarios were designed to test impacts of different policy 
orientations. Firstly we focus on impacts of public investment status change. 
Secondly we focus on impacts of distribution of private investment. At last, we 
explore the impacts of a price regime change.  
To measure the impacts of public investment status change, the model was run 
based on endogenous and exogenous public investment, respectively. The 
endogenous private and public investment scenario, namely optimal public 
investment scenario, suggest an optimal solution for an irrigation area, which also 
provides a base run model for the further scenario analysis. The model results 
showed that private investment was chosen to be zero in this scenario due to its 
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high costs, but public investment was kept at a maximal level to ensure a 
zero-loss rate in the water conveyance system. The canal water flow can reach 
location 164, i.e., 8200m without water loss via transport. However, when public 
investment becomes exogenously in the model, i.e., if public investment is 
removed from the water conveyance system, the model results showed 
considerable different consequence according to different soil conditions. If the 
soil permeability, i.e., recharge rate for groundwater, is low, a removal of public 
investment will largely damage the social welfare and water resource allocation. 
The aggregate social welfare decreases by 42.48% as compared to a system with 
optimal public investment (the base run model). This removal will reduce the total 
water consumption by 54.41%, since water is largely lost via the poorly operated 
canal system, simultaneously the groundwater stock cannot get sufficiently 
recharged. The canal water length can only reach location 37, i.e., 1850m, in line 
with the area irrigated by canal water shrinking sharply by 77.44% as compared to 
the system with optimal public investment. If the soil permeability is very high, 
the model results suggest that a removal of public investment will slightly decline 
the social welfare and water resource allocation as compared to a well-managed 
public canal system. Social welfare decreased only by 0.29%. Total water 
consumption increased by 23.06%, mainly attributed to groundwater 
consumption, thanks to a high seepage rate. The canal water length becomes even 
shorter, reaching only location 31, 1550m. Sufficient groundwater compensates 
the canal water shortage. By analyzing the impacts of status of public investment, 
our model results indicate that public investment will always function positively 
in an irrigation system, and will do especially well in a system under low soil 
permeability. On the other hand, its impacts on social welfare and water resource 
allocation are smaller under high soil permeability.  
The impacts of public investment have been discussed above, but the role private 
investment plays, is not concerned much (it was chosen to be zero endogenously 
by the model due to its high costs). To avoid this limitation, we extended the 
initial model by introducing an additional coefficient for private investment 
(namely c3) to help model the performance of private investment. The coefficient 
c3 is achieved by estimating a function of scaled private investment over 
distances. There are two advantages to employ the coefficient c3. One is that, the 
model becomes capable to deal with private investment. This indicates, that the 
private investment in irrigation technology is able to vary over space instead of 
being held zero as did in the public investment policy scenarios, so that the 
impacts of public and private investment on social welfare and water resource 
allocation can be modeled simultaneously The other advantage is a nearly real 
situation and other different policy orientations can be modelled by changing the 
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order of c3. For instance, a nearly real situation indicates that the distribution of 
irrigation technology centers at the upper area of the canal, since normally 
wealthier farmers are situated in this area due to the access to cheap canal water, 
and they are likely to afford the costly irrigation technology. In this case the 
coefficient c3 enters into the model in a normal order, i.e., an ascending order. As 
regards a situation of a potential requirement of government intervention, the 
model distributes irrigation technology at the downstream area where poor 
farmers gather. In this case, c3 is in a reverse order, i.e. a descending order. At last, 
a situation of government promotion based again on factual condition, i.e. c3 
enters in a normal order, was modeled. Under this situation, a deliberately fixed 
irrigation technology was allocated over the whole irrigation area.  
The model results of all the three scenarios suggest that, the different distributions 
of irrigation technology will change water resource allocation. When irrigation 
technology centres at the upper area, upstream farmers consume the smallest 
amount of water. Moreover, more water in the canal becomes available for 
downstream farmers. As suggested in the previous base run model, i.e., the 
optimal public investment scenario, which is without participation of private 
investment, the longest canal water length could be up to location 164, but it can 
be extended up to location 174 in the modeled nearly real situation scenario. 
These results support the complementary relationship between public and private 
investment in terms of effects on water efficiency.  
When irrigation technology is allocated at the downstream area, which is molded 
as a potential requirement of government intervention, the social welfare is 
slightly increased with a growth of 3.6% in comparison to the nearly real situation, 
in which farmers adopt the irrigation technology at upper stream area. The 
average on-farm water use efficiency is increased from 0.58 to 0.62. But the 
required private investment reaches up to 219,114 Yuan, which is an increase by 
58.24%, as compared to the nearly real situation. However, with private 
investment soaring, public investment in the conveyance system is reduced much. 
Excluding social welfare and on-farm water use efficiency, the indicators of 
revenue, land rent and water rent are worse off as compared to situation that 
technology centers at the upstream area. For instance, in the downstream area, 
land rents for some farmers become negative if they invest in modern irrigation 
technology. Such kinds of model results strongly suggest that irrigation 
technology adopted in the downstream area will significantly increase the on-farm 
water use efficiency, but a government subsidy for supporting poor farmers to 
adopt modern irrigation technology is potentially required.  
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When one fixed type irrigation technology is allocated over the entire area, which 
is an assumption of a government promotion of one fixed type irrigation 
technology situation. The model results indicate that the impacts on social welfare 
and water resource allocation are negative. If a relatively strong and fixed water 
saving irrigation technology (100 Yuan/Mu annually) is adopted over all locations 
without considering different location’s conditions, farmers loose. The social 
welfare will decrease by 73.72% in comparison to a system with a varied 
irrigation technology (nearly real situation scenario). Indicators, such as water 
consumption, revenue, land rent and water rent, decrease strongly too by 22.78%, 
14.6%, 28.45% and 35.74%, respectively. However, the effect of water saving in 
the irrigation area is significant. It is improved due to the considerable 
contribution of water saving technology and a well-managed canal system. The 
on-farm water use efficiency increases by 21.52% as compared to the nearly real 
situation. But the expenditures are too high to afford, either by farmers or by 
government.  
The model results of the three distributions of irrigation technology suggest that 
an optimal solution can be achieved if different technologies at different locations 
rather than going for one fixed type technology are adopted. This will not only 
reduce total costs, but also ensure social welfare and better water use efficiency.  
Under the extended optimization model, the impacts of public investment were 
investigated, too. They are designed by removing the public investment from the 
water conveyance system under different soil permeability. The models showed 
similar results as they did under the initial optimal model. That is: Public 
investment will improve social welfare and ensure water use efficiency a lot under 
low soil permeability instead of high soil permeability.  
At last the model assesses the impacts of price regime change. When the output 
price is raised by 3 times, the model results suggest a huge increase of social 
welfare as compared to the lower output price. A remarkable change is that private 
investments are chosen by the model, internally, without the help of an additional 
coefficient. This result indicates that farmers will actively adopt modern irrigation 
technology, if they can afford the costs.  
Further, by keeping the high output price, the model additionally increased input 
(the canal water) price by 10 times. A significant change is that, more farmers 
adopt modern irrigation technologies, and a more advanced technology level is 
found in this scenario, as compared to the previous one merely with output price 
change. These performances strongly suggest that a high water price drives 
farmers to go for water saving technologies, and moreover, sufficient financial 
credibility can drive such adoption activity.  
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11.2 Policy recommendations 
Based on the model and simulation results, the following policy recommendations 
can be made:  
(1) Public investment plays a very important role in water saving activities. This 
result suggests that government should make more efforts to improve water 
use efficiency, either in water generation or conveyance systems. Public 
investment in water conveyance system will do better under low soil 
permeability rather than high soil permeability. Under such a condition, an 
irrigation project should be rejected if it would be constructed under high soil 
permeability.  
(2) The study unveils a relationship of combination between public and private 
investment. With regard to effects of water efficiency, they are complementary. 
On the one side, a well managed canal system will reduce water losses in 
water conveyance systems. It therefore lowers the water costs for farmers so 
that they could have more financial possibilities to adopt modern irrigation 
technology. On the other side, broadly adopted modern irrigation technologies 
by farmers will leave more water in the canal, so that more farmers can 
benefit from public water conveyance systems. Consequently the overall 
water efficiency will get improved. Concerning absolute costs of public and 
private investment, they show a more substitutional relationship. One 
investment increasing will lead to the other decreasing. Considering the 
vulnerable economic situation of Chinese farmers, it may be rational to let the 
government do more to improve water use efficiency rather than individual 
farmers. What the government could do is not only to improve the water 
conveyance system, but also to assist farmers to finance modern irrigation 
technologies. By doing this, the overall water use efficiency will be improved. 
However, due to substiutional relationship, in terms of absolute costs, this 
may not be a big burden for the public budget. 
(3) A high water price is the biggest incentive for farmers to adopt modern water 
saving technology. For government, it is very crucial to set a reasonable water 
price level. Such a price level should be able to encourage farmers to adopt 
water saving technology, and not to do damage to farmers interests. 
11.3 Research questions for future work 
The presented study could not address all of the important issues as related to 
social welfare and water resource allocation. There is more work for future 
research.  
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The SWAM model of the present study is actually a static spatial programming 
model, in which the dynamic approach was used to model water movement along 
the canal within one time period. No time lag is considered while recharge to the 
groundwater aquifer emerging in the present study. Furthermore, the movements 
of private and public investment were simulated statically too. A meaningful 
future work can be centered round the movement of water and investments over 
time and location changing simultaneously.    
Another limitation of the study is that labor costs are not concerned in the 
optimization model. Labor costs are a very important input element in agricultural 
production. An effort has been made to model a labor response function. But, as 
mentioned already, the bad harvest year resulted in a low revenue function. The 
model results suggested zero costs for labor. This problem could be solved either 
by getting a better revenue function, or employing a coefficient for labor. Due to 
limitations in the research scope, this work should be done in future 
investigations. 
The current study investigated canal water and groundwater utilizations. For canal 
water, a cost concept is clear enough. For groundwater it becomes tricky. Though 
sufficient groundwater can compensate water shortages, it is with high costs (due 
to limitation of data, groundwater costs have not been fully calculated in the 
present study, that is why the model suggests less disadvantage from groundwater 
taken). For example, pumping costs are not concerned in the current study for 
simplification. It is specified as electricity costs rather than real pumping costs. 
The electricity costs are merely responsive to volume of water extraction rather 
than the cost of construction of water wells. The real situation could be further 
complicated due to different well depths. In reality, this means if more farmers go 
for groundwater, it could worsen the social welfare very much as compared to 
what the model suggested currently.  
Finally the investigation is made based on a field survey. The modelled area is 
still relatively small. By enlarging the irrigation area, the model could be more 
broadly used for some bigger irrigation projects. Further more, this study is 
carried out by investigating a single crop pattern to simplify the model. 
Multi-cropping patterns can also be incorporated in future work.  
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG (GERMAN SUMMARY) 
Auswirkungen einer effizienten Wasserallokation auf  Wohlfahrt und die 
Ressource Wasser in Nord-West China: eine raumbezogene Modellanalyse 
Problemstellung und Zielsetzung 
Um Probleme der Wasserknappheit lösen zu können, haben sowohl private 
Unternehmen als auch der öffentliche Sektor weltweit enorme Bemühungen 
unternommen. 
Das Ziel dieser Studie ist es, mit Hilfe eines theoretisch-quantitaiven Instruments, 
die öffentliche Wasserversorgung und ein Bewässerungssystem effizienter zu 
gestalten sowohl eine optimale Allokation der Bewässerungsprojekte zu 
erreichen, um damit politischen Entscheidungsträgern eine Hilfestellung zu 
geben. Des weiteren werden die aktuelle Situation und die potenzielle 
Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Einführung von modernen Bewässerungstechnologien 
bei privaten Bauern berücksichtigt. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen wurde ein 
dynamisch-mathematisches Modell entwickelt, um die Einflüsse von öffentlichen 
und privaten Investitionen auf die Wohlfahrt und die Wasserallokation 
abzuschätzen. Durch eine Analyse der Wirkungen von öffentlichen und privaten 
Investitionen in einer Beispielregion mit Bewässerungslandwirtschaft soll diese 
Studie insbesondere 1) den optimalen Verbrauch von Grund- und 
Oberflächenwasser an verschiedenen Stellen eines Bewässerungsprojektes 
ermitteln, 2) die Effizienz von Bewässerungssystemen untersuchen, die aus 
öffentlichen Geldern gefördert werden, 3) die Effizienz des Wasserverbrauchs bei 
Betrieben untersuchen, indem die privaten Investitionen auf diesem Gebiet 
analysiert werden, 4) die Beziehung zwischen öffentlichen und privaten 
Investitionen erforscht werden und 5) die Auswirkungen auf die Sozio-Ökonomie 
und die Wasserallokation analysieren, werden unter Berücksichtigung der Höhe 
der öffentlichen und privaten Investitionen. 
Modell- und Simulationsergebnissen 
Um die Forschungsziele erreichen zu können, wurden Feldforschungen in der 
Vegetatious Periode in den Jahren 2000 / 2001 in den Gebieten Liquan Country, 
Shaanxi, China durchgeführt. Insgesamt wurden 149 Landwirte interviewt, die 
Angaben zu den folgenden Themenbereichen gemacht haben: Eigene 
Agrarpoduktion, sozial-ökonomische Situation, und Beteiligung der Landwirte an 
Bewässerungsmaßzahme.  Außerdem  wurden  zusätzliche  Kontakte zu den  
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wichtigsten fachlich ausgebildeten Personen,  die in den staatlichen Institutionen 
für Wasser zuständig sind, hergestellt. 
Die Ergebnisse der Feldforschung beschreiben die Bedeutung der 
sozioökonomischen Situation der landwirtschaftlichen Haushalte im Hinblick 
Demographie, Ressourcenausstattung, Bildung, Produktionsaktivität, Kreditmarkt 
und der Einkommensquelle sowie deren Beteiligung an Bewässerungsaktivitäten. 
Die empirische Analyse hat zu den folgenden Ergebnissen geführt: (1) Die 
traditionelle Flächenbewässerung spielt in dem analysierten Gebiet immer noch 
eine wichtige Rolle. (2) Der Wasserpreis ist um so höher, je weiter man von der 
Quelle für Wasser entfernt ist, da damit die Wasserförderungskosten steigen. (3) 
Ein steigender Wasserpreis führt dazu, dass Landwirte eher bereit sind in neue 
Bewässerungstechnologien zu investieren. (4) Die vor Ort entwickelte 
Bewässerungstechnologie ist für Farmer mit wenig Einkommen billiger, einfacher 
und effizienter als importierte Bewässerungstechnologien.  
Das Ziel der Arbeit war es sodann, einen umfassenden Modellrahmen für eine 
Bewässerungsgebiet zu entwickeln, und eine sogenanntes raumbezogenes 
Wasserallokationsmodell (SWAM) zu etablieren. Der Rahmen besteht aus zwei 
Bereichen: Der eine Bereich ist ein ökonometrisches Modell, das 
Regressionsmethoden benutzt (SPSS). Der zweite Bereich ist ein mathematische 
Programmierungsmodell GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System).  
Das untersuchte  Farmingsystem in der Beispielregion ist typisch für die aktuelle 
kommerzielle Agrarproduktion im ländlichen China. Die natürlichen 
Bedingungen für Agraraktivitäten, wie z.B. Bodenqualität, Klimabedingungen 
usw., sind als konstant und angenommen. Hingegen wurde Heterogenität der 
Standorte entlang eines öffentlichen Kanals Priorität beigemessen. Die 
Nutzbarkeit des Modelles ist dadurch  regional nicht begrenzt. 
Mit Hilfe der Anwendung eines ökonometrischen Modells (Hotelling´s Lemma), 
wird eine netto Erlösfunktion in eine inversen Wassernachfrage integriert und 
ermittelt. Die On-Farm Wassereffizienzfunktion, Wasserverlustfunktion, und die 
Preisfunktion für das Kanalwasser und der Grundwasser sind mit 
Regressionsmethoden geschätzt worden.  Diese Funktionen dienen als 
Schlüsselkomponenten in einem räumlichen,  dynamisch-mathematischen 
Model. 
In diesem Programmierungsmodell sind eine Zielfunktion und  mehrere 
Beschränkungen enthalten. Mit der Zielfunktion wird die Wohlfahrt 
(Produzentenrente) im Untersuchungsgebiet maximiert, wobei der Fokus auf der 
effizienten Wassernutzung lag.  
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Die Optimierung der Wohlfahrt wurde untersucht, indem von wasserbezogenen 
Einkünften im Untersuchungsgebiet die Ausgaben für Wasserbeschaffung und 
andere wasserbezogene Ausgaben abgezogen wurden. Die Restriktion enthält 
auch die On-Farm Wassernutzungseffizeinzfunktion, die Wasserverlustfunktion 
und die Funktionen für die „Beförderung“ von Wasser. Letztere Funktionen sind 
die wichtigsten Restriktionen für das räumliche Modell. Aufgrund der hohen 
Nicht-Liniaritäts-Characteristika der Zielfunktion und der Nebenbedingungen, 
musste zur Lösung dieses Problems Conopt (GAMS solver) und Minor (GAMS 
solver) benutzt werden. 
Die erste Gruppe von Szenarien fokussiert auf den Einfluss der öffentlichen 
Investitionen auf die soziale Wohlfahrt.  Die zweite Gruppe der Szenarien  hat 
die Verteilung der privaten Investitionen als Gegenstand. Die drite Gruppe der 
Szenarien untersucht die Auswirkungen eines Preisregimewechsels. 
Der Einfluss der öffentlichen Investitionen werden in drei einzelnen Szenarien 
untersucht.  Im ersten Szenario sind die optimalen öffentlichen Investitionen 
endogen. Die letzten beiden Szenarien werden mit zwei unterschiedlichen 
Bodeneigenschaften betrachtet, wobei die öffentlichen Investitionen hier exogen 
sind. Die Modellergebnisse zeigen,  dass bei niedriger Bodendurchlässigkeit von 
Wasser nicht getätigten bei öffentlichen Investitionen die augregierte Wohlfahrt 
um 42 % sinken würde im Vergleich zu einer optimalen öffentlichen Investition. 
In Gebieten, die durch einen Kanal bewässert werden, kommt es zu einem starken 
Rückgang des Wasserverbrauchs in Höhe von 77%. Weiterhin wird deutlich, dass 
die Wohlfahrt und Wasserallokation kaum sinkt im Vergleich zum öffentlichem 
Kanalsystem, wenn die Bodendurchlässigkeit hoch ist. Die Wohlfahrt sinkt 
lediglich um 0,3%. Die Modellergebnisse verdeutlichen, dass die öffentlichen 
Investitionen in das Bewässerungssystem immer einen positiven Effekt auf die 
Wasserallokation haben, speziell unter der Annahme, dass eine niedrige 
Bodendurchlässigkeit angenommen wird. 
In der zweite Gruppe von Szenarien werden die Investitionen in das Zentrum der 
Betrachtungen gestellt. Insbesondere wurden die Verteilungswirkungen der 
verschiedenen, räumlich angewendeten Bewässerungstechnologien ermittelt. Ein 
ergänzender Koeffizient c3 ist für die privaten Investitionen in das erweiterte 
Optimierungsmodell eingeführt worden. Dieser Koeffizient resultiert aus einer 
geschätzten Funktion der tatsachlichen skalierten, räumlich anfallenden, privaten 
Investitionen. Bei dieser Methode können die privaten Investitionen in der 
Zielfunktion im Gegensatz zum Ausgangsmodell,  wo die privaten Investitionen 
Null sind, variieren. Ein weiterer Vorteil aus der Verwendung des Koeffizienten c3 
ist, dass sowohl die reale Situation, als auch verschiedene Politikmaßnahmen 
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durch Veränderungen des Koeffizienten c3 modelliert werden können. Drei 
unterschiedliche lokale Anwendungen in Abhängigkeit von der Entfernung zur 
Wasserquelle der verschiedene Bewässerungstechnologien sind durch die 
Veränderung des Koeffizienten c3 erklärbar. 
Wenn c3 einen steigenden Verlauf aufweist, so modellieren wir eine realitätsnahe 
Situation. Unter diesen Bedingungen werden die Landwirte im oberen Teil des 
Kanals die moderne Bewässerungstechnologie anwenden. 
Wenn dieser Koeffizient absteigend verläuft, so modellieren wir eine Situation, in 
der eine staatliche Intervention vorgenommen werden sollte bzw. öffentliche 
Investitionen nicht nur für die Beförderung des Wassers, sondern auch für die 
moderne Bewässerungstechnologie verwendet werden sollten. Unter diesen 
Bedingungen werden die Landwirte im unteren Bereich des Kanals die moderne 
Bewässerungstechnologie anwenden. 
Im letzten Fall modellieren wir eine staatliche Förderung für nur eine 
Bewässerungstechnologie in dem gesamten betrachteten Gebiet.  
Die Modellergebnisse suggerieren, dass die unterschiedlichen 
Bewässerungstechnologien einen Einfluss auf die Wasserallokation haben. 
Weiterhin wird deutlich, dass eine optimale Lösung erreicht werden kann, wenn 
unterschiedliche Technologien in unterschiedlicher Entfernung von der 
Wasserquelle eingesetzt werden. Dies führt nicht nur Senkung der Kosten, 
sondern sichert auch die Wohlfahrt und steigert die Wassereffizienz.  
Mit dem erweitern Modell modellieren wir auch die Effekte der öffentlichen 
Investitionen. Die Modellergebnisse dieser Szenariengruppe zeigen, dass die 
Effekte der öffentlichen Investitionen ähnlich wie in der ersten Szenariengruppe 
ausfallen. D.h. öffentliche Investitionen werden die Wohlfahrt und die 
Wassereffizienz stärker bei einer niedrigen  Bodendurchlässigkeit erhöhen, als 
bei einer höheren Bodendurchlässigkeit. 
In der letzten Szenariengruppe werden die  Effekte von Veränderungen des 
Preisregimes analysiert. Es wird ein drei mal höher Outputpreis angenommen, 
was natürlich mit einem Wohlfahrtanstieg einhergeht. Dieser Preis wurde gewählt, 
weil sich die ursprüngliche Analyse auf ein Jahr mit schlechtem Apfelpreis bezog 
und untersucht wedern sollte, was geschieht, wenn der Apfelpreis höher wäre. 
Das erste Szenario dieser Gruppe veranschaulicht, dass die Farmer bereit sind, 
moderne Bewässerungstechnologien einzusetzen, wenn die Kosten durch hohe 
Preise gedeckt sind. 
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In dem zweiten Szenario wird ebenfalls ein verdreifachter Outputpreis 
angenommen bei einer gleichzeitigen Verzehnfachung der Wasserpreise. Dies 
führt zu signifikanten Veränderungen, bei dem deutlich mehr Landwirte moderne 
Bewässerungstechnologien  anwenden.  
Diese Ausführungen zeigen eindeutig, dass ein hoher Wasserpreis Landwirte zu 
einem Wechsel zu wassersparenden Technologien veranlasst.  Eine ausreichende 
finanzielle Kreditsicherung kann diese Tendenz weiter unterstützen. 
Diskussionspunkte und Empfehlungen 
In dieser Arbeit sind mehrere Punkte zu diskutieren.  
Diese Studie analysiert die Beziehungen zwischen öffentlichen und privaten 
Investitionen. In Bezug auf die Wassereffizienz ergänzen sich öffentliche und 
private Investitionen. D. h. ein gut organisiertes Kanalsystem kann den 
Wasserverlust reduzieren. Dies führt dazu, dass die Kosten der Farmer für den 
Wassereinsatz sinken und damit einen größeren Spielraum für die Einführung 
moderner Bewässerungstechnologien haben. Die Einführung moderner 
Bewässerungstechnologien führt dazu, dass in den Kanälen mehr Wasser zur 
Verfügung steht, so dass mehr Landwirte eine Rente aus dem öffentlich 
bereitgestelltem Wasserangebot (Kanal) realisieren können. 
Betrachtet man die absoluten Kosten der privaten und öffentlichen Investitionen, 
so  zeigt die Studie, dass hier eine substitutive Beziehung vorliegt.  
Setzt man eine schlechte ökonomische Situation der chinesischen Farmer voraus, 
so macht es Sinn, dass der chinesische Staat die Landwirte durch öffentliche 
Investitionen in Bewässerungsanlage unterstützt. Eine Unterstützung seitens des 
Staates verbessert die Wassereffizienz. Mehr noch, eine Unterstützung in dieser 
Form führt langfristig zu einer höher sozial Wohlfahrt. Die öffentlichen 
Investitionen spielen auch bei der Sicherung der Wasservorräte eine wichtige 
Rolle.  
Dieses Ergebnis suggeriert, dass der Staat durch seine Unterstützung die 
Wassereffizienz verbessern kann: sowohl bei der Wasser-Bereitstellung als auch 
bei den Durchleitungssystemen. Nur bei sehr durchlässigen Böden sollten keine 
öffentliche Investitionen in das Kanalsystem vorgenommen werden. 
Wichtigster Anreiz für die Landwirte, moderne Bewässerungstechnologien 
einsetzen, ist  ein hoher Wasserpreis. Für den Staat ist es damit besonders 
wichtig, ein vernünftiges Wasserpreisniveau festzusetzen. Solch ein Preisniveau 
sollte die Farmer zur Anwendung von moderner Bewässerungstechnologie 
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ermutigen. Wird der Wasserpreis jedoch zu hoch festgelegt, so werden in erster 
Linie die Einkünfte der Landwirte sinken.  
Forschungsausblick  
Die Studie kann nicht alle wichtigen Fragen in diesem Themengebiet 
beantworten. Im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit stehen die Wohlfahrtseffekte und die 
optimale Wasserressourcenallokation. Darüber hinaus besteht noch ein 
umfangreicher Forschungsbedarf. 
Das hier präsentierte SWAM-Modell ist ein statisches Analyseverfahren, ein 
dynamischer Ansatz wurde lediglich zur Abbildung des Wasserverlaufs innerhalb 
einer Zeitperiode angewandt. Statisch simuliert wurden auch private und 
öffentliche Investitionen. Eine sinnvolle zukünftige Arbeit wäre daher die 
dynamische Darstellung des Verlaufes von Wasser und Investitionen in Zeit und 
Raum. 
Die Arbeitskosten spielen hier eine wichtige Rolle, da diese als Inputkosten in die 
landwirtschaftliche Produktionsfunktion eingehen. Die Auswirkungen 
variierender  Arbeitskosten werden in dieser Studie nicht explizit untersucht. 
Hier wäre die Entwicklung eines Modells zur Abbildung des Arbeitsmarktes bzw. 
der Arbeitsangebotsfunktion wünschenswert. Eine weitere Verbesserung des 
Modells könnte erreicht werden, wenn eine bessere Abschätzung der 
Ertragsfunktion vorliegen würde oder in dem Modell ein 
Beschäftigungskoeffizient für den Arbeitseinsatz berücksichtigt werden könnte. 
 
Die aktuelle Studie erforscht die Nutzung von Kanal- und Grundwasser. Die 
Kosten des Kanalwassers sind eindeutig ermittelbar. Die tatsächlichen 
Grundwasserkosten sind hingegen schwierig zu kalkulieren. Beispielsweise sind 
die Pumpkosten für Grundwasser in der aktuellen Studie nicht explizit enthalten 
in Abhängigkeit von der Tiefe der Brunnen. Diese Kosten sind nur als 
Elektrizitätskosten berücksichtigt worden. Das Modell kann die Realität nur 
bedingt abbilden. In der Realität werden die Farmer das Grundwasser nutzen und 
die Wohlfahrt wird schlechter ausfallen, als dies im Modell dargestellt ist. 
Letztlich steht diese Studie eine Fallstudie in einem kleinen Gebiet dar. Das 
Modell ist relativ klein und es wurde zur Vereinfachung eine  
„ein-Produkt-Region“  gewählt. Dennoch ist die Übertragbarkeit des Modells 
auch für größere Bewässerungsprojekte gegeben. 
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APPENDICES: 
Appendix 1 Spatial Water Allocation Model in GAMS format for a 
small irrigation area in Northwestern China 
Sets 
J    location /1*200/ 
Jfirst(j)   first location 
Jlast(j)   last location; 
Jfirst(j)  =  yes$(ord(j) eq 1); 
Jlast(j)   = yes$(ord(j) eq CARD(j)); 
 
Scalars 
Beta    recharge rate to groundwater stock /0.3/ 
cw0    stock of canal water at source /300000/ 
gw0    groundwater stock at water source /1000/ 
 
Parameters 
c0(j)    constant term from water demand function 
c1(j)    coefficient of water demand 
c2(j) coefficient of water demand and investment in irrigation 
technology 
c3(j)    coefficient of private investment over space 
e0(j)    coefficient of water base use efficiency  
e1(j)    coefficient of investment in irrigation technology 
e2(j) coefficient of investment of square form in irrigation 
technology 
r0(j)    coefficient of public investment in canal 
r1(j)    coefficient of public investment of square form in canal 
r2(j)    coefficient of water base loss rate  
cwp(j)    canal water price at location j 
gwp(j)    groundwater price at location j; 
 
c0("1")= 11.83; 
c1("1")= -0.07; 
c2("1")= -0.01; 
e0("1")= 0.48; 
e1("1")= 0.0025; 
e2("1")= -2.936E-6; 
r0("1")= -0.000405; 
APPENDIX 
 
196
r1("1")= 5.25E-7; 
r2("1")= 0.074; 
loop (j,c0(j+1)= c0(j)); 
loop (j,c1(j+1)= c1(j)); 
loop (j,c2(j+1)= c2(j)); 
c3(j)=0.045*1.028**ord(j); 
loop (j,e0(j+1)= e0(j)); 
loop (j,e1(j+1)= e1(j)); 
loop (j,e2(j+1)= e2(j)) 
loop (j,r0(j+1)= r0(j)); 
loop (j,r1(j+1)= r1(j)); 
loop (j,r2(j+1)= r2(j)); 
cwp(j)= 0.13+0.0071*ord(j)-4.5E-06*ord(j)**2; 
gwp(j)= 0.475+0.006*ord(j)-8.698E-06*ord(j)**2; 
display c0, c1, c2, c3, e0, e1, r0, r1, cwp, gwp; 
 
Variables 
cw(j)    canal water demand at j 
gw(j)    groundwater demand at j 
crem(j) canal water remaining at location j and can be used for next 
farmer at location j+1 
grem(j) groundwater remaining at location j and can be used for next 
farmer at location j+1 
sw     social welfare of the project area 
h(j)    coefficient of water use efficiency at location j 
a(j)     canal water loss rate at location j 
k(j)    investment in public canal at location j 
I(j)     investment in irrigation technology at location j 
tcw    canal water demand over the project area 
tgw    groundwater demand over the project area 
ttw     total water demand over the project area 
tw(j)    canal water and groundwater demand at location j 
la(j)    land rent at location j 
wr(j)    water rent at location j 
nr(j)    net revenue from apple production; 
 
Positive variables 
h(j), tcw, tgw, k(j), cw(j), gw(j), tw(j), crem(j), grem(j), a(j), nr(j); 
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Equations 
Eobj    objective function 
Ecrem1(j) equation for canal water remains at the first location and can 
be used for the second location 
Ecrem(j) equation for canal water remains at location j and can be used 
for next location j+1 
Egrem1(j) equation for groundwater remains at the first location and can 
be used for the second location 
Egrem(j) equation for groundwater remains at location j and can be used 
for next location j+1 
Etcw    canal water demand over the project area 
Etgw    groundwater demand over the project area 
Ettw    total water demand over the project area 
Etw(j)    canal water and groundwater demand at location j 
Eh(j)    equation for water use efficiency in farmer's field at location j 
Ea(j)    equation for canal water loss rate reduction at location j 
Ela(j)    equation for land rent at location j 
Ewr(j)    equation for water rent at location j 
Enr(j)    equation for net revenue at location j; 
 
*without c3 to private investment 
Eobj.. 
SW=E= 
sum(j,15*(c0(j)*(tw(j)*h(j))+c1(j)*sqr(tw(j)*h(j))+c2(j)*I(j)*(tw(j)*h(j)))-0.05*k
(j)-15*I(j)-15*cwp(j)*cw(j)-15*gwp(j)*gw(j)); 
 
*with c3 to I 
*Eobj.. 
SW=E= 
sum(j,c0(j)*(tw(j)*h(j))+c1(j)*sqr(tw(j)*h(j))+c2(j)*c3(j)*I(j)*(tw(j)*h(j)-0.05*k(
j)-c3(j)*I(j)-cwp(j)*cw(j)-gwp(j)*gw(j)); 
Etcw.. 
tcw=e= sum (j,15*cw(j)); 
Etgw.. 
tgw=e= sum (j,15*gw(j)); 
Etw(j).. 
tw(j)=e= cw(j)+gw(j); 
Ettw.. 
ttw=e=tcw+tgw; 
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Ecrem1(j)$(ord(j)eq 1).. 
crem(j)=l=cw0-15*cw(j); 
Ecrem(j)$(ord(j)gt 1).. 
crem(j)=e=(1-a(j-1))*crem(j-1)-15*cw(j); 
Egrem1(j)$(ord(j)eq 1).. 
grem(j)=e=gw0+ beta*(1-h(j))*15*tw(j)-15*gw(j); 
Egrem(j)$(ord(j)gt 1).. 
grem(j)=e=grem(j-1)+beta*a(j-1)*crem(j-1)-15*gw(j)+ beta*(1-h(j))*15*tw(j); 
Eh(j).. 
h(j) =l= e0(j)+e1(j)*I(j)+e2(j)*sqr(I(j)); 
Ea(j).. 
a(j)=e= r0(j)*k(j)+r1(j)*sqr(K(j))+r2(j); 
Ela(j).. 
la(j)=e=c0(j)*(tw(j)*h(j))+c1(j)*sqr(tw(j)*h(j))+c2(j)*I(j)*(tw(j)*h(j))- 
cwp(j)*cw(j)-gwp(j)*gw(j)-I(j); 
Ewr(j).. 
wr(j)=e= cwp(j)*cw(j)+gwp(j)*gw(j)-0.05*1/15*k(j); 
Enr(j).. 
nr(j)=e= c0(j)*(tw(j)*h(j))+c1(j)*sqr(tw(j)*h(j))+c2(j)*I(j)*(tw(j)*h(j)); 
 
*Scaling and bounds 
Egrem.scale(j)=1e3; 
Ecrem.scale(j)=1e4; 
crem.scale(j)=1e5; 
Eobj.scale=1e3; 
cw.lo(j)=0; 
gw.lo(j)=0; 
I.lo(j)=0; 
tw.lo(j)=20; 
h.up(j)=.95; 
h.lo(j)=0.01; 
a.up(j)= .80; 
a.lo(j)=0; 
a.l(j) = 0.1; 
cw.l(j) = 50; 
crem.l(j) = 5000; 
gw.l(j) = 50; 
tw.l(j) = 100; 
h.l(j) = 0.5; 
grem.l(j) = 1000; 
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model water /all/; 
water.scaleopt=1; 
option iterlim=100000; 
option nlp=conopt2; 
solve water using nlp maximizing sw; 
option nlp=minos; 
solve water using nlp maximizing sw; 
display w.l, gw.l, I.l, crem.l, grem.l, tcw.l, h.l, tcw.l, tgw.l, tw.l, k.l, a.l, la.l, wr.l, 
nr.l, sw.l; 
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